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

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

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THE BURDEN OF UNEMPLOYMENT

A STUDY OF UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF MEASURES IN FIFTEEN AMERICAN CITIES, 1921–22

BY
PHILIP KLEIN

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PREFACE

THE prevention of unemployment would seem to be a matter exceeding the power not only of a single firm, industry, or group of industries, but even of all industries—unless, indeed, transportation, agriculture, banking, finance, and international relations are included in our concept of industry. At any rate, whether or not the phenomenon of unemployment can be prevented, minimized, or quickly conquered by statesmanlike means, there remains for the present, and probably for years to come, the question of what to do with the distress caused by unemployment—family disintegration and the manifold other miseries which lack of work creates—and how the community is to bear the burden imposed upon it. It is to this question, and particularly to the meaning of unemployment for the individual community, that, within the limits of time and space set for the present study, these pages are addressed. They do not attempt to deal with larger aspects of the philosophy of industrial life, or with such matters as unemployment insurance, pensions, and similar proposals.

In the autumn of 1921, as a second consecutive winter of unemployment seemed imminent, many American cities felt the increasing need for organized effort to meet the emergency. Past experience in dealing with unemployment, with such modifications of method as present conditions called for, should have offered a guide for action. There had been three other serious business depressions within a generation—those of 1893–94, 1907–08, and 1914–15. What records were there of measures taken in those emergencies that would serve as a guide to present action? In October, 1921, a short summary of the most important available published reports of these crises was made for the use of the staff of the Russell Sage Foundation. Of the depression of 1893–94, this summary says in part:

> On the side of the relief of the unemployed, this long and severe period of industrial depression has been voluminously reported. The American Social Science Association has a report, a Massachusetts Commission pub-

lished a volume in 1895, and the Nashville meeting of the National Conference of Charities summarized in May, 1894, the work of the winter.[1] Nearly all of the testimony, however, comes from official sources, or was gathered by the questionnaire method after the emergency was over. The period was one of large central relief committees operating by means of a central fund, usually with "made" work supplied to applicants. The things that these committees said in the various reports about their own work, often self-congratulatory things, were seldom contradicted by the relief agencies federated with them, though a reading between the lines more than confirms both the evidence of a few critics who dared to speak out then and the doubts of those social workers who were young recruits at the time, but who had won their way to places of responsibility in 1907–08. They were determined that the glaring mistakes of 1893 should not be repeated. No one who had faced in that earlier period the struggling masses fighting for work-tickets, no one who had realized the cruelty of sending narrow-chested tailors to the stone-pile, or of treating the unemployed mass in any one way, could ever forget the experience.

Concerning the measures in 1907–08, the summary says:

While in some cities the plans followed in the panic winter of 1907–08 were no improvement over those adopted in the earlier crisis, and while some of these discredited procedures have survived even into the present year, 1921, still, on the whole, there was a definite advance made in 1907–08. In many places improvised relief machinery was discouraged and the existing agencies united upon a quietly expanding program. This was true even in some of the large manufacturing cities especially hard hit by industrial conditions, such as Philadelphia. Buffalo, in contrast to its policy in 1893, also avoided breadlines, discouraged processions and impromptu relief bureaus, while straining every nerve, through an enlarged staff in its family welfare agency, which utilized volunteers also, to maintain a record of adaptable service and prompt relief.

Of 1914–15, the summary continues:

The unemployment situation experienced during the early months of the European war was different in character and less severe in degree than the

[1] Relief of the Unemployed in the United States during the winter of 1893–94. *Journal of the American Social Science Association*, No. 32, November, 1894, pp. 1–51.
Massachusetts. Report of the Massachusetts Board to Investigate the Subject of the Unemployed. Part I: Relief Measures, and Part V: Final Report. Boston, 1895.
National Conference of Charities and Correction. *Proceedings*, 1894, pp. 19–66.

two preceding times of stress. In some industries there was dullness, due to quite different causes in the different industries, while others were unusually busy. These conditions created a very uneven, up-and-down situation during the winter, but recovery, because of the demand for war material, came rapidly, whereas in the earlier periods it had come very slowly.

. . .

One characteristic of the treatment of the situation in 1914–15 was the greater share taken in it by such neighborhood agencies as the social settlements, the educational clubs and classes organized in poorer neighborhoods, and so on. The New York report of the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment[1] puts especial stress upon the value of these agencies, and in so far as they deal with unemployed persons already known to them and utilize central registration in order to avoid duplication of effort, this part of a decentralizing policy can be strongly commended.

The records consulted for this summary were made largely by persons who were themselves administering the measures described. Moreover, the various published accounts related to comparatively few cities, presented few details, and took little account of those other aspects of community life which determine whether certain measures are really successful or not. For, in addition to providing immediate visible relief, the measures adopted should in no wise ignore possible effects, constructive and destructive, upon family life, upon community agencies, and upon the sense of responsibility of such groups as employers, trade unions, neighbors, the municipality, and the state.

Recognition of the lack of objectively recorded experience of the recent emergencies prompted the Russell Sage Foundation to undertake the present study. Its aim is to give some account of the unemployment relief measures made use of during the emergency period of 1921–22, projected upon a background of as many and as varied American cities as there was time to visit and inquire into before the summer of the latter year. If personal observations were to be made on the ground while distress was still severe, the field work had to be done between the months of December, 1921, and May, 1922. This fixed the very definite limits of the study, though observations made in the field have since been supplemented to

[1] Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, How to Meet Hard Times. Published by the Committee, New York, January, 1917.

some extent by correspondence and by data supplied during the succeeding months.

Fifteen cities in all were studied, with about ten days, on an average, spent in each, though the length of visit varied from less than one day to more than two weeks. For sectional representation cities were chosen in New England, the Atlantic states, the South, and the West, as follows:

Boston, Mass.	Minneapolis, Minn.
Chicago, Ill.	New Bedford, Mass.
Cleveland, Ohio	New York, N. Y.
Columbia, S. C.	Borough of Manhattan only
Evanston, Ill.	Philadelphia, Pa.
Hartford, Conn.	Pittsburgh, Pa.
Kansas City, Mo.	St. Paul, Minn.
Memphis, Tenn.	Sioux Falls, S. Dak.

It will be seen that these places vary in population from 25,000 to two and three-quarter millions. In so far as the geographical distribution permitted, the cities were chosen as representing types, such as the trading center in an agricultural district, the manufacturing center specializing in a particular industry, the commercial and banking center, the distributing point, and the manufacturing city of varied commodity output. Most of these places were revisited, sometimes more than once, during the course of the winter.

It was planned to obtain from each city only first-hand and current data. The material, therefore, consists almost entirely of personal observations, of interviews with competent local observers, of the current documents of local organizations, of their recent publications, and of data obtained by them as the result of special inquiries made at my request. There has been no attempt to weave into this study the existing literature on unemployment in any of its phases. Interviews were held with 249 individuals in the cities visited, most of whom were seen more than once, and a considerable proportion a number of times. Of the persons interviewed, 47 represented family welfare agencies; 27, agencies dealing with homeless men; 42, other social agencies; 27, public officials; 25, employment service; 8, mayors' unemployment committees; and 73, such miscellaneous sources as trade unions, busi-

ness organizations, personnel of industrial plants, veterans' organizations, and university and college faculties. In addition to these interviews, some 15 conferences were held with social workers in groups varying in number from three to 20.

Thus the whole study was made possible through the generous co-operation of more than three hundred persons, who gave time, energy, patience, and access to their confidential records. To these I would acknowledge my great indebtedness and offer my apologies that individual mention in this place is impracticable. Wherever possible, I have given credit in the body of the text to the source of the information presented.

Especial indebtedness, for services in the collection of data not available in the routine work of their organizations and requiring much additional effort and personal sacrifice, should be recorded as due to the following: Stockton Raymond, of the Family Welfare Society of Boston; Miss Amelia Sears, of the United Charities of Chicago and the case workers of her staff; the Cleveland Welfare Federation, particularly for the services of Titus Rohrbaugh; the Associated Charities of Cleveland; the Charity Organization Society of Hartford, especially for the services of its district secretaries, Misses Dorothy A. Phelps, Elsa K. Reuschel, and Edith Spencer; Mrs. Henry Cohen, of the Jewish Educational Institute of Kansas City, Mo.; Prof. William H. Lewis, Junior College, Kansas City, Mo.; J. F. Ebersole, of the Ninth District Federal Reserve Bank, Minneapolis, Minn.; Miss Mary Russell of the Associated Charities of Memphis; Frank J. Bruno, of the Family Welfare Association of Minneapolis; Mrs. Mildred D. Mudgett, of the University of Minnesota; Miss Georgiana Leake, Family Welfare Society of New Bedford; E. G. Steger, United Charities of St. Paul; Miss Nell Scott, Associated Charities of Pittsburgh; and Theodore Bock, of the Family Welfare Association of Sioux Falls, S. Dak.

If more space is given in these pages to recording the activities of social agencies, special committees, and, in general, to the organized community attempts to meet distress among the unemployed than to the unaided efforts of individual families to meet their own crises successfully, it is not because the efforts of these families are deemed less important. On the contrary, they are far more impor-

tant, both in bulk and in their character-building value. But the purpose of the study has been to be of service to the community agencies which must deal with the acute phases of unemployment during times of industrial depression. It is the experience of this organized effort, therefore, as observed in the cities visited, that I have attempted to bring together. With the same purpose in mind and with some inevitable loss of organic unity, descriptions of general conditions in the places studied have been omitted from the body of the text and the discussion has been arranged around the leading problems that face a community at such times; but to supply, in part at least, this lack, brief résumés of the local conditions are given, city by city, in the Appendix.

PHILIP KLEIN.

New York, January, 1923.

PART I

BEARING THE BURDEN

CHAPTER I

MEANING OF UNEMPLOYMENT TO THE WORKER

BEFORE embarking upon the main task of this study, which deals primarily with measures for the relief of the unemployed adopted by communities, it may be worth while to review briefly how the workers themselves meet the problem of enforced idleness and suspension of income, and their resourcefulness in retarding the full impact of distress upon themselves and their families.

The unusually severe period of unemployment which started late in the summer of 1920 affected, sooner or later, most of the industries. It cut deeply into the income of workers. It struck all classes of labor—skilled, unskilled, clerical, professional. It continued from the summer of 1920 through the spring of 1922.

Many workingmen started a second year of unemployment at the end of the summer of 1921. While the proportion of these varied with the type of industry in which they were engaged and with the section of the country, it was considerable throughout.[1] Hundreds of plants in the steel, iron, and other metal trades—basic for all industries—had entirely shut down, retaining only enough

[1] A study of unemployed families by the United States Children's Bureau during the winter of 1921–22, in two cities, undertaken principally to discover the effect of prolonged unemployment of the breadwinner upon the welfare of the children in the family, showed that in 71 per cent of the families studied in one city and 48 per cent in the other, the father had been unemployed a year or longer. Of the two cities, one was in the East and one in the Middle West. The eastern city had a population of about 132,000, and the unemployed were estimated at 12,000; the middle-western city had 59,000 population, with the unemployed estimated at 10,000 to 12,000. The industries of importance in the cities are metal works, boots and shoes, furniture, stationery, sporting goods, toys. It was earnestly hoped that complete results of this intensive study would be available before this writing, and that they might be utilized to supplement the more general information gathered in this inquiry. Unfortunately, that is not the case. Quotations in this chapter are from a preliminary abstract of the study authorized by Miss Grace Abbott, Director of the Bureau, and furnished by Miss Emma Lundberg, who was in direct charge of the study.

personnel for the maintenance of the plants.[1] Countless manufacturing concerns that had reduced their working forces made no attempt to retain contact with their discharged employes, seeing no definite sign of revival in view. Many, indeed, put forth deliberate and generous efforts to procure other jobs for their men.[2] Clerical forces in factories, offices, stores, insurance offices, banks, mail order houses, sales departments, were cut to skeleton dimensions.[3] The demand for common labor, and the wages along with it, descended to new low levels.[4] General reduction of wages proceeded apace.[5] Farm labor was dispensed with as far as possible, farmers—especially in the Middle West—endeavoring to raise what they could by their own and their families' labor.[6]

To the typical workingman the first blow of unemployment is not a great shock. Very soon he will get his job back—or another one. Familiarity with his industry and experience of other times in finding supplementary work guide his first steps; later, however, as the situation becomes graver he calls successively upon his various resources, item by item. The first effect of unemployment, therefore, is a call upon the ingenuity of the worker to obtain the means by which to keep himself and his family from starvation. These are numerous and distributed in a variety of fields. The wealth of resources that he may tap has often surprised the social observer. Only when these diverse resources have been largely exhausted do the more serious effects of unemployment

[1] The steel and iron industries were perhaps hardest hit. Being in a sense basic to all industries, their condition was indicative of the general situation. In fact, steel and pig-iron production statistics are extensively used as the barometers of industrial prosperity.

[2] A few instances will be found in Chapter VII, p. 143 sq.

[3] Returns on questionnaires from miscellaneous firms in Sioux Falls, S. Dak., confirm the general testimony gathered in the study that all classes of labor were seriously affected, not only the manual or unskilled groups.

[4] See diagram 3, p. 191, giving the trend of rate of wages of common labor in Cleveland.

[5] Data on this point are being gathered by official bodies such as the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, New York State Bureau of Labor, etc. Returns to questionnaires received by the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank indicate a reduction in that district varying about 20 per cent.

[6] James A. Hamilton, county agent, Minnehaha County, S. Dak.; C. McCaffrey, secretary, Chamber of Commerce, Sioux Falls, S. Dak., interviews of December 28 and 29, 1921.

upon the family make their appearance. In the present chapter, therefore, these various methods by which the worker keeps his head above water are considered first, and the more deleterious effects are discussed later.

There is no uniformity in the procedure nor in available resources as between one family and another. Generally speaking, the skilled and better-paid laborer can hold out longer than the common or unskilled laborer, and can command a greater variety of resources. The degree of the progress of the depression is reflected, indeed, in the extent to which distress reaches the groups that are ordinarily on a fair economic level. Thus, in the winter of 1921–22, social case work organizations almost uniformly report a rapidly increasing proportion, among their applicants, of skilled artisans, small business men, and members of the professions. Other factors than the one of previous economic level also influence a family's method and degree of success in overcoming the menace of distress. Among these factors, race and nationality are, perhaps, the most important.

It is generally known, for example, that in the matter of eking out income Negroes more quickly than others double up in apartments, take in lodgers, and in general permit the number of occupants per room to grow beyond any reasonable limits. On the other hand, it is not generally known that Sicilians, unlike other southern Italians, are strongly prejudiced against housing two families together or taking boarders; that they do not pawn or sell the jewelry or household linens, on which they place great value. Negroes are generous in aiding one another in every way. Italians freely borrow from their friends, Jews utilize mutual aid societies, Scandinavians and Germans command considerable credit with tradesmen. In reducing the food budget, Polish families are likely to go to the extreme of dry bread and coffee, while Italians rarely allow themselves to make serious inroads on their bill of fare, and native Americans continue to buy milk longest.

Negroes universally fared worst in the cities visited. The slump in the steel and metal trades affected Slavic groups and Italians; in construction work, Irish and native Americans; in cotton (New Bedford), Portuguese and French; in office and sales work, native

Americans and Jews, native and foreign born; in farming, native Americans and Scandinavians. Racial and national characteristics are, therefore, further complicated by local conditions and occupational distribution among the population, which may vary considerably from city to city.

I. ADJUSTMENTS WITHIN THE FIELD OF EMPLOYMENT

1. Part-time Work. Recourse to part-time work at his own trade as a means of support may hardly be attributed to the initiative of the worker. It is the customary procedure in many firms in times of depression to cut down the amount of work per man rather than to discharge employes. To this natural practice was added, in 1921, the urgent appeal to manufacturers by the President's Conference on Unemployment, which met in Washington in September and October of that year, to extend that practice to its utmost limits.[1] This method is also provided for in some contracts between manufacturers and trade unions.[2] How general part-time work has been, it is impossible to say. Not only are records few, but by the time this study was undertaken—which was when the depression had progressed pretty far—part-time work was no longer much in evidence. The continued inactivity of business had made it an insecure policy for the manufacturer.

2. Change of Occupation. A well-considered, deliberate change in occupation, one that is calculated to improve the general economic condition of the family, may be regarded as desirable. But, barring isolated cases such as are likely to occur at any time, the changes of occupation brought about by the recent unemployment crisis, as reported in numerous instances during the depression just passed, have been generally for the worse.

There has been an increase of small business enterprises on the part of workingmen during the emergency, which shows energy

[1] Included in the General Recommendations of the Conference for the Emergency Program, adopted September 30, 1921. Report of the President's Conference on Unemployment, Washington, D. C., 1921, Government Printing Office, p. 21. Further discussion of this conference will be found in later chapters, particularly Chapter II, p. 57 sq.

[2] For an example of this type of arrangement, see Chapter VII, p. 146 sq.

and ingenuity, but the adoption of which is rarely satisfactory in the end. The Chicago Urban League for Negroes reports:

> . . . the springing up of a number of small shops for barbecued meat, and the development of a string of hot tamale venders. These, while not unknown before the winter of 1921–22, at least were by no means so numerous before that period. A talk with some of the men concerned leads to the point of view that being unable to get work they conceived the idea of getting a little wagon and going out for what they could pick up. Others, seeing the success of the idea, followed it up and imitated it. Now there may be seen in Chicago a larger development of the same idea in a number of wagons—some of them small enough to be pushed by hand, others of them being reconstructed trucks or horse-drawn vehicles. These latter carry a much larger assortment of food, hot dogs, sandwiches of different kinds, fish, candies, cakes, and so forth.[1]

The Hartford Charity Organization Society reports "from March, 1921, to March, 1922, a noticeable increase in small commercial establishments in Park Street, new photographers' shops, florist shops, shoe stores, bakeries, and ice-cream and candy stores."[2] An addition in the number of salesmen and saleswomen is reported by some tradesmen, who were visited by numerous persons each selling some special line, whereas previously, especially in the grocery business, one salesman would represent a variety of articles.[3] The Self-support Department of the United Hebrew Charities of New York noted the same augmentation of small business. This department seeks to set up physically handicapped clients in business, and it experienced the keen competition of unemployed men who were attempting to solve their difficulties during the recent depression through the very means

[1] "Some Observations on Housing and Industrial Conditions as Affecting Negroes in Chicago," by the Urban League of Chicago, manuscript in letter of April, 1922.

[2] Unemployment in the South District of the Charity Organization Society of Hartford; notes by Miss Dorothy F. Phelps, May, 1922.

[3] Miss Anna B. Heldman and Miss A. F. Skolsky, Department of Personal Service, Irene Kaufman Settlement, Pittsburgh, Pa., interview of March 19, 1922. There seem to be unlimited openings for salesmen and saleswomen on a commission basis. The great majority of such positions are so little remunerative that the best private employment agencies have practically refused to clear applicants for such employment.

adopted by the department.[1] The subsidiary trades by which a workingman frequently fills the seasonal gaps of his regular craft undoubtedly suffered no less in 1920–22 than the principal trades.[2]

3. Temporary and Odd Jobs. Most of the emergency work during the period of depression was either temporary—lasting not more than a few weeks—or consisted of discontinuous odd jobs measured in hours or days. Wherever emergency public works came to the attention of the writer of the present study, this was the case. Usually these jobs were necessarily temporary because of the low wages paid. The wages made the work equivalent to a short job.[3]

In bulk, therefore, temporary and odd jobs—more plentiful in some cities than in others depending largely on the public interest and the energy of the unemployed individual—were the worker's greatest resource in the field of employment. Of 4,963 placements up to November 26, 1921, reported by the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment in Hartford, only 360 were described as permanent; the remainder, 92 per cent, consisted of short jobs, some paid for by the municipality, some from charitable funds, some by private individuals.[4] Practically all placements by the Chicago Woman's City Club, in co-operation with the public employment office in that city, were odd jobs.[5] Even the best of the American Legion employment offices observed in the cities visited, hardly bettered a 75 per cent average of temporary and odd jobs.

[1] Miss Frances Taussig, general secretary, United Hebrew Charities, New York City, interview of April 24, 1922.

[2] These adjustments by entering the fields of vending and small business were to some extent counterbalanced by the thinning of the ranks of paper and junk pedlers due to the heavy fall in the prices of these commodities.

[3] This, as we shall see, was true of the public works in Hartford, Boston, Sioux Falls, Evanston; of the public works contemplated in Minneapolis, true of work given to clients of the Kansas City Provident Association on the stone pile of the Helping Hand Institute, true of much of the work relief given by family agencies in Philadelphia and New York. For more detail on these points see Chapter III, pp. 76 to 86. The reader may find it profitable also to refer from time to time to the summaries of general conditions in the several cities visited, contained in the Appendix.

[4] 785 are described as city jobs; 1,339 as pick-up jobs; 1,695 as emergency jobs; 774 as jobs in tobacco fields. Office of the Committee, A. Bradstreet, secretary, December, 1921.

[5] See Chapter III, pp. 76 and 86.

Through emergency work provided by the two cities and through short jobs secured in other ways, all but four of the 366 men whose families were visited had earned partial support for their families during the period that followed the loss of their regular occupations,

reports the Children's Bureau in the study previously quoted. The same type of testimony comes from organizations and individual workers, white and colored, East, South, and Middle West. It is the importance of such jobs in the efforts of the unemployed toward eking out a living that gives so much weight to the demand for emergency employment service.

4. Women and Children of the Family Going to Work. It was the practically unanimous opinion of local observers that the reduction of personnel in firms employing women was, by comparison, much smaller than in those employing men. Relatively, therefore, there was less unemployment among women than among men; and, conversely, the chances of finding work were better for women than for men.[1] The Chicago Urban League reports:

> . . . for the fiscal year ending October 31, 1921, more women found work than men for the first time since the office has been open. There was a greater proportionate opportunity for domestic service, and a fair increase in the demand for power machine operators in the apron trade. . . .

At any rate, it was easier for unemployed women to find work during the emergency than for unemployed men to find it, despite the fact that in the field of day labor in homes, such as cleaning, washing, and so on, as distinct from "domestic service," there was a serious shrinkage of opportunity—due to lower general prosperity—and a great increase in competition. Family welfare agencies that had previously been able to place their clients without difficulty for day labor found this avenue of income very much narrowed.

Stories such as the following are, therefore, more the type than the exception:

[1] The field of domestic service had sustained almost no loss in the number of openings, but women were reluctant to accept such service. In the deepest depression there were always more jobs than applicants recorded in this field by the Chicago and other public employment offices, though probably not by those in the southern cities visited.

Mr. H. could not find work after the strike [packing houses], but his wife found employment for three days a week in a nearby factory; so Mr. H. kept house and cared for the children. Although neither of them liked this arrangement, it was the best they could do. . . .

Mrs. L. worked eight hours every night, although she had a four months' old baby. Her husband cared for the children and the house during the daytime, but she had to give up the work because of ill health.[1]

There were some very unusual ways of solving the difficulty. One social case worker's report is brief:

Mr. X's mistress cares for the X children, while the wife works. Everyone concerned, including the wife, seems to be well satisfied with the plan.[2]

The observations of another case worker are telling—and typical:[3]

The most forcible impression I gained from tabulating unemployment sheets[4] was the number of surprisingly young married couples that applied to the United Charities. There were a few whose duration of marriage could still be counted in months, a far greater number who had been married less than five years. Some ask definitely for relief, but *the majority requested nursery care for the children so that the mother could work.*

Among 190 families actively under care in one district of the Kansas City Provident Association, 41 of the mothers were earning all or part of the income; in a majority of these cases the children were in day nurseries, while in some, where children were older, they were being cared for by brothers or sisters or by relatives.[5] The demand on day nurseries in many cities was quite unprecedented.

Confirming these impressions and summaries by local workers, the Children's Bureau reports that almost one-third of the mothers in the families studied by the Bureau in the inquiry mentioned were gainfully employed, and most of them—in fact, three-quarters of the number—away from home. The number of these working

[1] Cases reported by Miss Gertrude B. Jayne, United Charities of Chicago.

[2] Reported by Miss M., visitor, United Charities of Chicago.

[3] Miss Althea K. Rautenberg, visitor, United Charities of Chicago, letter of April 25, 1922.

[4] These tally sheets were kept for the purpose of aiding the present study.

[5] Miss Marie E. Hubbard, Provident Association, letter of July 25, 1922.

mothers was 115, and *90 of them had secured employment after their husbands had been thrown out of work.* Only 25 had worked previously.

There was no lack of pressure upon children to go to work, but employment conditions generally made the pressure futile. The Children's Bureau did indeed find the number of working children between fourteen and eighteen years of age almost doubled in the families studied (75, as against 39 usually employed). But the general testimony is quite different. Records of the Junior Employment Service of the Board of Education in Pittsburgh show a steady decline of placements during the two years of depression.[1] The issuance of work certificates to children of school age, which is generally conditioned on the promise of definite employment, declined, and, conversely, school attendance, especially in the lower high school grades, which would be most affected by conditions in the field of child labor, increased considerably.[2]

5. Accepting Reduced Wages. Parallel with the shrinkage of employment came also reduction in wages. Those who were fortunate enough to be retained at work found themselves faced with a lowered scale of wages. The wage income of the worker decreased even where he continued to work full time, and necessarily more so when he was employed part time only. The worker had no choice. Even where powerful labor organizations resisted the reductions, as in the building, transportation, clothing, printing, and other industries, wages nevertheless frequently went down after strike, lockout, or compromise. In the field of common labor and in the less well-organized trades there was nothing to stop the downward trend. While instances frequently occurred of men's refusing to accept new jobs at wages inordinately low, generally speaking they accepted any wages that were offered.[3] Reductions in wages were greatest in the field of common labor and affected also the wages of women and children. Negro day labor in the

[1] Supplied by John D. Stark, Director of the Service, Pittsburgh, Pa. See also diagram 16, p. 207.

[2] See diagrams 9 and 10, pp. 200 and 201.

[3] Much ill-feeling was said to exist in Sioux Falls, S. Dak., because unemployed men refused to accept farm labor at wages approximating $30 a month and board. But such acceptance, considering the expense of moving the family and furniture back and forth and other complicating factors, would have been at an actual financial loss. On the surface their refusal seemed wanton.

South was frequently obtainable in the winter of 1921–22 at $1.00 or $1.25 a day, and this competition brought white labor down to $2.50.

II. TAPPING FINANCIAL RESOURCES

1. Credit. Tradesmen doing business with workingmen's families know the ups and downs of the worker's income and have accepted as a matter of course the system of extending credit to them in periods of unemployment. It is part of the "risks of the trade." The chances of loss (as compared with long illness, for example) are slight, whereas refusal to give credit would seriously cut down trade.

It was expected, then, that credit would be a rich resource for the temporary relief of the incomeless workingman. The question was how far it would go. According to the testimony of competent observers the local tradesmen have been one of the strongest bulwarks of the unemployed against destitution.

> It seems to be a conservative estimate [reports New Bedford] that the grocers have increased the credit extended by an average of 100 per cent, but in the extreme cases, 400 per cent. There are two instances—one in our own experience and one in the experience of one of the banks—of families owing $1,000.[1]

The sums owed by families, as reported from Hartford, are rarely less than $30 or $40 per family, in many cases over $100, and in some cases on record as high as $200 to $300. These sums represent generally the points at which the limit of credit for the respective families was reached. When tradesmen refused further credit, families were forced to apply for charitable aid.[2]

[1] Miss Georgiana Leake, assistant secretary of the New Bedford Family Welfare Society, in reporting as above finds it difficult to reconcile that fact with the absence of business failures among the small tradesmen, except by reference to the sustained high prices in New Bedford as compared with other neighboring cities. It has also been suggested that wholesale dealers gave much longer credit to tradesmen. They often do at such times and without charging interest.

[2] Miss Edith Spencer and Miss Dorothy F. Phelps, district secretaries of the Hartford Charity Organization Society, May 16, 1922. From the same source comes the information that, unlike New Bedford, several small tradesmen in Hartford were forced out of business by the overextension of credit to unemployed customers.

What makes it so much harder than formerly for these tradesmen is the rapid spread of low-price chain stores, which not only compete in normal times but attract the custom of the tradesmen's indebted customers when some income has been found and before they are able to pay their debts.

In the observation of a Pittsburgh social worker who has lived and worked in the same neighborhood for some twenty years and has unusual access to neighborhood facts, the number of persons having credit accounts with tradesmen increased shortly after the beginning of the depression by about 50 per cent. But, as the depression continued, tradesmen were compelled in self-preservation to tighten. In some cases all new accounts were refused. In others the amount of credit allowed was cut in half; still others cut off further credit to those already indebted to them. Not a few tradesmen actually censored purchases, selling, for example, only half the usual amount of milk to a credit customer, three-eighths of the amount of cakes, one-fourth of fresh vegetables, and so on.[1] The Children's Bureau, in its study of unemployed families in 1921–22, found that 66 per cent of their families had gone into debt for food;[2] and a careful study of rural unemployment in an Ohio mining district, conducted at about the same time, showed families owing debts to tradesmen, after some ten months of unemployment, amounting to $400 and $500. In the same territory two tradesmen had closed their doors, two others—according to information given by local bankers—had drawn out their last resources, while a few had gone on an absolute cash basis of trade.[3]

There is, however, another side to this picture. Accounts must sooner or later be paid up. In the ordinary depression, a comparatively brief idleness rolling up a reasonable debt is followed by prosperous days, and soon the indebtedness to grocer or butcher is liquidated. The long depression, however, drove debts to unprecedentedly high points. Wages had come down, and, as work was resumed, the task of paying up became an incubus that was sometimes as full of terror as unemployment itself. Some social agencies, such as the Cleveland Associated Charities, mindful of this fact, did not discontinue relief immediately upon the employment of the breadwinner, but gave him a little time to pay some of his

[1] Miss Anna B. Heldman, Irene Kaufman Settlement, Pittsburgh, Pa., letter of June 5, 1922.

[2] See footnote, p. 13.

[3] One merchant was quoted as carrying two and a half times his ordinary credit account; eight merchants reported a total of $37,500 in outstanding accounts on credit trade ranging from 25 per cent to 95 per cent of the total business. Report to the Committee on Unemployment of the Ohio Council of Social Agencies, October, 1921.

debts first. Not many social agencies are in a position to do this, yet the heavy handicap of back debts was reported to be quite general.

There is another type of credit which is only second in importance to that given by tradesmen; this is credit given by landlords. While no actual figures on this point are available at the present writing, credit of that type is known to have been widely resorted to.

2. Savings. There is some discrepancy between the opinions of social workers and the records of many banks as to the extent to which savings were a resource in the emergency. But there is, nevertheless, sufficient common ground for recognizing that savings did serve materially to tide over the family of the unemployed man for a considerable period of the depression.

Social agencies uniformly report the use and often the exhaustion of savings before clients appealed for relief. Two and three hundred dollars in savings were common among the families known in Hartford, and occasionally they were as high as $500 when the depression came.[1]

Of 491 cases under the care of a western family agency, in which information was available as to measures adopted by the families to support themselves before application to the agency, 232, or nearly half the number, lived on savings.[2] This ratio is almost identical with that rated by the Children's Bureau study, which found that 43 per cent of the families visited had savings which had been used to tide them over.

In view of a great deal of testimony of this type it might reasonably be expected that bank deposits, and especially savings bank deposits, would show material shrinkage. And, indeed, many savings banks did show this effect. Postal savings in all the cities visited, except Boston, show a steady decline from 1919 to the spring of 1922.[3] Similar shrinkage in savings accounts was found elsewhere, as, for example, in Sioux Falls. But there is by no means

[1] Miss Edith Spencer, Hartford Charity Organization Society, May 16, 1922.

[2] From records examined at the office of the Minneapolis Associated Charities by Prof. Mildred D. Mudgett of the University of Minnesota.

[3] A few of the figures relating to postal savings have been charted and will be found in Chapter X, p. 205, together with an explanation of the exceptional record of Boston.

uniform agreement on this point. Many cities show consistent increase in the total of bank deposits (including time deposits), and not a few show increases in savings deposits as well—even if not at the rate characteristic of preceding years.

A reasonable explanation of the increases—where they occur—has been offered by a number of bankers consulted. An officer of the Park Street Bank of Hartford informed a social worker who made inquiries on that point that, "although some families had withdrawn, many other families had deposited to such an extent that the bank was doing a bigger business than ever."[1] An explanation might come from a more exact knowledge of the number and type of each group of families. Another bank in the same city, whose business had been falling off considerably during the depression, suggests more concretely the probable explanation. Most of the depositors of this bank come from a poor district of the city. The records showed fewer new accounts opened than in normal times; they showed many instances of the withdrawal of the entire savings, and others in which, while no money had been withdrawn, none had been added in over a year.[2]

Records of the Philadelphia Savings Fund Society, said to be one of the largest and best established institutions of its kind in the United States, as quoted by Karl de Schweinitz, add further proof to the opinions of those who regard savings as being a most important resource of the unemployed workingman.[3] The sums deposited in this institution were, for the calendar years,

1920—$51,427,351.82
1921— 39,782,154.51,

a decrease of over eleven and a half million dollars. January, 1922,

[1] Miss Dorothy Phelps, Charity Organization Society of Hartford.

[2] Miss Ella K. Reuschel, district secretary, Charity Organization Society of Hartford, interview with Mr. A., banker.

Miss Georgiana Leake, of the New Bedford Family Welfare Society, in a letter dated May 24, 1922, reports the results of interviews with officials of four large banks in that city, which indicate a much larger effect upon savings accounts of the unemployment depression than the mere quotation of figures would indicate, and prove beyond a doubt that savings were used to a very large extent by families of unemployed workers of New Bedford during the depression—which was at its worst there in 1920–21. Lack of space prevents the full reproduction of Miss Leake's valuable statement.

[3] From a letter from Mr. de Schweinitz to Spencer Erwin, February 9, 1922, a copy of which was furnished to the investigator.

moreover, compared with the corresponding month of the previous year, showed money deposited during

January, 1921—$5,742,911.18
January, 1922— 4,179,077.92,

a decrease in one month of over a million and a half. Furthermore the increase in average deposit per account in the same bank indicates the relative elimination of the small depositor. On December 31, 1920, it was $551.41 per depositor, and on the corresponding date of 1921 it was $580.44. This inference is strengthened by a comparison quoted by Mr. de Schweinitz, of accounts opened and accounts closed in January, 1921, classified by occupation of clients:

No occupation	18 more accounts opened than closed.
Minors	13 more accounts opened than closed.
Professional men	77 more accounts opened than closed.
Salaried employes	325 more accounts opened than closed.
Domestics	31 more accounts closed than opened.
Business men	102 more accounts closed than opened.
Wage-earners	560 more accounts closed than opened.

These facts all seem to point to the conclusion suggested by a banker and statistician in Cleveland and corroborated by bankers elsewhere; namely, that savings are, indeed, drained by the wage-earner, but savings of the more prosperous groups, professional, salaried, and so on, for which there is little opportunity of safe and profitable investment during a business depression, are temporarily deposited in savings banks, thus swelling savings deposits. An apparent increase in larger deposits, therefore, covers up the sharp decline of small deposits—these going toward maintaining the unemployed man and his family.[1]

3. Help from Relatives. Help from relatives is expected as a matter of course by those in straits in the first place, and by social workers also where the expectation is reasonable. Yet, despite their importance as a resource in normal times and their usual generosity during the depressions, relatives appear to have slipped down lower in the scale of active aids during the unemployment

[1] Estimates obtained from local bankers by Miss Georgiana Leake, of the Family Welfare Association of New Bedford, place the decrease in the number of depositors in that city during the depression at one-third, and in the number of new depositors at some 40 per cent.

distress of 1921–22 than formerly. Heroic efforts abounded, but in the aggregate they were of comparatively little importance as the depression continued. The Children's Bureau reported, in fact, that only 10 per cent of the 366 families studied by them received aid from relatives. The reason for this must be, not that relatives were less inclined to help than at other times, but that they were less in a position to do so. Unemployment was general. The chances were not more favorable for one than for another. The skilled, the efficient, the resourceful, were less affected than the unskilled. But *less* often was not much less.

4. Loans. In discussing the importance of loans in the wage-earner's efforts to sustain his family during the employment depression of 1921–22, the Children's Bureau summarizes its findings as follows: "The principal source of maintenance, both as to aggregate amount and number of families reporting, was loans and other debts exclusive of credit for food." More specifically, "32 per cent were recipients of loans . . . 69 per cent had contracted other debts [than for food]. . . ."

The terms "loans" and "debts" in the social workers' records evidently cover a variety of items. Some of the loans undoubtedly come from relatives. These in some cases amounted to considerable sums; and several instances were cited by social workers of sums in the neighborhood of a thousand dollars, with many more amounting to several hundred dollars—generally in successive small amounts. A case of a loan of $150 by a mother to her son and his family, made possible by mortgaging her house, is reported from Pittsburgh; probably such adjustments can be duplicated in the same city and elsewhere many times over. Borrowing from friends and relatives is recorded in the case of more than 60 per cent of the families studied in Hartford.

Elsewhere in this report reference is made to help given by employers and by trade unions. Frequently such help was in the form of loans. In most of the cities where the size of the Jewish population has justified the organization of a separate family agency, the system of aid by loans is part of the equipment of the organization; and the larger cities generally have a Hebrew Free Loan Association, which lends money without interest to applicants of good character who are vouched for by two other persons of good stand-

ing in the community. These associations served to the limit of their capacity during the winter of 1921–22.[1] For many reasons few of the nonsectarian family agencies are able even in normal times to do much in the way of free loans, and in the emergency the situation in this respect remained unchanged. Such loans as are reported represent little if any departure from case work practice under ordinary circumstances.

The semi-philanthropic loan agencies doing business in chattel and pledge loans would have been a much more important aid to the unemployed had they been able to augment their resources. Applications increased and, in order to meet the demand and because of the greater risks involved, these organizations reduced the limit of individual loans and tightened the requirements as to security.[2]

Life insurance policies constituted a common type of collateral upon which loans were raised; also furniture, jewelry, victrolas, violins, and so on. This latter type of collateral can, of course, be used in pawnshops, without the necessity of appealing to philanthropic agencies. Despite the high interest rates on loans obtained from pawnshops, this method has indeed been used extensively. During the year immediately following the beginning of the depression the pawn business boomed, but later suffered a corresponding slump; exhaustion of pawnable goods, as well as financial inability of borrowers to redeem the pledges, was held responsible for the slump.[3]

5. Other Financial Resources. It would be impossible to give a complete list of ways and means by which families have managed to raise funds to live upon while the breadwinner was idle. Credit, savings, help from relatives, and loans—a good many of the last from friends—were undoubtedly the most important quantita-

[1] Records of the Hebrew Free Loan Association of Pittsburgh show the increased demand in the striking differences of "balance available at the end of the month" between the first six months of 1922 and the corresponding period of 1921. In 1922 funds were short at the end of two months, January and March; in 1921 there was a shortage only at the end of June. The average balances, including "short" months, were 1922, $148; 1921, $598.

[2] The Economy Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland reduced the maximum from $300 to $200; the Equitable Loan Association of Minneapolis to $100. See also diagram 15, p. 206.

[3] Louis Shoop, Vice-President, Hebrew Free Loan Association, Pittsburgh, interview of December 12, 1921.

tively. In particular instances none of these aids may have been employed. Income from rent paid by lodgers tided over some families. The sale of houses, furniture, clothing, articles of luxury, produced money for others. Not a few mortgaged their homes or other real estate.

Income from lodgers was a fairly acceptable source of income where available. It was resorted to in 61 families out of the 366 studied by the Children's Bureau, and in one-third of these instances it was recorded as a new departure due to the emergency; it was mentioned in few cases in Minneapolis. In general there were no lodgers to be had, though families would willingly have taken them. The demand for lodgings is greatest when prosperity is high; it comes then from unattached men, seeking and finding employment away from their former homes. The depression reduced their numbers. Many were unable to continue paying for their rooms. They were often permitted to remain as long as the family could bear the burden. Frequently an entire family would move out, either to double up with some other family or to sell or store their furniture and move into a furnished room.

The sale of homes and furniture struck the same snag as the attempt to find lodgers. There were few in condition to purchase. Moreover, the enforced sale is a most expensive mode of raising money. Prices offered are low, and the cost of re-establishment later is incomparably high.[1] Such attempts to meet the emergency are particularly sad when the cash raised is used for moving elsewhere, especially to the large cities, as was frequently the case among Negroes in the southern states.

III. OTHER ADJUSTMENTS

1. Migration and Emigration. Past experience suggests that migration—change of residence from one community to another within this country—and emigration to the home country of immigrant workers have been attempted by the unemployed in their search for better luck. There was comparatively little evidence of

[1] A rather rare example is reported by the Family Welfare Association of Sioux Falls, S. Dak., of a railroad section man who after being laid off, sold his home, situated in a good neighborhood, for $2,000, and immediately bought another a little farther out for $1,500, and lived on the difference for some seven months of unemployment.

either movement, however, in the recent depression. In all probability there was a considerable return to the country, or to smaller towns, of single men and women or even of whole families who had been attracted to the larger cities during the industrial boom, but no tangible evidence of this is available. There was also undoubtedly more than usual mobility of labor of the type not specifically recruited for definite jobs. A bank in Hartford reported the loss of 150 depositors in one month in the spring of 1922 by reason of their removal to other towns in search of employment. But this removal may have been part of the revival of business activities and employment.

The expected re-migration of Negroes to the South, whence they had poured into northern cities during the industrial boom, failed to take place on a scale sufficiently large to relieve the congested cities of their impoverished and incomeless Negroes. Few appear to have cared to return, and fewer still have had the means to do so. Cases of re-migration financed by some family agencies, while more frequent than in normal times were, nevertheless, few in the aggregate.

Some migration, also frequently of Negro families, is reported from the southern cities visited. These migrants constitute almost a class by themselves. Though the removal from farm or small village to the city is usually an attempt to escape poverty or even starvation, the results often prove to be disastrous to the family and seriously embarrassing to the social agencies. The following examples come to us from the Associated Charities of Memphis:

A family had been renting a farm just outside the city for $300 a year—depending on cotton crop to meet expenses. Was successful until last year, when the boll-weevil upset everything. The man finished by owing his landlord $78 on the year's rent. This he reduced to $20 by selling potatoes which had been stored for the family's use; after which landlord discounted balance due him. Man went into debt for seed and mortgaged cow and mule. The woman having become dissatisfied with conditions, left her husband and children and came to the city to stay with a married daughter.

When the family applied to the Associated Charities in December, they were without food and the children suffering from lack of clothing.

The S——— family lived in a small house in a railroad town where man was employed as railroad fireman. When he was laid off he took odd jobs

he could get around the yards or on the farms. Finally the family sold the furniture to raise money enough to come to the city. There they lived in a small room, formerly used for servants, in the rear of a rooming house in one of the least desirable sections of the city. It was impossible for either of them to find employment. The woman was a telephone operator, but could not be employed by the local company because of its rule against hiring married women. Their fund was soon exhausted. They sold their house furnishings and trunks to buy food. The landlady accepted linens in payment of rent. The woman, not physically strong, was giving out under the strain. The man worried constantly, became nervous and easily agitated.

The man, who had been twenty-four months in the Army, applied unsuccessfully to the American Legion for employment. After being without work from early in January until March, the woman applied to the Associated Charities.

Of emigration back to the Old Country, a means of escape from the effects of unemployment so widely utilized in 1907–08, there was less evidence in the depression of 1920–22, either in the experience of social workers or in the official records of the Immigration Bureau of the United States Department of Labor. This fact may be attributable to the complex post-war situation in Europe, to the settling effect of the war period upon immigrants who had arrived earlier, and to the practical suspension of immigration to the United States from European countries during the long war years following 1914. For when the wave of immigration is high, there is always some reflex of restless or detached persons, or of those who had come on visits or who find themselves ill adapted to conditions in this country. Those immigrants who did go back in 1921–22 usually had some money saved up and could have stayed on but for the opportune combination of "no work," favorable exchange, and the general post-war atmosphere prompting change, together with a desire to look up relatives not heard from.

2. Reductions in the Scale of Living. Accusations against the whole working class have been made by unsympathetic critics to the effect that during the period of high wages they squandered their money on "silk shirts and automobiles." Against individual instances of extravagance that could undoubtedly be cited, should be taken into account the amount of financial reserve now seen

to have been built up by this same class and used effectively for self-support when income was suspended during the depression. It is true that a great number of workingmen had raised their scale of living during the high wage period of 1918–20, and that, in addition to expenditures that brought returns in health and a richer life, they purchased what ordinarily would be considered luxuries quite beyond their means. Unwise though some of these expenditures may seem in retrospect, there is ample evidence that the "wild extravagance" charged did not prevent working families as a whole from laying up savings and other protection against a rainy day, and that they weathered two cruel seasons of unemployment with less suffering than they experienced in the comparatively brief depression of 1914–15.

There was, however, a narrow margin at best between the current scale of living and the usual standard of living of the workingmen.[1] The reduction in scale soon ate into the standard.

IV. EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT

The effects of unemployment constitute a tale that is not entirely told for years after the depression has passed. The inevitable aftermath of sorrow and suffering is generally admitted, but its extent cannot even be guessed. Of the more immediate and recognizable effects, the congestion of families, the reduction of diet, and the resulting illness and malnutrition are perhaps the most serious.

1. Congestion and Bad Housing. A family of twelve with a thirteenth in prospect is reported from Pittsburgh to have moved twice, each time to a poorer location—in one of the places occupying two rooms. The rent apparently mattered little, for they were not able to pay anywhere and in two or three months would have to move again.[2] A Memphis family of five moved from a good detached house to one small room, where they cooked, ate, and slept.[3]

[1] The standard of living may be considered to comprise those items which by long custom have come to be considered by the family as necessary to its minimum of comfort and happiness, so that the elimination or reduction of any of them would be regarded as a deprivation. Temporary additions of items of luxury, which can be easily dispensed with without causing unhappiness, may raise the *scale* without affecting the standard of living. A standard, in other words, is something which its possessor will make very considerable sacrifices to maintain.

[2] Reported by Miss Amelia Igel, Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh.

[3] Reported by Miss Mary Russell, Associated Charities, Memphis.

"One of the most noticeable things which is probably due to the house shortage as well as to the general unemployment, are the small shacks being erected," says a Kansas City worker.[1] "In some instances these are rented for a small amount. Often the lots are bought on small monthly payments, the lumber purchased in the same way. Here the family feel secure, as they will not be evicted when there is no money to pay rent."

In no other group of people, as already stated, has congestion due to unemployment been so severe as among Negroes. Overcrowded before the depression, because of the increase of colored population in cities to which industrial prosperity had drawn them, the distress of unemployment crowded them even more. In the winter of 1920-21, many of the homeless colored men in Chicago put up shanties on the lake front—a method of housing that was airy enough but had little else to recommend it. In the city itself

"where previously it was a problem where to get a flat," says the Chicago Urban League, "recently it has been rather how to pay rentals. . . . A check of real estate offices revealed uniformly that more flats were for rent than in April of the two preceding years. This would indicate either a doubling up of families or a decrease in population, or both.[2] It is unquestionable that there has been considerable doubling up, as the reports of express and storage men testify. Numbers of families have broken up, the man often going to nearby places in search of work, the other members of his family going with relatives or merely lodging."

A family of five (reports one agency) were living in four rooms and paying $14 a month rent (later raised to $20). Developments of the employment situation found this family of five occupying one of the four rooms, another family of five occupying another room (both families using the kitchen), and the third bedroom rented to two lodgers.

Another family, consisting of parents and three children, living in six rooms and bath, fairly prosperous, the man conducting an ice and coal business, took in various other members of the family on account of unemployment, until on the last date visited there were 14 persons in the household.

Cases of this type were being encountered by social case workers at every step. Under such circumstances, necessity on the one

[1] Miss Louise Knake, Kansas City Provident Association.

[2] Testimony in Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Chicago was to the effect that there was little actual decrease of colored population in these cities.

hand and the promise of profits on the other, conspired to increase congestion and unsanitary living conditions.

2. Reduction of Diet. Practically all the families observed in Hartford by social case workers were reported to be reducing their food budget, and a group of some twenty workers in conference in Chicago uniformly reported observations of similar reductions. While the observations of these reductions were not based on scientific count of calory values, they represent competent evidence in view of the intimate acquaintance of these case workers with the families under their care. One Chicago worker says:

> Certain items are eliminated almost at once from the food budget. Meat and fresh milk are dispensed with in a great number of cases, and condensed milk is used in a surprisingly large degree. Frequently families are found who have been subsisting for a week or more on county agent supplies before they became known to the United Charities.[1] Among the chief items of these supplies are coffee and dried beans, and the results of this diet are only too evident in the thin bodies and pasty faces of the children.[2]

A worker in the Italian district of the same city reports that many families substituted dry legumes, such as horse beans, chick peas, and lentils for fresh vegetables and fruit, took reduced amounts of milk—where the milkman would give them credit to take any—and in some cases went so far as to live on black coffee and dry bread for the adults' breakfast, dry bread and coffee with milk for the children; dry bread and some olives for lunch, and plain boiled spaghetti for supper.[3] One of the Polish families of the city lived a week on what they thought an ingenious scheme—bread soaked in coffee and then fried.[4]

As a general practice, milk was given up with the idea of eliminating nonessentials, or because credit was cut off. The milk sales of the largest dairy "supplying milk to the great middle class and the poor" in Kansas City, Mo., showed a 15 per cent reduction in 1921

[1] The county agent dispenses public outdoor relief, chiefly in the form of staple food supplies.

[2] Reported by Miss Alice Duan Rood, United Charities of Chicago.

[3] Reported by Miss Alice de Stefani, United Charities of Chicago.

[4] Reported by Miss Helen G. Musselman, United Charities of Chicago.

as compared with 1920.[1] There is reason to believe that experiences such as are reported of a Memphis family which lived principally on mush and, for a while, on what the mother had rummaged from garbage cans in parks after picnics, are not isolated instances.

3. Illness and Undernourishment. While the effects of these deprivations admittedly do not manifest themselves immediately, a few of the more direct consequences, such as sickness and malnutrition, may be seen in the early stages of the depression. The diagrams presented elsewhere in this volume,[2] show indeed an increase in free service in dispensaries and hospitals, but may indicate not an increase in illness but only a more extended recourse to free treatment. The Children's Bureau statement, in connection with its study of unemployed families, that 63 per cent of the entire number reported sickness or disability during the time of unemployment, while not statistically conclusive, is at least indicative of the existence of a close relation between unemployment and ill-health. Other numerical data point in the same direction.

But more important than the available figures are the observations of health workers and social case workers confirming the figures. In Boston the first definite move toward concrete action by social agencies in the matter of unemployment, came as a result of a call from the Instructive District Nursing Association, which had noticed an alarming increase in undernourishment in families of the unemployed. Findings of similar organizations elsewhere are corroborative. The Visiting Nurse Society of Philadelphia reports an increase of patients from December, 1920, to December, 1921, of 1,959, or 61 per cent (5,165 against 3,256), and a doubling of free services during the same month; in 700 of the cases the breadwinner of the family was known to be out of employment.[3] The Hartford dispensary authorities, after a phenomenal increase of work in 1922 (which alone might have testified only to lack of ability to pay for treatment), expressed the opinion that the noticeable increase in sickness could be traced directly to undernourishment.[4] In resolutions passed by the West Philadelphia

[1] Reported by Mrs. Henry Cohen, Jewish Educational Institute, Kansas City, Mo.

[2] See diagrams 18 and 19, p. 208.

[3] Karl de Schweinitz, general secretary, Society for Organizing Charity, Philadelphia.

[4] Miss Dorothy F. Phelps, Hartford Charity Organization Society.

Community Conference on January 31, 1922, the Visiting Nurse Society went on record as reporting

> an increase of 1,500 sick families over last year, due to decreased resistance to disease, a direct result of unemployment.

and the Division of Child Hygiene of the Department of Public Health

> found the effects of unemployment in the discouraged attitude of parents, the inability of undernourished mothers to nurse their babies, the lower vitality of the children, and the actual poverty and distress in over 1,600 families visited during the month of December (1921).[1]

An experiment conducted by the Cleveland Nutrition Clinic presents significant evidence: A group of children whose weights were carefully watched during seven months of two consecutive years showed an average gain in weight of two pounds in 1920–21, but only of three-quarters of a pound in 1921–22.[2]

There is little reason to doubt the observations of case workers who report alarming conditions of undernourishment in their clients among adults as well as among children. One worker in Chicago records an extraordinary number of rickety children (a disease due to malnutrition). Another's tentative judgment was that the unusual amount of illness in one family under her care was attributable to undernourishment.[3]

> . . . Evelyn had curvature of the spine, heart lesions, and was 12 per cent underweight; Eleanor had goiter, chronic sore throat, and was 6 per cent underweight; Marcel was 10 per cent underweight, had chorea and bad tonsils; LeRoy was 7 per cent underweight and had bad tonsils, and Richard was about 8 per cent underweight.

The visiting nurse reported some time later remarkable improvement in all the children after aid—chiefly food—had been given.

Tuberculosis, insanity, post-natal complications abound in the many cases cited by workers in all the cities visited. Statistics can never tell the tale. Pitiful stories of children and parents visibly shrinking for lack of food and unable to follow medical

[1] Minutes of the Conference, Charles H. Anspach, secretary, May 16, 1922.
[2] Reported by Cleveland Associated Charities.
[3] Miss Martha Poston, United Charities of Chicago.

advice for lack of the price of medicine, can give only flashes of insight into the suffering brought by unemployment. Only the families themselves, and possibly those who serve them in their need day in and day out, summer and winter, know what it means to be unemployed, hungry and sick, and without prospects.

4. Lowered Morale. Though lowered morale—whether due to unemployment or to other causes—cannot be measured and stated in quantitative terms, it was a persistent phenomenon that permeated every manifestation of the depression. Among the jobless breadwinners of families it took a variety of forms under different circumstances: strain and friction within the family, loss of ambition to seek work, occasionally desertion of family, temperamental upheavals, loss of mental balance even to the point of insanity, development of lawless habits, begging, the fostering of bitterness against the government and social institutions in general, or sheer laziness from the discontinuance of sustained application. This loss of morale complicated every task of the social case worker.

CHAPTER II

UNEMPLOYMENT COMMITTEES

WHEN the President's Unemployment Conference issued its findings in October, 1921, it expected and urged the mayors of American cities to take prompt leadership in calling, organizing, and guiding emergency committees on unemployment in their respective cities.[1] Some of the mayors in the cities covered by this study, notably in Boston, Columbia, Evanston, Hartford, and Minneapolis, promptly adopted this suggestion; others, acting upon ill-considered pressure, made the attempt; but, for the most part, they permitted the spontaneous formation of unemployment committees from among groups whose natural interests the year round brought them in contact with the problem. Often the mayors encouraged and aided such committees; rarely did they interfere with them.

There is no doubt as to the need in most cities for some kind of a central committee to direct unemployment relief. "The man in the street" wants an authoritative source of information, a center of responsibility, a sense of someone's dealing actively with a problem that faces him throughout the day, wherever he goes. The community as a whole wants to know that it is meeting its responsibilities. It does not want to be pointed out as a shirker. Social agencies, if they are a step beyond the stage of primitive

[1] This move was probably prompted by the desire to find some channel through which stimulation emanating from the Conference could be conveyed to the local communities in order to rouse them to appropriate action. The fact that, with negligible exceptions, American municipalities are headed by mayors elected by the people and that these mayors could be reached by an appeal requiring no loss of time, seemed to point to them as a promising solution of the difficulty. Speed was at a premium because of the emergency; uniformity of procedure promised speed through efficiency. Therefore the plan was adopted to focus local emergency activities around mayors. Were it not for the fact—known to students of American social life—that the simplicity of the political system of this country is not matched by the complexity of its social institutions, such a plan, based on the ideal position of mayors, might have promised greater success.

organization and vision, want to compare notes, co-ordinate activities and fields of work, and find a channel for the effective presentation of their extraordinary task to public opinion. The amount of publicity necessarily attaching to a serious depression increases the sense of individual responsibility. The relief activities of both individuals and organizations, intensified under stimulation of publicity, demand intelligent co-ordination. Some authoritative point of centralization must be created, some kind of a central committee, or else dominant leadership must be provided by one or more of the organizations most interested.

I. FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL UNEMPLOYMENT COMMITTEES

Even in the few cities covered by this study the experience of 1921–22 shows many ways of dealing with unemployment, from complete lack of any special action or cognizance on the part of the general public, to an elaborate voluntary committee complicated by the simultaneous existence of a mayor's committee. It shows great variety in the functions assumed and in the caliber of work done.

The functions attempted by unemployment committees may be roughly grouped as comprising:

1. Study of the situation and formation of general plans
2. Publicity for the existing needs and the efforts to relieve them
3. Co-ordination of activities
4. Administration of specific activities such as employment service, relief, etc.
5. Stimulation of individuals, firms, agencies, and municipal departments.

It is hardly possible to enumerate and to distinguish clearly between the different types of these committees. Roughly, there were represented such types as:[1]

Mayor's Unemployment Committee
Committee of the Central Council of Social Agencies
Committee representing the general public or a diversity of interests (appointed in a variety of ways)

[1] See Appendix for the important committees in the cities visited.

Committee of the Welfare Federation or Community Chest
Informal citizens' committee
Informal committee of representatives of social agencies
Committees within the membership or boards of social agencies
Committee or union of the unemployed.

1. Study of the Situation and Formulation of Plans. In none of the cities visited had a thorough study of the situation in 1921 been made. Even the Chicago Unemployment Conference, organized in August, 1921, by representatives of some thirty important social agencies of that city, and undoubtedly the most effectively organized emergency committee encountered during this inquiry, failed in this respect.[1] It did, indeed, through a series of subcommittees, survey several specific aspects of unemployment in Chicago. On October 21, 1921, its subcommittee on public works presented an excellent report, depicting conditions and possibilities, but proposing no plan of action and making no mention of possible preparations for 1922–23. After that date nothing more was heard of report or of subcommittee.[2] A one-day cross-section study of the purely relief task of the Chicago social agencies undertaken by another committee of the Conference at a later date, with a view to ascertaining whether special efforts for raising funds were necessary, was limited in scope to answering that one question.

In Cleveland, employment statistics of a limited kind have indeed been carefully gathered. Not, however, by the Mayor's Committee or by any other unemployment committee, but by a group of employment managers affiliated with the Chamber of Commerce.[3] In addition, a subcommittee—this time of the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment—made a survey in the autumn of 1921 of the status of public work and the amount of it available, reported the facts, and made some recommendations as to rendering this resource of immediate use.[3] A committee on unemployment statistics in New York City, informally affiliated with the Industrial Aid Bureau and utilizing the machinery of the Merchants' Association, made reports on the extent of unemployment in that city in December, 1921, and in February and April, 1922. These inquiries attempted only to estimate the number of those unemployed.[1]

[1] See Appendix, p. 226, for brief history of the Conference.
[2] Minutes of Conference and interview with its secretary, W. S. Reynolds.
[3] Minutes of the Mayor's Committee, M. F. Bourjaily, secretary.

Studies of a partial nature were made occasionally by separate organizations. They were generally intended for the guidance of the organization; sometimes they consisted of nothing more than a critical examination of the work of the organization itself as affected by the demands of the depression. In a number of instances such studies were undertaken with a view to pressing for some proposed action on the part either of their own boards or of city authorities, through the presentation of salient facts. In some cases they were made in connection with the President's Conference and by its request. Surveys of this nature, for example, were undertaken in Pittsburgh by the Employers' Association, the Chamber of Commerce, and others;[2] in Kansas City, Mo., by the Chamber of Commerce;[3] in Sioux Falls, S. Dak., by the Family Welfare Association and the Chamber of Commerce;[4] in Chicago by the Charities Endorsement Committee of the Association of Commerce.[5] In almost every case such an inquiry was made once—generally in September or October—then dropped and never resumed. Consecutive sustained inquiries were, with few exceptions, not made as an integral part of community action. They were undertaken, if at all, by separate local organizations on their own initiative, as in the case of the State-City Employment Office in Chicago, the Federal Reserve Bank in Minneapolis, and the Employment Managers' Group in Cleveland.

[1] This committee on unemployment statistics was appointed at the recommendation of the President's Conference by the Commissioner of Public Welfare of New York City, who was one of the three members of the Industrial Aid Bureau of the city. This bureau had been appointed under earlier permissive legislation, and its main achievement during the winter of 1921–22 was the establishment of an emergency employment office. For a further statement about the bureau, see Appendix, p. 239.
[2] John D. Stark, interview of December 9, 1921.
[3] In co-operation with the Federal Employment Service and others. E. F. Fader, District Director, United States Employment Service, interview of January 17, 1922, and J. E. Burke, Chamber of Commerce, interview of January 19, 1922.
[4] Theodore Bock, Family Welfare Association, and Charles McCaffree, Chamber of Commerce, interviews, December 27 and 28, 1921.
[5] Henry Stewart, secretary of Endorsement Committee, Chicago Association of Commerce, interview of March 29, 1922.

More comprehensive from the standpoint of subject matter were studies presented by single organizations or groups of social agencies for the purpose of stimulating municipal action. It was in this manner that the city of Minneapolis came to assume the burden of caring for its homeless men after a survey and presentation of facts by the Council of Social Agencies.[1] The city of Philadelphia was thus approached for special appropriations for the relief of the unemployed, and the city of Chicago for the reopening of a municipal lodging house.

It has been maintained that more comprehensive studies than the foregoing are not necessary, that plans can be made as fast as action is needed. One prominent citizen of a mill city, in defending his reluctance to act in the matter of an employment committee, stated that of course it might be useful to have a representative citizens' committee to study the subject and to make plans, but that anything done in an emergency is necessarily inadequate and too late, while before there is an emergency it is impossible to obtain the necessary sustained interest for fruitful action. Therefore, there is nothing to do.

The winter of 1921–22 showed many instances where lack of previous study and preparation *in time* resulted seriously. In St. Paul the provision of facilities for the care of the homeless came in January, more than two months too late and therefore inadequate; in Minneapolis provision was made in December in great haste, so that no satisfactory work test system could be devised for the men cared for; in Chicago appropriations for the Municipal Lodging House were made at the tail-end of the winter of 1921–22, so that the institution was not reopened; in Philadelphia the tardiness of appropriations by the city and the unavoidable delay in the gift of a private fund received in February by the Society for Organizing Charity caused suffering to families long in want and extraordinary difficulties to the social agency;[2] Boston social agencies were short of funds. Both New Bedford and Boston—equally or worse hit in the winter of 1920–21 than in 1921–22—were little better prepared as communities than other

[1] See Chapter VIII, p. 171.

[2] Miss Betsey Libbey, case supervisor, Society for Organizing Charity, Philadelphia, interview of May 3, 1922. See also Chapter V, p. 100.

cities to meet the second winter. They had had the experience but still had no plan.

On the other hand, those committees that had been organized a reasonable length of time before the onset of the stress of 1921–22 were able to plan and carry on some activities of a very creditable nature. The Mayor's Committee in Hartford, the Welfare Federation Committee of Cleveland, the Unemployment Conference of Chicago, the Industrial Aid Bureau of New York, came about as a result of movements initiated months or even a year before the autumn of 1921–22 and before the meeting of the President's Conference. The Hartford municipal employment work, the Cleveland Community Chest's unemployment emergency fund, the several activities fathered by the Unemployment Conference of Chicago, and the shelters for homeless men conducted in New York could never have accomplished a tithe of what they did if they had had to rush in in October or November. By anticipating the winter's emergency they were able to plan specific measures and to carry them through. Had there been committees in the cities enumerated so devised as to make possible a comprehensive preliminary survey and a checking up of specific activities, really statesmanlike control of the situation might have been possible. In quick, effective, well-supervised emergency work, no large city with complex social conditions could possibly equal a small, fairly homogeneous residential city, such as Evanston, for example, which accomplished an excellent piece of emergency work through its Mayor's Committee in the winter of 1921–22.[1]

2. Publicity. For good or for evil, the possibilities for publicity in most unemployment committees are almost unlimited.[2] It is a tragedy if those possibilities either cannot be utilized or are used to harmful effect. The publicity commanded by the President's Conference was unexcelled and could easily have been harnessed to work for the local community. The question really becomes one of damming and controlling such publicity. From this standpoint, mayors' committees have proved in most instances

[1] For a detailed account see Appendix, p. 230.

[2] A further and more detailed discussion of publicity, especially as relating to methods employed, will be found in Chapter VI, pp. 125 to 132.

very difficult. In the first place, the press feels it has a right to know and discuss public matters and policies, and that the actions of a public body are common property. In the second place, it is rarely possible for a committee appointed by an elective official with strong political affiliations to remain entirely free of political coloring. This is a most important point. It outweighs almost by itself all possible advantages of a mayor's unemployment committee, such as that advocated by the President's Conference of 1921. Where the political lines are not too taut and sensitive it means perhaps no more than storing up political strength. But even where the work of such a committee is not deliberately guided or interfered with for political advantage, the irrelevant alignment of political loyalties weakens its chances for effective work as a committee on unemployment.

Such would seem to have been the experience in Chicago, New York, and Minneapolis, three of the cities studied for the present purpose. The so-called Thompson political machine in Chicago had had a standing feud with an important section of the press. It is of no consequence which side is in the right if either side can and will turn all available material into political munition. Perhaps for this reason, or because he recognized the necessary weakness or ineffectiveness of a committee that he might appoint, Mayor Thompson himself refrained from appointing one until practically forced by pressure from the President's Conference and the subsequent publicity to fall in line.[1] Influential persons, by diplomatic means, prevented serious newspaper controversy, but the situation resulted in inaction by the Mayor's Commission.

In New York City there was little co-operation between private social agencies and the Department of Public Welfare, responsible to the Mayor. Some press controversy was started. Emergency co-operation between public and private agencies remained at the point of a partial co-ordination in measures dealing with the homeless man.

The Minneapolis experience is perhaps even more instructive.

[1] In publicity released by Herbert Hoover, chairman of the President's Conference, during the latter part of the autumn of 1921, Chicago was pointed out as an example of a city that had failed to co-operate by the creation of a Mayor's Emergency Committee on Unemployment. *New York Times*, November 11, 1921.

Labor interests control the common council. The Mayor was elected by forces friendly to employers, and in this group the "open shop" Citizens' Alliance[1] is a powerful factor and the Association of Commerce an influential voice. The social agencies are, of course, mainly supported by that part of the population financially and psychologically removed from the laboring group. The management and staff of the agencies, however, are nearer in sentiment to the aspirations and outlook on life of the families of the workers. A few of the complications that arose may be mentioned by way of example, and most of them were fought out in the press: Registration of the unemployed through the Mayor's Committee was fought by the labor press,[2] and attempts at securing work, by the Citizens' Alliance;[3] appropriations for relief of families of the unemployed and for the homeless were favored and made by the labor forces, and opposed by others as coming from taxation; there was controversy over wages to be paid by the city for relief work under its auspices, and controversy over the inclusion of a strict work test and residence qualifications in the relief of unemployed; the friendly press supplied publicity for relief appropriations, while the opposition press criticized the publicity as designed to bring an influx of outsiders; the public welfare department and the private agencies disagreed in respect to special points involved in the emergency treatment of families of the unemployed. In brief, unemployment and its relief became an issue between labor and employers as politically represented, instead of being faced as a community problem.

This fatal weakness is not, of course, inherent in mayors' committees as such, but in the probable method of appointment and the sources of choice of personnel. In Evanston the latter aspects were favorable and the work of the Mayor's Committee successful. In Cleveland the Mayor's Committee, recognizing that the work had been comprehensively planned and was being adequately carried on by the private agencies, refrained from independent activity or competition in the press; in fact, Mayor Fitzgerald[4]

[1] This organization is considered locally to be a militant foe of the trade unions.
[2] Minneapolis *Daily Star*—Weekly Labor Review.
[3] See also Appendix, p. 236.
[4] Term expired December 31, 1921.

allowed some very good political opportunities to slip by, out of a desire to help the situation. For a long time he refrained from appointing a mayor's committee, even for form's sake.[1] In Columbia a good employment bureau was organized and conducted by the Mayor's Committee, and no press battle ensued. What would have happened in Pittsburgh if a mayor's committee had been appointed is interesting speculation. The press remained almost entirely closed to the publicity sought by private agencies in connection with the unemployment situation.[2]

Another very serious difficulty about mayors' committees is their almost necessary discontinuity and its consequences. In Boston and Cleveland, city administrations changed in the middle of the winter, and the committee appointed by the outgoing Mayor felt that its activities should be suspended or entirely cease with the change of administration.[3] The secretary of the Cleveland Mayor's Committee closed his books as a matter of course, expecting to go with the outgoing Mayor, and he did.

This discontinuity, even when not so palpable as in these two cases, is nevertheless real and serious. In the unemployment relief plans of the present administration in New York City no trace of a reference will be found to the thorough and excellent report of the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment appointed by Mayor Mitchel of the preceding administration. Chicago presents an even more striking example. A Mayor's Commission on Unemployment, consisting of 22 members, was appointed on February 24, 1912, by Carter H. Harrison, then Mayor. This commission, of which the late Charles R. Henderson was secretary, made an exhaustive report on the subject in March, 1914. The present form and, to a large extent, the efficiency of the Illinois Free Employment Service is due to the efforts of that commission. Such extraordinary accomplishment was worth study in the emergency of 1920–22. Yet there is no trace in the composition,

[1] James F. Jackson, Associated Charities of Cleveland, interview of December 13, 1921.

[2] Miss Nell Scott, Mrs. C. Seidle, and Miss Mary J. R. Condon, Pittsburgh, interviews of December 7 and 8, 1921.

[3] In Hartford, also, the administration changed, though not until early in May, 1922.

organization, or procedure of the Mayor's Commission of 1921–22 of any knowledge of the record of its predecessor of 1914.

Apparently, even the subject of unemployment cannot be treated on its own merits and without regard to political effect or to the probabilities of the next election.

This fact of discontinuity, added to the factors entering into the appointment of personnel, the difficulty in obtaining continuous appropriations, and the necessity of actively maintaining visible party enterprises, militates against the usefulness of a mayor's committee, not only in respect to scholarly research, long-time planning, and purposive publicity, but also in respect to undertaking any permanent leadership in co-ordination, any successful administrative task, or any disinterested pressure on groups or individuals.[1] This raises the question to be discussed, later, of whether any committee is able to do all these things or should be expected to do them.[2] And, if not, is there a distribution of functions that may combine the possibilities or excellences of a variety of types of committees or organizations?

3. Co-ordination of Activities. There has been co-ordination of undertakings, especially of those of an emergency nature, both in connection with unemployment committees and independently of them. The extent of co-ordination has in general been proportionate to the state of development of the social agencies in the community. In Kansas City, Mo., where very little emergency work was carried on or called for and no central unemployment committee of any kind existed, most complete co-ordination obtained under the council of social agencies. Similar was the experience in Cleveland through the Welfare Federation and in

[1] In some of the southern states the boll-weevil ruined many farmers, large and small. The effects have been particularly disastrous to tenants, a large proportion of whom are Negroes. Their landlords, often as hard hit as themselves and without other resources, were unable to advance the necessary money and equipment to enable their tenants to put in a new crop. As a result, hundreds or possibly thousands of families have become stranded and are endeavoring to get to the cities, hoping to find something to do there. It is exceedingly important to stop this wholesale city-ward migration of large families without resources or industrial skill. It is a matter directly affecting employment. This can be done only by carefully organized and continuous publicity, which must cover several states—the tri-state territory around a city like Memphis, for example. It can hardly be done by committees whose existence, tenure, and policy pivot about election day.

[2] See Section II of this chapter, p. 50.

other cities with central organization of their social agencies. Co-ordination was also satisfactory in Boston, where neither federation not active mayor's committee existed, but where a long-standing delimitation of fields of endeavor between agencies was strengthened by a newly organized central council. A good record for general co-ordination was made by the Chicago Conference of Unemployment, interlocked with the central council of social agencies.

On the whole, however, the leadership of single agencies and the habits inherent in their work have been the co-ordinating forces. Neither mayors' nor other unemployment committees were in the lead. In fact, some of the central councils of social agencies, upon whom leadership would naturally devolve, have been surprisingly lacking in initiative in this direction when compared with the individual agencies. In special directions, particularly, the work of co-ordination remained the task of the several agencies or their executives. Among the agencies dealing with homeless men, this was found to be true of the United Charities of St. Paul, the Union City Mission and Associated Charities in Minneapolis, and the Co-operative Bureau for registering homeless applicants in New York. The American Legion was responsible for goading the St. Paul Association into such action, but that body, unsupported by any driving faith or interest in making its co-operative employment plan a success, sagged under the weight of its machinery.

4. Administrative Activities. The criticism most frequently made of unemployment committees has been that they did nothing but talk. Whether, if true, this really constitutes damaging criticism, depends largely upon the question of what such committees can or should do, if "do" means definite action of a type requiring administrative work. It may be well to group the cities with reference to this question.

Evanston, Columbia, and Hartford are cities of 37,000, 38,000, and 138,000 respectively. New York and Chicago belong, as regards population, at the other extreme, while Boston, Cleveland, Minneapolis, and St. Paul are intermediate in size. The mayors' committees in each of the smaller cities named had undertaken specific emergency tasks, consisting mainly of em-

ployment service. Neither Evanston nor Columbia had previously had free employment bureaus. Both had mayors' committees of small membership. These committees conducted very creditable temporary free employment service, including not only the task of "clearing" but also that of stimulating potential jobs. There was a concentration of effort on a single task by a small group, with no friction, jealousies, or political maneuverings. *In small cities, small unemployment committees consisting of public-spirited capable men selecting a single activity have been able to make a good job of it.* Hartford is fully three times the size of Columbia or Evanston. It abounds in social agencies and has a central council. The latter, while it took the initiative in urging the consideration of the unemployment problem, refused to be responsible for any "administrative" task. The employment service was conducted by the executive committee of the mayor's committee, through the staff of a municipal Americanization committee. It mixed registration of the unemployed with relief work, public works and employment service, and functioned as an employment agency for the relief organizations. The amount of work was greater and more varied, the difficulties more numerous, the relative success less uniform than in the two smaller cities.

In the larger cities, with the exception of New York, unemployment committees refrained from assuming responsibility for any specific services. Perhaps nothing can be proved by what was *not* done, but the uniformity of this self-restraint does seem to be significant of the general conviction that administrative services are handled with difficulty by a temporary body lacking experience in routine. Every activity fathered, stimulated, or even financed by such committees was generally turned over in whole or in part to an existing agency. In St. Paul, indeed, a small bit of new machinery was set up for supplementary employment service and under a special unemployment committee of the Greater St. Paul committee, but this service proved in a short time an utter failure and waste. In New York, the Industrial Aid Bureau, although it is really a semi-permanent body, undertook only one separate, new task, namely, the employment service, and there is no general agreement as to how successful this service has been.

5. Stimulation of the General Public. On some points in connection with unemployment there has been fairly general agreement. It has been conceded as desirable that working forces in factories and shops, if possible, be not cut down; that the offer of jobs by citizens be stimulated; that public works, in so far as they are desirable, be undertaken; that "sprucing up," housecleaning, repair work, and so on, be started or expedited. In a general way, the unemployment committees have been expected to stimulate these procedures: to urge industrial plants to maintain their working forces, if necessary by manufacturing for stock, by rotating part-time employment, by reducing hours; to urge private homes, clubs, institutions, to do their repair work, painting, cleaning, during the depression; and to expedite public works either by obtaining, or by making immediately available, appropriations from city, county, state, and national government.

There are two general methods by which this stimulation can be effected; their relative merits have not been and perhaps cannot be ascertained. Both, however, are necessary and supplement each other. One operates by sheer publicity especially through the press; the other by painstaking, detailed follow-up work. Undoubtedly, for publicity alone a central committee, and particularly a mayor's committee, is most effective. For detailed approach, sub-committees or individuals are best. There has been little stimulation of the latter kind by mayors' committees. Work of this nature was performed chiefly through supplementary service by chambers of commerce, manufacturers' associations, church federations, women's clubs, American Legion posts, small committees of social agencies, and by influential citizens or public meetings of citizens. It has been exceedingly difficult to estimate the effects of such stimulation in any direction, but the opinions of professional workers and of unattached citizens agree that it has been of value.

II. SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMMITTEES

Administrative undertakings by emergency committees, then, were not found save in small cities. Co-ordination of activities is better practised in other ways than through such committees. Study, planning, research, appear to be practicable but little

practised by them. Publicity is a fertile field, but weeds have as good a chance as the crop. Administrative measures of whatever nature, from family relief to public works, are best applied by experienced organizations through trained personnel. What, then, would seem a practicable general type of plan for unemployment committees?

For practical purposes three major groups of possible functions may be assumed, as comprising the interests of such committees:

1. Preparatory activities, such as research, planning, co-ordination
2. Administrative activities
3. Publicity.

The first group of functions requires continuity, trained personnel, close touch with first-hand facts and conditions, and patient, painstaking research.[1] The second group of functions requires experience and flexibility to allow for change and expansion in any contingency. The third must be carried on by a group universally recognized as truly representative of the public—a group that has potential news value, is able to focus public opinion, and has some access to the purse of the community, public or private. Many combinations are possible that would allow for this distribution of functions. The combination here suggested is of a general type that would seem, with some modifications, to be practicable in most large cities.

1. Composition of the Committee and Distribution of Functions. What might be called a survey committee on economic conditions to take care of the first group of functions could be appointed by the central council of social agencies in a city, by its welfare federation, or by a group of executives of social and civic agencies meeting for the purpose. The committee might conveniently consist of some dozen members, chosen *not as representatives* of their respective organizations but as individuals known to have the necessary interest, training, connections, and time. Such persons would undoubtedly be found among the faculties of universities, the staff of family welfare societies and other social agencies, the federal reserve banks, chambers of commerce, trade unions, welfare federations, insurance companies, industrial plants, state or

[1] The details of such possible research are discussed in Part II.

city employment bureaus or labor departments, and possibly church federations, newspapers, and so on. There may be indefinite variation from city to city because individuals would be called in by the accident of their personal qualifications, not as representatives of organizations. Such persons as these have as a matter of fact been gathering data and interpreting conditions in their particular cities, but have been doing this as isolated units, not only not organically related but not even brought together—they or their labors. The committee would consider and determine upon plans of study, would probably divide up the work among the members of the committee as individuals or as subcommittees, and might add other persons to these subcommittees, as required by the work.

The inquiry could cover all the important phases of the subject: business conditions, savings accounts, business failures, stock turnover in merchandizing concerns, employment in factories, trade and transportation, building operations, employment service, production indices of industrial plants, nation-wide business matters, local housing, relief and service, changes in population, and so on. The important thing, besides relevancy, is continuity of this type of inquiry. While not more than an annual check-up might be required in normal times, the frequency of collecting data would be increased according to need, in time of emergency. In cities having a central council of social agencies or a welfare federation, such a proposed committee might be one of the standing or affiliated committees of the council or federation. Where there is no such central council or federation, the proposed committee might be affiliated with some existing permanent agency or body. To judge from the relative degree of interest and participation of social agencies in the work of the past winter, the family welfare society might be the permanent body that would best serve the purpose. Possibly an endowed research body or a competent university faculty may prove the most practicable nucleus. The survey committee should report from time to time to the general membership of the central council or to a meeting of the interested social agencies or of the board of the organization with which it is affiliated.

In time of emergency the work of this committee can be ex-

panded or turned into special fields of inquiry, as circumstances may require. To judge from the number of studies made by many organizations during the winter of 1921–22, hit or miss, in one corner of the field or another, there can be no doubt of the practicability of such extension, even if special funds have to be raised for the purpose.

Let it be clearly understood that this committee would not be designed either for administrative work or for supplying publicity material directly to the public or even to the social agencies. Its work need be no more generally known than that of the federal bureau of standards or hydrography, or any other one of thousands of continuous pieces of research carried on in many places under many auspices for a great variety of purposes. The work of a continuous local survey committee, observing the changing economic and social conditions, would constitute the routine, scientific preparedness for the service of social engineers in the community. Some specific suggestions regarding the statistical researches that might come within the field of such a committee are presented in another chapter.[1]

2. Administrative Activities. Administrative undertakings growing out of emergency needs can in almost all instances best be handled by existing agencies; in *almost* all, but there are exceptions. For example, the public employment work in a number of cities has been so poor, inefficient, or politics-ridden that, unless a movement strong enough to force it up to an acceptable level were successfully launched, and despite the valid theoretical objection to the establishment of temporary employment agencies, no honest doubts could be entertained as to their necessity in such places in emergencies. This fact has justified in many places the otherwise indefensible opening of emergency employment bureaus by American Legion posts.

The most important tasks growing out of emergency needs are: family relief and social treatment, treatment of homeless men, employment service, relief in the form of made work, public works relief. In all these the emergency brings the necessity of expansion or of co-ordination. In a number of the cities, groups of agencies dealing with the same problem have spontaneously come together

[1] See Part II, Chapter IX, p. 185.

to co-ordinate their work. Where active welfare federations or central councils exist, such group meetings for co-ordination are easily brought about, or become almost automatic—as in Cleveland, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Mo.

Even the raising of emergency funds can be undertaken through existing media and have been so undertaken most effectively. The establishment of new agencies or administrative units is defensible only when no organization already functioning can do the job, but then it may be demanded by the circumstances. Employment service and also the care of homeless men have occasionally required new machinery.

The tendency has been to think too much of administrative tasks in connection with emergency unemployment committees. Such tasks can be seen and talked about. The sense of accomplishment more easily emanates from them. Credit can be claimed. Statistics can be quoted of amounts expended, of the number of jobs secured, and so on, and the existence of the committee justified to the general public. Experience shows, however, that the field of administrative services is the one in which least done is best done, so far as temporary agencies are concerned.

3. Publicity. In the third group of functions—public education and support through publicity—the great potential usefulness of mayors' committees or other representative public emergency committees is seen. Such an emergency committee, however, cannot be and need not be permanent. In fact, it should not be. Its appointment should be timed to the need of "publicity," and should follow the gathering of facts and the arrangement of plans by the other type of committee previously described and by the social agencies upon which will devolve the administrative tasks.

4. Choice of Personnel. The basis for effective work of an emergency committee lies in the manner of its appointment, its personnel, organization, energy. A committee appointed in haste, under pressure, in consequence of reluctant compromise or in the face of indifference, has small chances for excellence. If the committee is too large or is drawn from such diverse sources that the members cannot come to know each other and effect a real exchange of opinion or group thinking, the likelihood of accom-

plishment is poor. Mayors' committees have given signal proof of this. Mayor Thompson of Chicago, as has been said, was virtually forced into appointing his Unemployment Commission and did it almost overnight. The result was a top-heavy group, a house divided against itself. It consisted of large membership, composed roughly of a majority of aldermen and a minority of leading business men. The former were supporters of the Mayor's administration, while the latter included many persons who were known to have been antagonistic to the Mayor—including publishers of anti-administration newspapers.[1] Meetings of the Commission were ill-attended, infrequent, deficient in program, given to speech-making, and reluctant to act. They had, moreover, no contact in any way with the actual situation as it affected the unemployed men and women, and no machinery for obtaining facts.

The Boston committee, though appointed under good auspices and without undue pressure or irrelevant political maneuvering, had thirty-odd members with little common ground and met but a few times. It was removed from the work of dealing with the unemployed, was weighted with indifference, although considered "representative." The same desire for representativeness killed the possible effectiveness of the Minneapolis Mayor's Committee.

It is common experience that often small committees may act, large ones will not—almost cannot. In Columbia and Evanston the mayors' committees were small—six members each. They achieved results. In Cleveland, inconspicuous subcommittees of two and three quietly achieved their aims. In New York the Industrial Aid Bureau consisted of three persons and carried much administrative work. In Hartford a small subcommittee had direct supervision of the employment work, and the general committee was hardly ever thought of.

5. An Example: Chicago. Why, then, did Chicago's unofficial emergency committee—the Chicago Conference on Unemployment—accomplish so many specific things despite its large membership, composed of some thirty-odd organizations (represented

[1] Harry M. Beardsley and Willoughby Walling, interviews of March 29 and March 31, 1922.

chiefly by executives), and despite, also, the existence of a Mayor's Commission, appointed later and larger in size? The answer lies in part at least in the following facts: The agencies joined in the Unemployment Conference had been considering the situation and proceeding toward organization some eight or nine months before the meeting of the President's Conference on Unemployment in September, 1921. They had had co-operative service relations with each other even earlier. Many of them had been associated with or knew of the Mayor's Commission of 1914 and its secretary, Mr. Henderson, and had witnessed the permanent benefits that had grown from the work of that committee. The Chicago Conference followed the grooves of organization established by the Central Council of Social Agencies, strengthened this council and was in turn strengthened by it, using its officers and administrative machinery. The work of the Conference was well under way and the field, in a sense, pre-empted long before the Mayor's Commission was appointed, and the chairman of the former, as member of the latter, retarded ill-advised independent action. The Conference membership *represented* not group interests in the population, which may or may not have had experience in dealing with unemployment, but agencies whose service had been directly related to the various problems of the people in trouble; they could be counted upon for specific work as individuals, agencies, or groups of agencies. Lastly, they were well organized into working committees: a subcommittee on public works, one on relief, one on special relief funds, one on "procurement" work in connection with the public employment bureau, one on publicity to prevent the influx to the city of people out of work, one on the reopening of the Municipal Lodging House. The value of the Conference in its totality was not, it is true, tested to the limit, for conditions in Chicago did not become catastrophic in dimensions or exceed the resources of existing social agencies. But within the limits of the winter's test it justified its origin and methods—its early start, preparedness, mode of coming into being, personnel, organization, activities.

No committee of any kind can do much without the sincere interest of the organizations represented on it or the devoted energies of individuals. Whatever was accomplished by com-

mittees in Hartford, New York, Cleveland, Chicago, Columbia, Evanston, is attributable to such interest and energy.

III. STATE AND NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT COMMITTEES

The consideration of other than local committees, save in so far as they influenced plans in the cities visited, is outside the field of the present study. In a few instances only did state committees or governors' commissions undertake any local work. Not many such state bodies existed. They were of fleeting importance only, from our standpoint, in such cities as Cleveland, Minneapolis, and St. Paul, and had to do mainly with the survey of conditions and some general stimulation. In Boston the State Commission to Promote Work actually obtained $100,000 in state appropriations and spent $60,000 of it, practically all in Boston.[1] For purposes of publicity such committees had the usual possibilities, but they did not interfere with the local work, for good or for evil. It is highly desirable where extant state bodies may be drawn upon or profitably co-operated with, that no opportunity for such co-operation be lost.

Very different, necessarily, has been the experience with the President's Conference on Unemployment, composed of individuals drawn from many parts of the country. Of the twelve general recommendations in the emergency program of the President's Conference, six may be considered to have applied directly to cities. They were:

1. The problem of meeting the emergency of unemployment is primarily a community problem. The responsibility for leadership is with the mayor and should be immediately assumed by him.

2. The basis of organization should be an emergency committee representing the various elements in the community. This committee should develop and carry through a community plan for meeting the emergency, using existing agencies and local groups as far as practicable. One immediate step should be to co-ordinate and establish efficient public employment agencies and to register all those desiring work. It should co-ordinate the work of the various charitable institutions. Registration for relief should be entirely separate from that for employment.

3. The personnel of the employment agencies should be selected with consideration to fitness only and should be directed to find the right job

[1] See Chapter III, p. 77.

for the right man and should actively canvass and organize the community for opportunities for employment. The registry for employment should be surrounded with safeguards and should give priority in employment to residents. Employers should give preference to the emergency employment agencies.

4. The emergency committees should regularly publish the numbers dependent upon them for employment and relief, that the community may be apprised of its responsibility. Begging and unco-ordinated solicitation of funds should be prevented.

5. Private houses, hotels, offices, etc., can contribute to the situation by doing their repairs, cleaning, and alterations during the winter instead of waiting until spring, when employment will be more plentiful.

6. Public construction is better than relief. The municipalities should expand their school, street, sewerage, repair work, and public building to the fullest possible volume compatible with the existing circumstances. That existing circumstances are favorable is indicated by the fact that over $700,000,000 of municipal bonds, the largest amount in history, have been sold in 1921. Of these, $106,000,000 were sold by 333 municipalities in August. Municipalities should give short-time employment the same as other employers. . . .

What was the effect of these recommendations in so far as the experience of the 15 cities under review indicates? In 7 of the 15, the mayor took no action whatever. In the 8 remaining, 4 had active mayors' emergency committees that can show results—New York, Columbia, Evanston, Hartford; of these, 2, New York and Hartford, had been organized before the President's Conference but were stimulated by it. In Columbia and Evanston, directly as a result of the Conference, mayors took responsibility and appointed committees which functioned. Responsibility for leadership has not been generally assumed by mayors. No acceptance is indicated of the principle laid down in the report of the Conference that "the mayors of cities are the natural and authorized leaders and directors of their communities for all emergencies affecting the public welfare. In the present crisis the mayor should head the effort of each locality and organize the most influential and representative citizens and agencies to handle the local situation."[1]

[1] Report, Committee on Municipal Organization for Unemployment, October 5, 1921, in Report of the President's Conference on Unemployment, Washington, D. C., 1921, Government Printing Office, p. 61.

Even where mayors' committees were appointed, leadership was neither with that committee nor with the mayor, with the exception of the small cities of Evanston and Columbia, and, even of these, the former achieved its practical results through the chairman of its small executive committee, a clergyman.[1] Leadership was exercised in a few cases by citizens' committees, but mostly individuals or agencies independent of the city government carried the burden of initiative. The emergency committees—advocated by the President's Conference—were not the "basis of organization," and no such committee even attempted to publish regularly the numbers dependent upon them for employment or relief.

New York City may, in a sense, be considered to have had a successful emergency committee, appointed by the Mayor. It consisted of an "advisory committee" of large membership, supporting a "bureau" of three persons. This bureau, in fact, was a real emergency committee, possessed initiative, and took action. It can hardly be considered to have exercised leadership, however, in view of its absolute failure to carry out the fundamental of leadership emphasized by later instructions from the President's Conference, that mayors "try to harmonize the operations of all the different agencies which are trying to relieve the situation, so as to avoid clashing and wasted effort."

So much for the general recommendations of the emergency program of the President's Conference. This program was announced on September 30, 1921. It was followed, on October 5, 1921, by a report of the Committee on Municipal Organization for Unemployment, which enlarged somewhat on the points in the emergency program.

This committee, upon the adjournment of the Conference in October, 1921, became the Committee on Civic and Emergency Measures and constituted itself a dual instrument to stimulate cities to action on the one hand and, on the other hand, to serve as a clearing house for information and publicity on the emergency work undertaken by the cities. It would take us far afield to discuss in detail the achievements of this committee. Observations in the cities visited failed to disclose any important results.

[1] Rev. Dr. J. M. Stifler, chairman, Mayor's Committee.

The information gathered by the committee was not always checked up before it was made public. Sometimes erroneous statements and inept advice were circulated. Unsupported opinions and judgments of local correspondents were quoted by the committee and given nation-wide circulation through the press.

Nothing that has come from the President's Conference and nothing in the experience of national or local organizations would justify the expectation that, for the purpose of dealing with local emergency situations, a national machinery can set up uniform methods for local service or prescribe detailed procedure, though it might, by careful study and research, bring to the local communities the verified experience of others. The community must, in the main, do its own thinking and planning. Moreover, nothing that we have discovered in our inquiry would indicate that the mayor is the natural leader in an unemployment situation, or that the emergency committees advocated are the best machinery to deal with unemployment. It was very clear, moreover, that untested information about one community cannot be safely utilized in another.

CHAPTER III

WORK

A CERTAIN amount of unemployment both locally and in the country as a whole is due to lack of information regarding the labor market. Demands for workers exist while qualified persons, desirous of filling them, are without employment. This maladjustment between demand for and supply of labor obtains not only within particular centers but also between centers and in the country as a whole. It persists because of the frequent absence of adequate local employment service and of incomplete co-ordination of such services for the nation. It is further aggravated by the evils inherent in the fee-charging commercial labor exchanges. A national public employment service, properly organized and co-ordinated with state and local services, would go a good way toward reducing the amount of persistent unemployment; and while it could not entirely meet an unemployment emergency, it would mitigate considerably its severity.

There are two quite distinct classes of emergency employment. First, there is employment at existing jobs, and, second, at potential jobs to be discovered or stimulated by organized effort. The task of distributing or allocating these two classes of jobs to the applicants on principles sound in themselves, yet not incompatible with the demands of the emergency, is one of considerable difficulty. It may be convenient in this chapter to deal separately with the questions of *finding work* at existing jobs, of *increasing work* though emergency measures, and of *distributing work* on constructive social principles.

I. FINDING WORK

There would be little need for emergency machinery in an employment depression in any community if, ordinarily, it had sufficient employment service. Commercial employment service has failed to meet the common need not only because frequently it has been marred by fraud and exploitation, but because the demand

for profits has been subversive of the basic principles of such service, and excessively costly to the worker even in normal times. No relief during a depression may be looked for in this direction. Public employment service has in very few cases been adequate in ordinary times. It has certainly, with a few rare exceptions, not attained that state of efficiency which is equal to furnishing initiative in an emergency, nor has it, on the whole, developed sufficient flexibility to adapt itself to unusual conditions. Moreover, political influences often hamper its usefulness.

1. Temporary Public Employment Service. To make public employment offices serve the emergency, such offices must be available, of course, and they must be equal in size, efficiency, flexibility, and public confidence to the task in hand.

In four of the cities visited—Columbia, Evanston, Memphis, and New Bedford—there was no permanent public employment service. All but Evanston are important central points. That during an emergency, at least, the existence of a public employment office is justified, was proved by the temporary employment services established in Evanston and Columbia by the mayors' unemployment committees of those cities. In Columbia, a non-manufacturing city of barely 38,000 inhabitants, a single worker had in three months placed 250 out of 705 applicants, a little over half of them colored.[1] Most of these would probably have found no jobs for themselves, or only with great loss of time and morale. Evanston, proportionally, did even better.[2] In about three months nearly half of the 228 applicants had been placed, over one-third being colored. In Evanston the members of the Mayor's Committee added personal efforts to the public support.

The sad fact about temporary service is that of necessity it is launched too late, and then must spend a great deal of the most precious initial period in setting up its machinery, establishing relationships, and getting its bearings. Nevertheless it is worth the effort, not only because of whatever success it may have in actual placements, but also because it is one of the healthiest

[1] Report by W. S. Willingham, secretary, January 31, 1922.

[2] Report of Carl A. Smith, employment secretary, Evanston Mayor's Committee on Unemployment.

manifestations of public interest and participation, and may lead to a permanent employment service.

2. Regular Public Employment Service—Chicago's Experience.[1] All the other cities visited did and do have public employment offices, conducted either by state or by city, or jointly by both. How have they succeeded in performing the task of finding all available jobs, and to what extent have they rendered unnecessary any private philanthropic attempts or the launching of temporary agencies?

The Chicago offices of the Illinois Free Employment Service may serve as an example of satisfactory functioning in an emergency. Incidentally, the Illinois office also demonstrates that, where normal service is best, there the emergency is also most successfully met.

The Illinois state service has offices in twelve cities besides Chicago.[2] At the latter office are the headquarters of the State Advisory Board of five persons, with its research staff. Beginning with September, 1921, the board has been publishing a monthly employment bulletin containing state-wide figures on employment obtained from co-operating firms, and statistics of the work of the employment service offices. These are given both in absolute figures and as ratios of applicants per hundred jobs open. The Chicago offices are under the general superintendence of Charles J. Boyd, who has held office since the reorganization of the offices in 1915.[3] The Chicago service has been active in discouraging a

[1] This is not an evaluation of public employment offices as such; nor does it imply that there were not many others throughout the country which were doing their full part in the emergency. That is not a part of our story. The Chicago case is cited merely as one which has something to teach with reference to our immediate problem.

[2] The first Illinois Free Employment Service was established in 1899, but the legislative act creating it was declared unconstitutional in 1903 because of a clause relating to strikes. In the same year, however, the law was re-enacted, omitting the objectionable clause. The present service was established after a report by a special commission appointed in 1914, with Charles R. Crane as chairman and Prof. Charles R. Henderson as secretary, and much of its present efficiency may be attributed to the excellent work done by that commission in 1914, and to the legislative enactments in 1915 which had been recommended by it.

[3] The present staff of the Chicago office consists of 49 persons, exclusive of the advisory committee and its staff of two "labor investigators"; of the latter, one is a member of the faculty of the Northwestern University and carries on the statistical research and editorial work connected with the publication of the monthly bulletin. The annual appropriation for the Chicago office is about $100,000, exclusive of advisory committee, and constitutes about half of the total employment service appropriation for the state. Mr. Boyd, interview of March 28, 1922.

multiplicity of potentially competing free employment services, while encouraging those that help to cover intensively the more specialized fields, such as the Jewish and the colored groups.[1] To avoid duplication by social agencies, which are daily confronted with a certain amount of employment work for their clients, the public employment office has assumed the task of acting practically as their placement agent. This arrangement has been satisfactory to the agencies and is carried on by the office despite some difficulties arising from the fact that the clients referred by social agencies are often more difficult material than the general run of applicants.

The first meeting of persons concerned in the problem of unemployment was called by the General Advisory Board of Illinois Free Employment Offices on December 16, 1920, when the records of the Illinois Free Employment Offices showed a steadily increasing number of applicants compared with the decreasing number of available opportunities, and a meeting of a larger group was held on December 22, 1920, to consider the matter of unemployment in Chicago and methods to relieve it.[2] A meeting of representatives of civic and social agencies called by Dr. Graham Taylor in August, 1921, included Mr. Boyd, of the Chicago office of the Free Employment Service; the Unemployment Conference which grew out of this meeting had that office among its members, depended upon Mr. Boyd for information, and concentrated its employment service at his office.

The specific emergency activities that devolved upon the public employment service in Chicago as a result of this intimate cooperation and of its competent basic organization are very suggestive. They were, chiefly:

1. Increased "procurement service" during the winter of 1921–22.

2. Auxiliary procurement service by the Woman's City Club, the Chicago Association of Commerce, the Manufacturers' Association, the Federation of Churches, the Fire Department, and so forth.

[1] There are effective services conducted by the Jewish Social Service Bureau, and by the Urban League for Negroes, both deserving careful study.

[2] Records of the Illinois Free Employment Service, data supplied by Mr. Boyd, letter of December 28, 1922.

A special committee of the Chicago Unemployment Conference, appointed to consider the question of procurement of employment, reported October 21, 1921, in part as follows:[1]

The Committee believes the procurement of work, and placement of men and women at work, constitutes a most important service in relieving the stress of any period of unemployment. The Committee further believes that there must be centralized machinery through which the mobilizing of jobs, and the placement of men and women applying for them, be administratively co-ordinated.

The Illinois Free Employment service is Chicago's city-wide free service, available to receive information regarding all types of work to be done, and to receive applicants for work of all types, assigning them to the available positions. This service should have the maximum of city-wide publicity, making it thoroughly known to the community, and should be strengthened in whatever points it needs to be strengthened and used to its fullest capacity.

The Committee suggests two lines of effort:

1. Publicity to inform the people of Chicago, including large industrial employers, employers of smaller numbers of workers, down to the householder who may have need of workers for the odd jobs, what the State Free Employment Service is and how to use it.
2. The solicitation of employment, systematically organized and administered, under the direction of the Illinois Free Employment Service.

To assist the Illinois Free Employment Bureau in stimulating and securing employment, the Committee suggests that provision be made for an extension of the service to include more solicitation for work from employers. For this there are two possibilities:

1. To secure from sources outside the Illinois Free Employment appropriation funds to pay the salaries of qualified persons to solicit employment under a systematic plan, directed by the Illinois Free Employment office, and
2. To secure volunteer service of men and women who are qualified and are willing to give scheduled time to the employment office to solicit employment.

If the suggestions of this Committee meet the approval of this Conference, the Committee will proceed along these lines.

These recommendations were accepted, and on November 28, 1921, a temporary procurement bureau was established in the

[1] For more details on the Chicago Unemployment Conference, see Chapter II, especially pp. 55 to 57.

public employment office, supported by a gift from the Industrial Club and the Commercial Club of Chicago.[1]

By means of this gift, four employes were engaged, and the employment service supplemented these four by four others. While the value of this supplementary service was generally conceded, it had also some weak points.[2] Despite the formal amalgamation of the new temporary staff with the regular personnel of the service, some friction arose from the fact that the former were financed, appointed by, and in reality responsible to an outside group. Another, and more serious, tangible difficulty was the duplication of work; that is, the temporary staff solicited firms that had already been co-operating with the employment service and reported jobs already noted in the files of the office. The chief of the temporary staff reported (to the chairman of the Unemployment Conference) 8,548 visits by the staff, and 2,190 "opportunities" listed in sixty-five and one-half days from December 1, 1921, to February 25, 1922.[3] As a net result in placements attributable to this work, Mr. Boyd reports 847, of which number 300 were female.[4] A tally of the jobs for women reported back by the temporary staff shows the extent of duplication in the work:

JOBS FOR WOMEN

	With firms previously known	With firms not previously known	Total
Factory	102	29	131
Clerical	61	23	84
Restaurant	12	9	21
Hotel	3	2	5
	178	63	241
Domestic			77
Day's work			85
			403

Since domestic workers had been continuously scarce, and placement practically 100 per cent, the 77 places of this type re-

[1] Letter from Mr. Boyd to Col. Arthur Woods, December 17, 1921, and interviews with Mr. Boyd in December, 1921.

[2] Interviews, Charles J. Boyd and staff.

[3] Willoughby Walling, Chairman of the Unemployment Conference, interview of March 31, 1922.

[4] Charles J. Boyd, interview of March 31, 1922.

ported may be disregarded. Of the other jobs offered, 70 per cent (178 out of 241) were solicited from firms already co-operating. Moreover, some 45 of the jobs so obtained were finally cancelled. Many of the clerical jobs for both men and women were to sell on commission, a type of occupation generally so unprofitable that private employment agencies do not handle it;[1] many of the factory openings were piece-work jobs like manufacturing of lamp shades, artificial flowers, and the like, also deemed so unprofitable as to be entirely undesirable. The experience with work openings for men was stated to have been quite similar. The net benefit of the *procurement* service appears, therefore, from the standpoint of successful placement, to have been slight.

Nevertheless, considerable value was conceded to this emergency method.[2] It advertised the service, helped educate the public regarding the unemployment situation, furthered the centralization of free placement work, and knitted more closely the co-operative relations between the public employment service, the employing public, and social agencies. The weaknesses can be remedied and the type of procurement work adopted in modified form as a regular feature of emergency employment service. In Mr. Boyd's opinion the supplementary staff should be introduced gradually, should be taken on by the general superintendent, utilized to replace some of the clerical force in the service, so as to relieve for field work the more experienced staff, and be financed by the service itself from emergency funds to be supplied by the legislature when conditions are declared (by some such competent authority as the state advisory board of the public employment service) to require emergency measures.

The number of placements recorded as a result of the co-operation of the Woman's City Club is given as 891, of which 350 were made through the Illinois Free Employment Service. These figures give only a minority of recorded placements, and take no account of the "endless chain" placements—that is, the passing on of workers from householder to householder without referral

[1] The Illinois Free Employment Service, being a public service, was nevertheless obliged to accept these orders for help.

[2] Charles J. Boyd, interview, March 29, 1922.

back to the employment service. They represent, however, the foundation of the entire plan, which was predicated upon the co-operation and assistance of the public agency.[1]

Among auxiliary services was "a house to house canvass by firemen, under the direction of 23 battalion chiefs, to compel householders to remove from their premises, as a fire prevention measure, all combustible material and refuse. This campaign resulted in

[1] A full report of its employment work in 1921–22, a copy of which has been obtained through the kindness of Miss Helen Montegriffo, ward secretary, was issued by the Woman's City Club of Chicago in May, 1922. The following excerpts from the report present some of its salient features:

"In forty-eight hours (after the approval of the plan) the fifteen organized branches had Unemployment Chairmen appointed. In wards where we had no organization or chairman preparing to organize, the members of the Club, residents of each ward, were 'phoned to in alphabetical order until someone was reached who had the time and interest to take up the work. Letters of instruction were mailed to Unemployment Chairmen, and these letters were followed by telephone calls with further explanation as to what was to be done."

These letters were accompanied by a list, giving current wages for a considerable number and variety of jobs. The letters read in part as follows:

"My dear—— December 8, 1921.

"We take great pleasure in accepting your valuable services as Chairman of Unemployment for the.....ward.

"INSTRUCTIONS: When you are telephoned to by someone wishing to engage a person, please fill out the white card on the face side only. Do this accurately. At the expiration of your hours for receiving 'phone calls or as soon thereafter as possible, telephone Miss Dibble of the Illinois Free Employment Office, Randolph 7140. In 'phoning say: 'Miss Dibble, this is the.....ward district, Mrs.....' Then repeat everything that you have written on your application cards.

"Your work regarding the application is then over and you are to assume that a worker is supplied. In the event the Illinois Free cannot supply someone for a particular 'job,' especially if a time is set for the commencement of the work, then you will be 'phoned to, to that effect by the Illinois Free Employment Office. Keep the cards which you will fill out that we may call upon you for a record of the number of applications which you have taken and transferred to the Illinois Free whenever we may be asked for this information. Note: When the Illinois Free sends a person to the prospective employer they always 'phone the employer to get a record of the kind of service rendered by the employee.

"Tell your applicants for workers that every worker is instructed to have a reference in his pocket. If they will only accept workers with references they must state that at the time they apply to you.

"Explain to applicants that neither the Woman's City Club nor the Illinois Free make any effort to say what salary these people shall be paid, but you will be supplied, under separate cover, with a list of the kinds of work and the salary which is generally paid at the present time for that particular kind of work. You may cite these usual wages to any one asking what they should pay.

"Please encourage everyone to have work done. See that a notice gets into your local paper with your name and 'phone number. Have this notice encourage everyone who wishes whitewashing, cellar cleaning, attic cleaning, paint washing, window washing, chimney cleaning, or someone to mind the baby, etc., and small dealers

the creation of many short-time jobs."[1] The churches co-operated in observing an unemployment Sunday and in giving publicity to the service from the pulpit and through the church federation publications.

It would seem, then, that the Illinois Free Employment Service in Chicago met its task. No new agencies were needed and none was established. Many new tasks were undertaken, however, in co-operation with the expanding program of the service as it endeavored to meet the greater demands upon it of finding work.

None of the regular, permanent public employment services

desiring extra help on certain days to 'phone you between the hours which you have set. . . ."

By April 1, 1922, the following results were reported:

	(A) Opportunities:		
"Number of 'jobs'	found	891	
	filled	868	(23 unfilled)
	found that were filled by Ill. Free	350	
	filled directly by Chairmen	518	
	that were part-time	351	
	one day a week	225	
	more than one day a week	66	
	steady	249	
	(B) How Procured:		
"Local papers which published articles		47	
Clubs, lodges, and churches addressed		114	
Posters and slides in motion picture theatres		30	
Calls on local storekeepers, small manufacturers		205"	

It is most interesting that the organization thought it had succeeded sufficiently in its purposes to plan similar service in the future, should the emergency demand it. The report closes with the following paragraphs:

"In asking what we might do in order to work more intelligently should the financial depression continue over another winter, it was suggested that all publicity be handled through a central committee for the local and foreign papers, as well as for the daily newspapers, because many of the small paper editors felt that they were doing a personal favor to the unemployment chairmen when they inserted the requested articles in their papers. Only one chairman reported that a local paper had run an unemployment article every week since the beginning of the unemployment campaign.

"It was suggested that effort be made to secure in the lodging house districts especially, clubs for the single men where they may spend their time when not employed.

"The Chairmen also felt that the Woman's City Club should have desk room at least, in some store in every ward, which should be manned every day, either during the entire day or during certain hours each day by a member of the branch. That such a place should at all times be the clearing-house for all the work in a ward and the center when such emergencies as the unemployment period should present themselves. Each ward center should be financed by the ward branch."

[1] From letter by Mr. Boyd to Col. A. Woods, December 17, 1921.

in the other cities visited happened to rise to such a degree of integral participation in the community effort of finding jobs. The harvest labor service of the federal government in the wheat belt alone is comparable with the Chicago offices in their emergency expansion. But in the wheat fields the emergency is perennial; the impetus and appropriations come from Washington; the territorial basis is sectional, the co-operating units being states and counties.

3. Other Free Employment Services. The lethargy of many state and municipal employment services forced social agencies into their field to some extent. In this venture the social agencies have not been strikingly successful. In Pittsburgh, for example, the meager results attained by employment secretaries of the Associated Charities, the Red Cross Chapter, the Urban League, the American Legion, and others were far short of meeting the need of a state service. In the Associated Charities, moreover, the work of the employment secretary represented an amount of effort quite incommensurate with results. Such private, disparate efforts were in competition with each other, tended to enhance the feeling of power among the employers, and set applicants at a disadvantage. In Boston, the Industrial Aid Society regularly serving the handicapped, and temporarily acting as clearing house for the other social agencies during the winter of 1921–22, utilized the machinery of the public employment service.

Permanent free private services that had justified their existence in normal times were largely able to extend their service to meet the crisis of the winter of 1921–22. The Bowery Young Men's Christian Association in New York City, the Free Masons and Young Women's Christian Association in Kansas City, Mo., and others proved their value to the community in the emergency. Employment bureaus of "open shop" and kindred organizations, while also suffering a tremendous drop in placements, have had, on the whole, the inside track with the majority of employers. The placement records of such organizations, represented, for example, by the Citizens' Alliance in Minneapolis, the Citizens' Alliance of St. Paul, the American Plan Association of Cleveland, the Citizens' Committee of Chicago, the Employers' Association of Pittsburgh, compare favorably with other free placement agencies.

Their social value is impaired, however, by the fact that their organization is a partisan movement distinctly aimed at the weakening of labor unions.

American Legion Employment Bureaus. The employment offices established by the American Legion in the several cities raise some important questions in social engineering which communities interested in the introduction and maintenance of free bureaus should study with great care. They represent a new problem in this field similar to that of preference for veterans in the civil service. The appeal to the public is made on grounds other than that of fitness or even need. The introduction of extraneous and clannish policies into the permanent conduct of employment service would be unfortunate. This very exclusiveness, however, so undesirable as an established public policy, has been exceedingly useful during the past emergency. The Legion Posts rendered needed service that others were not rendering, and they also goaded an indifferent public to activity.

Two examples will suffice. In Kansas City, Mo., the American Legion-Red Cross Employment Bureau, growing out of the general activities of those two organizations, and fortunately finding an energetic and resourceful executive, succeeded between September 15, 1921, and April 30, 1922, in making 3,221 placements for 2,225 applicants. Of these, 741, or 23 per cent, were comparatively permanent, leaving over one and a half temporary placements per man for the remainder.[1] This is an exceedingly good record for a new bureau. Incidentally, the very well planned publicity given its work probably had an excellent educational effect on the entire community.

The Ramsey County (St. Paul) Central Committee of the American Legion carried on considerable relief as well as employment work. Its employment record was not so reliably kept or so well analyzed as that of the Kansas City, Mo., office. Its 4,771 placements, as given for the period from June, 1921, to April, 1922, inclusive, may not mean more or as much as the 3,221 reported in Kansas City. But the American Legion in St. Paul has the credit of having practically forced the civic bodies of St. Paul, by example and insistence, into action on the unemployment situation. It was

[1] Monthly reports of the bureau, December, 1921–June, 1922.

as a result of pressure by the American Legion that the Greater St. Paul Committee met and organized the clearing service at the St. Paul Association.[1] Two committees were appointed, one to supervise the procurement of jobs, the other to supervise registrations. The committees themselves appear to have done little, and the work of both was administered by a clerk under the supervision of a member of the secretarial staff of the St. Paul Association. To this clerk, who had an office and telephone at the Association headquarters, were given the names and qualifications of the registrants at the co-operating employment bureaus (the Citizens' Alliance, American Legion, and the Federal Employment Service) for whom no work could be found, and she in turn acquainted these bureaus with the labor opportunities obtained by the procurement committee. That the plan proved to be an utter failure was not due to any negligence on the part of the American Legion. The St. Paul Association, to which fell the task of breathing life into the machinery, showed less than the amount of interest necessary to insure success.

Employment Bureaus of Professional Organizations. There is one other type of free, privately conducted employment service that was brought into being during the emergency, and that deserves to be continued as a method of more intensive cultivation of the field of employment. This type may be best represented by the work of the Federated American Engineering Societies for their own profession. Their service was organized in New York City in May, 1921, as a result of the increasing unemployment among engineers. In scope it duplicates no existing free service and solves special difficulties peculiar to the professional field as compared with other lines of work.[2]

Employment Service Methods. It is outside the scope of this report to consider in detail the specific methods used for finding jobs. They are generally the same, varying in effectiveness with the standing and character of the employment service. The experience of the Illinois Free Employment Service in Chicago, of the Woman's City Club in Chicago, of the Federated American

[1] The local name for what is generally known as a chamber of commerce.

[2] Walter V. Brown, manager, Employment Service, Federated American Engineering Societies, reports of October 11, 1921, and April 10, 1922.

Engineering Societies, and of the Columbia Mayor's Committee places personal solicitation by representatives of the service at the top of the list.[1] Telephonic inquiries, when preceded by good publicity, have proved effective for American Legion bureaus and mayor's committee services especially. The "open shop" bureaus receive most of their job offers without solicitation and generally by telephone. Letters have on the whole been least effective. Some 4,000 letters and "follow-ups" sent out by the St. Paul Association brought a mere score or two of positions in response.[2] When not followed up, letters bring even fewer in proportion. But principally earnest, persistent, interested, indefatigable "push" is the *sine qua non* of finding jobs for the unemployed.[3]

II. INCREASING WORK

The idea of relieving unemployment by increasing the amount of available work is based on the assumption either that somewhere in the economic unit there is a surplus of capital, or that by an artificial impetus to capital its circulation through the cycle of investment-labor-profits can be stimulated. There is, it is true, a third assumption, more constructive, more akin to fundamental solutions of the unemployment problem. It assumes that *not* the total amount of production but the distribution of production over a period of years needs to be changed by preventing the unreasonable expansion that accompanies business prosperity; that during a period of years—ten or more—the peaks and depressions could be evened out to a comparatively steady normal; that "increasing work" is but drawing it from more crowded to less crowded time of production; that social and industrial statesmanship could enforce a more even distribution than now obtains. This, unfortunately, though generally conceded in theory, is seldom put into practice. In fact, with few exceptions, it is rarely even considered. So far as the question of increasing the amount of work available during employment emergencies is concerned, the first theory—

[1] See also discussion of publicity, Chapter VI, p. 125 to p. 132.

[2] Records at St. Paul Association.

[3] A forthcoming report on Public Employment Offices, made under the direction of Shelby M. Harrison, of the Russell Sage Foundation, New York, and dealing with the technique of employment service, will soon be available.

that somewhere in the economic unit there is a surplus of capital—is the assumed basis.

For convenience, we may divide efforts for increasing work into four groups:

1. Undertaking immediately additional *public works* of a desirable character
2. Executing immediately, with either public or private funds, any enterprises which, though not pressing, are desirable and would probably be undertaken in any case at some future time. This might be termed *work relief*
3. Expediting and concentrating *temporary work, odd jobs* and seasonal work into the period of deepest depression

(The labor suggested above is mainly of a non-profit-making nature.)

4. Continuing regular profit-making enterprises at the risk of loss to the entrepreneur.

All of these methods are, of course, considered from the standpoint of an emergency at the time of the emergency. No reference is made to measures of a fundamental nature designed to prevent emergencies, or to insure the worker against destructive loss of income during periods of inevitable unemployment.

The fourth group was included in the general recommendations of the President's Conference, as applying to industries. Where carried out, this plan tended not so much to increase work as to prevent its reduction. To what extent it was successful it is hard to estimate. Undoubtedly it was more successful in the industries which manufacture commodities of a directly consumable nature, such as textiles, shoes, and food products, where a demand is bound to revive early, than in steel, metal, and luxuries, where demand may be postponed for a long time, and the capital tied up in consequence imposes much greater strain on credit. For industries of the latter type continued production may have meant a gamble in credit requiring, during the deflation, unusual resources. At any rate this type of employment relief is not one carried on on a community basis or in community units.

1. Public Works. That public works may constitute a considerable labor opportunity and should be utilized to the full in the relief of unemployment is a principle generally accepted. The 1921–22 emergency found many advocates of increased public

works. The President's Conference gave it serious attention. A subcommittee of the conference with an active secretary was assigned the task of stimulating public works throughout the country and of gathering information on its progress. That a great deal of such work was carried on, especially in the form of road construction, is evidenced by the unusual sale of municipal, county, and state bonds, and the unprecedented production level in cement.[1] It is even said that the tremendous investment in such bonds retarded industrial revival, by disproportionately drawing capital that might have been put into manufacturing enterprises.

The exact amount of public works undertaken for the purpose of unemployment relief is not ascertainable. Reports by municipalities are not uniform in definition and analysis and, therefore, not dependable. Appropriations already made available, whether in annual budgets or by special bond sales, were generally not differentiated from appropriations designed to relieve the unemployment situation. Such appropriations as were specifically made for this latter purpose were, moreover, only in rare instances available immediately. Thus a great deal of money appropriated for public works of an emergency relief nature could not be used until after the time of the year when such aid was most needed.

Strictly speaking, employment on public works cannot be considered a practicable emergency measure unless such works have been planned in advance for a number of years, the plans approved, the contracts drawn, and all that remains when unemployment becomes severe is to get the funds in order to go ahead at once with the work. As it is, the routine that precedes operation on such works takes considerable time. Generally, state legislation must first be obtained, and this is often a time-consuming process even if the legislature happens to be in session. Usually, funds are raised by bond issue, and the business of selling the bonds must await approval of the issue by public vote—again a great loss of

[1] See Bulletin on Current Business, issued by the Department of Commerce, and monthly bulletins of district federal reserve banks. Also a chapter on "Long Range Planning of Public Works," by Otto T. Mallery in Business Cycles and Unemployment, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1923.

time. Then bids are received, specifications drawn up, contracts let, plans approved. More than likely, through this procedure the delay becomes inhibitory, and work cannot begin until the emergency has passed.

In the cities visited, little additional public work was carried on or even contemplated. The Mayor of Sioux Falls states that he had substituted hand digging for power in some sewer construction and water supply work. He also procured appropriations from the city authorities of $75,000 for public works to relieve unemployment, these sums to be expended in street, sewer, water supply, and electric lighting work.[1] The special committee on public works of the Chicago Conference on unemployment reported no new public construction undertaken, but, on the contrary, concluded its report with the statement that "the vigorous prosecution of all possible new construction work will not equalize the lay-offs from the public works now under way, and that from ordinary operations."[2] A similar report by the Mayor's Committee of Cleveland presented no further plans of additional construction.[3]

2. Work Relief. There was a kind of public work undertaken in Hartford and Boston that belongs more to the second than to the first type of emergency work. It was essentially relief work. Repeating in a measure the experience of 1914, the city of Hartford undertook to carry on some needed but not urgent improvements during the winter's employment depression of 1921–22, and to render these entirely a matter of relief so far as the distribution of jobs was concerned. Monthly appropriations, generally of $5,000, were made for the purpose, the improvements to be undertaken and supervised through the city departments in the regular way, but the clearing of applicants to be handled by the Mayor's Unemployment Committee. In view of the early organization of that committee, appropriations began in January, 1921. By November of the same year they had reached the sum of $52,500 and had nearly exhausted the city's contingency fund. The consensus of opinion of social workers in Hartford was that,

[1] Mayor George W. Burnside, interviews of December 29 and 30, 1921.
[2] Report, October 21, 1921.
[3] Records of committee, M. F. Bourjaily, secretary.

despite certain weaknesses in the distribution and supervision of the allotment of jobs, the experiment was successful and brought considerable relief.[1] From January 24, 1921, up to November 26, 1921, some 785 men had been given work under city departments through these appropriations.

Boston's experience was rather unique, in that the appropriation was made by the state legislature, while the benefit was reaped by residents of Boston. The work to be performed was the clearing of parks in the metropolitan area of débris caused by the heavy storm in November, 1921, which injured a great many of the trees in that section of the country. Ordinarily this work might have been left for some indefinite future time, at the convenience of the regular authorities. The importance of the undertaking as a relief measure was slight when compared with that of Hartford, except in respect of its educational value to the general public and to the social agencies. To the latter it demonstrated the difficulty of managing relief in the form of work.[2] Some 522 men received a chance to work.

The interesting features of Evanston's municipal relief work are two, both worthy of notice. In the first place, work performed was planned under the regular street and alley administration, and no additional funds were sought; in the second place, the inability of the municipality's treasury to bear the burden at the time the work was needed was relieved through the intercession of the Mayor's Committee, which secured an advance payment of franchise dues to the city by a public service corporation.

None of these municipal attempts, of course, constituted relief on a large scale. They helped a few materially. They showed the will to help others and represented the community in action: giving on the one hand, receiving on the other, with a frank recognition of the situation as extraordinary, emergent, and temporary.

[1] The approximate allotment of the work was as follows: Work on parks, $19,300; schools, $16,200; streets, $4,000; public buildings, $8,500; $250 overhead, and the remainder in abeyance.—Figures from the city treasurer's office, November 28, 1921.
[2] The first appropriation of $50,000 about February 1, 1922, was followed by a second of the same amount, but only $60,000 of the total was expended.

Relief in the form of work, where undertaken by social agencies, was different from other forms of work relief in this cardinal respect, that it was on the whole an adjunct of case work as applied to special types of cases, rather than a general relief measure. With very few exceptions this form of aid was "real" work, not purposeless muscle strain, and it represented value received for wages disbursed.

A certain amount of this relief and work in combination was organized by such agencies as the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, the Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity, and the Boston Overseers of Public Welfare. When these agencies paid out money in the form of wages it was meant for relief proper, and took the form of wages only for psychological reasons. It would have been no more expensive—possibly less so—to have given it outright as *material relief*.

New York. The New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor carried on three separate enterprises for work relief. The Crawford Shops, where, in ordinary times, old men are regularly employed at labor equal to their strength and at wages adjusted to their needs and productivity, were extended in scope to employ a capacity force for the older or more handicapped unemployed. Then, by an arrangement with the park authorities, beginning January 10, 1921, selected men, for whom relief moneys were available, were taken on for day labor in Bronx Park, and paid by the Bronx Zoological Park at the rate of $3.00 a day; the Department was reimbursed by the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor. Again, beginning with September, 1921, a similar type of work was done by the Association on its property at Sea Breeze, Staten Island, and made possible the completion of a five-year program of land improvement in one year.[1]

Philadelphia. The Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity instituted its system of work relief as part of the method of dis-

[1] In Bronx Park, 441 men performed 5,742 days' labor between January 10, 1921, and June 1, 1922, or about 13 to 14 men per day; on the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor property at Sea Breeze, 192 men performed 3,262 days' labor, or about the same daily average.—Records, Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, W. H. Matthews, June 14, 1922.

bursing a $25,000 gift made to the society in February, 1922, to aid in relieving the unemployed.[1]

Three weeks after the unemployment district[2] was opened, the first work was organized at the Lighthouse [a social settlement], the Pennsylvania Hospital, and the Episcopal Hospital. Shortly afterwards other work relief was started at Fairmount Park and the College Settlement.

The Society for Organizing Charity made an agreement with the Lighthouse Settlement to turn over to them $5,000 from the fund to build a playground, the Lighthouse supplying the materials and all of the $5,000 to be spent in wages. It was agreed that the Society for Organizing Charity was to send 50 per cent of the men and the Lighthouse was to supply the other half from unemployed men in their community who were known to the Settlement. This gave the Society for Organizing Charity an opportunity to place a maximum of 35 men, each working three days a week. Market wages were paid—for the unskilled 35 cents an hour, and 60 cents for handy men. There was an eight-hour day for all. In general, each man was to earn enough for food and a small amount for incidentals. For the unskilled this meant working about three days a week. Where money was needed for rent or other expenses, additional work was given. The case workers determined in each instance how many days' work the man was to have. Wages were paid by the Lighthouse, and the Society for Organizing Charity visitor appeared in the transaction only as the person securing a temporary part-time job for the men. The work was done under the direct supervision of the Lighthouse staff, and any information of significance to the social worker was quickly passed on.

A somewhat similar arrangement was made with the Park Commission for 50 men on half time. All of this work was for unskilled labor and a wage of $3.00 a day was paid. Here, in contrast to the other work relief operations, there was no one with social work experience interviewing or working with the men on the job.

The Pennsylvania Hospital offered opportunities for 6 men on half time to do cleaning, 2 for painting, 2 for carpenters or cabinet makers to repair furniture, and 1 plumber's helper. At the Episcopal Hospital, cleaning work was available for 12 men on half time.

[1] From a report to the Board of Directors of the Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity on the administration of the $25,000 fund for the unemployed, by Miss Betsey Libbey, May, 1922. For a further discussion of this emergency experience, see Chapter V, p. 108 sq.

[2] The "unemployment district" was really a functional rather than territorial division. It consisted of the special staff assigned to this work, with headquarters at the central office.

The College Settlement offered more diversity of work, perhaps, than any of the others. The following is a list submitted by them:

Painting—outside and inside work and cold-water painting
Whitewashing
Plastering
Cement work
Carpentry—repairing fences, shutters, doors, screens, window cords, locks, etc.
Glazing
Cobbling
Repairing furniture and picture frames
Upholstering
Plumbing repairs
Electrical work—putting in bells and repairing
Repairing victrolas and machines
Cleaning
Sawing wood
Making carnival decorations
Ironing and sewing (for women)

Relief work was given to 132 men in the 470 families applying to the Unemployment District, and $2,553.40 was paid them in wages. In addition, 67 men from the regular districts of the Society were employed and their wages totalled $1,530.38.

While the wages for this work were paid from a private fund, all of it was work that the community needed to have done. Nothing but lack of funds had kept the various agencies from doing it sooner. It was not "made" work in the sense of being unnecessary work created to keep the unemployed busy—it was real work at real wages. For the most part it avoided one of the pitfalls of many relief work schemes; that is, the assembling of a group with a common grievance—unemployment. At the Park they worked side by side with the men employed by the Park Commission and did the same kind of work. This was true at the hospitals. They worked and ate their noon meals with the hospital's employes. At the College Settlement the number was comparatively small and they were scattered over the building, so that they saw little of each other. The Lighthouse is the only place where unemployed men worked side by side. However, the businesslike management and the fact that it was a real job at real wages minimized this difficulty.

In the five relief work operations there was enough diversity in the work available so that there could be at least a crude kind of adjustment of the man to the job. For the unskilled laborer who could not handle a pick

and shovel, there were the inside cleaning jobs. At the Pennsylvania Hospital, the College Settlement, and the Lighthouse there were a number of opportunities for the skilled and the semi-skilled.

The maximum of men at work at any one time was approximately one hundred. It is doubtful whether the Society would have organized so extensive a work scheme had it not been known from the beginning that the problem would have to be handled as an emergency of three months at the most. Work was, no doubt, given in some instances where cash or relief in kind would not have been. On the whole, however, the staff are agreed that it was a distinct help in dealing with unemployment and that they would always want some such work available in handling unemployment in a depression. They would want to keep the scheme small enough so that it would be an adjunct to good case work and not a substitute for it.

Boston. The woodyard attached to the Wayfarers' Lodge in Boston usually serves the needs of a work test for the homeless, principally nonresident applicants. In the winter of 1922, however, it was used very largely for "work relief" for resident family men, applicants of the Board of Overseers of the Public Welfare (public outdoor relief department). During the three months of November, 1921, to January, 1922, 7,168 men were thus employed in the woodyards as against 337 in the corresponding period of the preceding year.[1]

It is clear that in all these instances work for wages was merely a preferred means of relief in such case work as the rush of cases permitted, and that the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, the Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity, and the Boston Board of Overseers provided work for their clients only as part of the internal management of their regular service, which was swelled and complicated by unemployment. In Boston, however, there was little difference between the labor performed by the men under this arrangement and the now discredited "made work."

3. Odd Jobs. The third large class of work is most clearly of an emergency nature; odd jobs are of an hour or a day or—rarely—a week or more in duration. Spring cleaning, cellar, attic, backyard cleaning, care of furnaces, whitewashing, scrubbing, window

[1] Records of Daniel J. Lyne, of Boston Overseers of Public Welfare.

washing, loading or unloading, any labor for which no permanent person would be employed, or which would be performed at the leisure of the existing force of employes, or which the householder would undertake at his leisure—constitutes part of this type of employment. Extra cleaning, grading, painting; repairs and improvements in institutions, public or private; spruce-up campaigns and fire prevention campaigns provide still other opportunities.

There is little room for originality in devising jobs of the kinds described above without creating artificial tasks. The relative success in this field depends largely on the publicity employed, the persistency and popularity of the employment service, and the consequent co-operation of the public. There is reason to believe that the Chicago public employment service, the American Legion Bureau in Kansas City, Mo., the Woman's City Club of Chicago, the mayors' committees in Evanston and Hartford, have probably succeeded in securing numerous jobs of the character we are discussing, just because they could depend upon one or all of these forms of assistance. The St. Paul plan previously referred to and many public employment services failed, probably, for the lack of assistance in some or all of these directions.

It is, of course, difficult to estimate how many jobs are really made available by emergency employment service and accompanying publicity and how many are merely cleared through them. It is quite likely that by far the greater number are found by the unemployed themselves in their day-long searches from house to house. There are, however, many indications that a good many work opportunities of the type described are actually created by purposive effort.

III. DISTRIBUTING WORK

Who shall have the job, when found or offered? Shall all unemployed be equally eligible and be selected for their fitness and efficiency and for their willingness to accept the wages offered? Shall the needy come first, whoever they be, or residents in preference to nonresidents, or perhaps the veteran before everybody? On some of these points there is considerable disagreement. The experience of the winter of 1921–22 shows some distinct tendencies, most of which appear reasonable, though often ill defined.

1. Fitness versus Need. In no instance observed during the past winter were jobs sufficient in number, as compared with applicants, to approximate so-called normal conditions. Fair competition, justifying placement by fitness alone, was made practically impossible. The highly skilled competed with the unskilled, the well-trained with the common laborer, the robust with the delicate, the transient, free of responsibilities, with the man bearing the burden of an entire family—all willing to accept wages far below their usual standard, thus involuntarily undercutting one another. To speak of free choice for efficiency would be straining a dogma. With the number of jobs so far below that of applicants, that principle, as applied to emergency employment service, became inoperative.

In employment service carried on by regular social agencies, need, of course, was the first consideration. Placement work carried on by such organizations as the Pittsburgh Associated Charities, the Pittsburgh Red Cross, the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor in New York, the Boston Overseers of Public Welfare, placed only those who were in need as well as unemployed. There were, however, even with this limitation, more unemployed in distress than could be supplied with jobs. The next factor in selection was, therefore, the psychological one of the effect of continued unemployment upon the given individual, aside from the question of meeting the material necessities of himself and his family.

Preference for those who were destitute marked to an appreciable extent the work of mayors' committees. One of the tests of need, generally speaking, was having a family or children. This test was often held to so rigidly that single men were needlessly discriminated against. In Hartford at one time during the winter the plan had to be deliberately changed so as to admit a ratio of one-third single men among applicants placed.[1]

In public employment offices in Chicago, Boston, Hartford, and toward spring in Cleveland, modified preference for those without resources was exercised or introduced. The Chicago public employment service, acting as informal agent for the placement work of social agencies, combined this special service with the regular work of the bureau. Quantitatively, of course, the latter overshadowed the former. Nevertheless, with the placement ratio standing at

[1] Interview, secretary, Hartford Mayor's Committee on Unemployment.

more than two applicants for each job, this meant a considerable concession to the emergency situation.

A similar arrangement between the social agencies and the Mayor's Unemployment Committee in Hartford limped along with some friction but fair placement results. The arrangement with the Boston public employment service was undertaken when representatives of social agencies, having met to consider their unemployment problems, agreed to pool their placement work and leave it in the hands of the Industrial Aid Society. This organization was specializing in employment work for the handicapped and was considered best equipped for the proposed service. By courtesy of the public employment office, a representative of the society was given a desk in the employment office, where he could interview applicants referred by social agencies and have direct and immediate access to information as to available jobs. The relations between the private Society and the public body were not as intimate as in Chicago, and the results were therefore meager.[1] Cleveland was still negotiating similar arrangements when the spring of 1922 brought general relief.

While the question of need versus fitness has been a troublesome one to decide, the test of need was generally simple and, in most cases, where applicants were referred by the social agencies, assurance of it preceded employment. In only one instance—in Hartford—was the question of the necessities of the applicant left in part to the employment service to decide. It may be said, in general, so far as the public employment offices co-operating in the emergency are concerned, that on the whole, and despite certain exceptions, the pressure in favor of those in distress was not permitted to interfere seriously with the basic principle that employment service is based primarily on fitness for the job.[2]

[1] It must also be borne in mind that the Boston office was not so well developed and had a lower ratio of placements to applicants.

[2] The sentiments of the best family welfare agencies on this point are expressed in the following statement: "An employment bureau exists for the purpose of placing workers satisfactorily on the basis of their qualifications; it is the personnel department of industry. To ask it to make further differentiation on the basis of economic need is uneconomical and unpractical. Social agencies and their clients will benefit with the rest of the community in the stimulation of the constructive industry of the community and in the adequate placing of those out of work even though the individuals thus placed are not themselves the clients of social agencies." —From *The Family*, Vol. II, No. 9, Section II, January, 1922.

2. The Question of Residence. There has been general agreement that residents should have preference in employment. Most private social agencies strictly adhere to this principle in dealing with applicants for aid or employment at all times. Public employment services assume local residence and do not verify applicants' statements on this point. Preference for the resident unemployed is based not upon any grounds of moral superiority or on the probability of his greater need. It is a question merely of social statesmanship. Such preference places the responsibility where it belongs; each community should take care of its own. Moreover, if and in so far as each community is to care for its own unemployed, it must be able to gain an idea of the size of its task and to see it through. An influx from other communities not only increases its task but complicates it as well. Adequate relief cannot be given to constantly swelling numbers attracted by the very fact of such adequacy, yet no community likes deliberately to refuse to help on grounds merely of nonresidence, which is utterly foreign to the question of need. Moreover, real lasting help can rarely be given in a strange community to a man without social ties or resources.

Most family social agencies, by the very nature of their work, eliminate the nonresident from their lists, except in the case of some that have special departments that deal with transients.[1] Mayors' committees have generally maintained the distinction at least in principle, while public employment agencies more often have ignored it. To what extent the lack of more accurate and painstaking investigations into the matter of residence has interfered with carrying into practice the preference for residents, it is hard to say.

3. Previous Military Service. Group preference to veterans of the World War has had little public discussion. There is a natural sentiment with regard to the ex-service man which has made objective judgment more difficult. The American Legion—the leading representative of veterans' organizations—has been exceedingly and fruitfully active in stimulating and carrying on emergency employment service. The potential political strength of this organization, both locally and nationally, has been a complicating factor in the situation. Thus, in Boston, of the men employed by means

[1] See also Chapter VIII, The Homeless Man.

of the legislative appropriation, half (260 out of 522) were obtained from the American Legion offices, and half from the state public employment office, the latter again being divided among the regular applicants and those reported by social agencies.

4. Full Time or Part Time. One more important point pertaining to the distribution of work requires mention.

We may dismiss such controversial points as arose between the city administration of Minneapolis, which proposed to pay union rates for work, and the Citizens' Alliance, which insisted on the depressed labor rates, and assume that, in general, some unanimity exists as to prevailing rates to be paid. We may further assume that the employment service, in so far as it followed approved practices, gave information to applicants as well as to employers on the prevailing rate of pay for the particular job.[1] The question that presented itself to the agencies carrying on relief work was whether to give full-time employment, so that the client might approximate a normal condition of employment, or to spread the work out thin and make it reach a greater number of applicants.

The tendency of public offices has been the latter. Thus the Mayor's Committee of Hartford allowed five hours a day at 35 cents per hour; the Mayor in Sioux Falls alternated his men on local public works, at three days each week; the plan of the Minneapolis city fathers provided for one week's work per man until the $200,000 contemplated for the purpose had made the rounds of the unemployed, but this appropriation was not actually made.

Private agencies, thinking rather of the effect on the individual families, and not hoping to make a large dent on the total unemployment in their communities, tended toward full-time employment, except where, for psychological or other special reasons, the contrary plan was indicated. The Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor of New York states that "the question was raised several times as to whether we should not work the men half time and thus make our fund cover more men. Our figuring was that as all of these men were men with families and had used up any resources they had, the six days a week at $3.00 per day was

[1] Most offices included such information at least for common or day labor in their general publicity; the Woman's City Club of Chicago gave a fairly detailed list of rates to their ward chairmen. See p. 68.

as little as they could be expected to keep their families going on."[1] This probably expresses the sentiment of most private agencies.

If there is any conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion, it is that the establishment and development in normal times of service such as that described in the case of the Chicago offices of the Illinois Free Employment Service will go farther toward bringing adequate emergency employment service than any single separate measure or group of measures undertaken during the emergency. Such a service maintains inviolate the basic principles of employment service in respect to fitness and residence of applicant, and the giving of proper information to employer and applicant. It avoids duplication, reduces the sense of panic, centralizes the clearing of jobs and of applicants. It stimulates cooperative service and co-ordinates it for greater efficiency. It can more readily learn of the changes in the employment field and keep the public informed. It can expand service without creating new machinery, which means expense and confusion. It contributes to the maintenance of the self-respect and courage of the applicant. It knits closer together the agencies interested in helping in the emergency.

[1] W. H. Matthews, director of the Association's department of family welfare letter of June 14, 1922.

CHAPTER IV

RELIEF ASPECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT

I. ATTITUDE OF THE SOCIAL AGENCY TO THE RELIEF PROBLEM

1. The Social Agency as One of the "Exits." Rarely does the relief problem—even in unemployment emergencies like that of 1921—present itself as a naked, mass demand for food, shelter, and clothing; nor does it drop down suddenly in its full rigor out of a clear sky. The change in conditions appears first almost imperceptibly. Then—faster here, more slowly there—it grows visibly, recognizably. It appears to the social agencies in a different form from that which it takes in the eyes of the unemployed individual. Though mindful of the psychology of the latter and of his efforts toward adjustment, the social agency must deal with the task of relief from more than that one angle.

In the eyes of the social agency, to use Miss Mary E. Richmond's comparison, the unemployed are somewhat in the situation of the audience in a crowded theater who, suddenly hearing the cry of "fire," seek to escape from the building. The task of the agency is to help them to get out. There should be as many exits as possible, and these exits should be visible and be kept clear. What are the emergency "exits" for the unemployed? There may be part-time work, temporary and odd jobs, change of occupation, use of credit and of savings; there may be removal to other communities or remigration to the Old Country; there may be help from relatives, friends, and neighbors, or from individuals, organizations, churches, and mutual aid societies known in better times; finally, there may be aid for the unbefriended from public welfare bodies and private social agencies. It will not do either to close or to block any of these exits nor to make any one of them too conspicuous at the expense of the others, for the crowd is large, and congestion at an exit may be fatal to those pressing toward it.

To stretch the comparison a little farther, let us assume that the

families in adjoining houses also heard the cry of "fire"; that seeing smoke at their own windows and fearing that their own house is afire, they ascend to the roof and attempt to get out by way of the theater—whose escapes seem larger and stronger than their own. They thus increase the crowd, and make escape difficult for themselves as well as for others. In somewhat the same way people from small communities flock to the nearest city, hoping for greater opportunities there, but only succeed in blocking the way for those already caught in the jam and for those who are trying to extricate them. It is desirable to discourage, if possible, this influx, in order that each community may deal as effectively as possible with its own people.

The social agency encourages the use of all practicable "exits." It knows that they are used successively, and that, in the case of a majority of unemployed families, every means of escape will be tried before application is made for charitable aid. Some families have more resources than others and may put off seeking relief longer than others. The social agency seeks to remain relatively inconspicuous lest, at any of these other exits, doors be closed that should remain wide open, or lest any socially desirable exits be overlooked by the pressing crowd. When relief is finally needed, it must be available, prompt and constructive and, in order that it may be all of these things, congestion of effort must be discouraged, diversity of resource developed.

For all these reasons—and as a result of their experience in former emergencies and in local disasters—social agencies have been wary of encouraging too great centralization of the actual work of relief, except in so far as efficient co-ordination of tasks demanded it. Such overcentralization, by removing responsibility from the neighborhood and from other more intimate sources of aid, has diminished rather than increased the aggregate resources. Experience has demonstrated that when centralization has taken the form of the collection of a general fund raised with much publicity and announcement is made that it will be distributed to individuals and families from a central point, the result has been a most serious drying up of the richer and more valuable sources latent in the good will and helpfulness of family, relatives, friends, tradesmen, landlords, and neighborhood.

2. Adaptation of Normal Service to Emergency Needs. Emergencies are, after all, temporary affairs, though their effects may be protracted or permanent, especially upon individuals. The community organizes itself for service slowly, year by year, responding gradually to needs as they make themselves felt, and establishes practices, institutions, associations, to meet them. Its habit of organization is for continuous day by day work. The guiding principles of organization are adapted to the ordinary, "normal" life of the community. The associations thus developed are not planned for emergencies and are not primarily suited for them. But emergencies of the kind here considered are no more than a sudden quantitative increase in the problems dealt with by existing social organizations the year round. While not best fitted for emergencies as such, these associations are best fitted for the type of service that is called for in these particular emergencies. But they must, temporarily, extend their forces and perhaps modify their procedure to meet the increased demand. That is, in fact, what they have a right to expect of the other community forces and what the community and the individuals in need have a right to expect of the social organizations. If they fail they will be judged incompetent even for ordinary service.

The tendency of social agencies is to concentrate on the yearly, daily task, to regard the emergency as a disturbance in the regular routine of service, and deal with it by necessity, not by choice. Yet they recognize that they must carry their full share of the load through the emergency and promptly put their shoulders under their portion of the burden.

For these reasons, relief agencies, public or private, have been reluctant to pass the responsibility for emergency relief to newly formed emergency bodies. One other reason for this reluctance has been operative: the fear of destroying standards of work slowly built up and precariously maintained in the face of indifferent public opinion, hostile selfish interests, and, frequently, insufficient funds. The whole trend of the social agencies that handle relief has been, wherever possible, to substitute service for material relief. Practical psychology has long demonstrated the cardinal principle in relief: that character, self-reliance, resourcefulness, are of the greatest importance for permanent self-help; that any material

relief carelessly given and divorced from other services tends to weaken these and impoverish the recipient by cutting him off from a richer and developing life. Social agencies have, therefore, emphasized service, adjustment, guidance, as the more important elements in case work, including material relief, and including it more and more generously, but only in so far as it furthers more effective living. Standards of service based on these principles have been the most precious achievements of the modern case work agency. Standards of typical emergency relief are of a different nature. Success at such times is more likely to be judged by the amount of food, clothing, and money distributed, or by the number of people served. If such standards were to be introduced into any social case service permanently, the work of years would be destroyed.

II. BASIC CLASSIFICATIONS IN THE RELIEF PROBLEM

1. Distinction between Problems of Families and of Single Men. Applicants for relief are mainly either families or single men. Single women also apply at times but, usually, they appear as members of families. In ordinary times single men appear infrequently among the applicants to social agencies and, when they do, they are almost always homeless. There are, therefore, two large classes dealt with by the case work agencies other than those for children; namely, families and homeless men. These also represent the two main divisions of the community's relief problem. As they demand, on the whole, very different treatment, they will be considered separately in succeeding chapters.

2. Distinction between Resident and Nonresident. Families or homeless men may or may not be residents of the place in which the emergency finds them stranded. In principle, at least, American cities and towns distinguish between residents and nonresidents, and provide different treatment for each in normal times. The history of settlement laws, especially in the New England states, gives ample material for studying these differences. In the past, the distinction has had a purely economic basis: while recognizing the responsibility for its own poor, no community has been willing to assume the financial burden of caring for those of another. Simple humanity demands immediate relief of men in straits where-

ever found, but elaborate machinery has been built up to transfer the cost where it properly belongs. Legal responsibility for aid lies either with the nearest of kin or, in the second instance, with the city, township, or county in which the person has a legal residence or "settlement."

There are socially more important reasons, however, for discriminating against the nonresident, provided the requirements of ordinary humanity are not outraged. Just because neighbors, friends, relatives, fellow-workers, and the local church are so much more important assets to men temporarily in need than a relief agency, it is desirable to develop and cultivate such resources—to discourage foot-loose, migratory habits. The reciprocal and constructive helpfulness that plays so important a rôle in emergencies cannot be bred among rolling stones. The man who seeks employment or relief in a new place in times of emergency contributes nothing but his presence and competes seriously with the resident who cannot be foot-loose because he has a family and social responsibilities in that community.

In recognition of these facts, emergency relief and emergency employment have favored the resident, and the distinction between the two groups is maintained throughout by social agencies and emergency committees.[1]

III. COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS AFFECTING THE RELIEF PROBLEM

1. Basic Economic Facts to be Considered. That every community has a character and psychology of its own; that the social agencies of one differ from those of another in kind, number, caliber, and interrelation; that industrial conditions, the economic

[1] Public relief departments are generally, by law or by ordinance, required to favor the resident poor, in some cases to the exclusion of the non-resident. This exclusion may take the form of deportation or of collecting costs from the applicant's legal residence. Deportation as between states and, through the federal immigration authorities, to other countries, is frequently part of the function of state departments of charities or public welfare. Family welfare agencies, as is generally known, arrange for the transportation of non-resident applicants to their home communities at the expense of the latter. A similar practice has been adopted by Red Cross chapters. In view of the investigation and supervision that are part of the case work technique of such agencies it has been comparatively easy to discourage and suppress nomadic family life. It has been more difficult with the homeless men. Here the co-operation of police and public authorities is essential and

structure, the composition and wealth of its inhabitants, and scores of other factors create important differences between places; and that, finally, these differences will be mirrored in the economic situation of the population in a time of emergency, are admittedly truisms.

To a certain extent all cities are manufacturing centers. But the importance of manufacturing as a type of employment and as the basis of the economic life varies widely with the nature of the product manufactured. In varying degrees, also, cities are commercial, transportation, or banking centers; and some places, like Kansas City, Mo., Sioux Falls and Minneapolis, for example, are important either additionally or chiefly as trading centers for large agricultural areas and as distributing points for food products. New York, Chicago, and Boston, while mainly commercial and banking centers, are also focal points of certain manufacturing industries, among which the textile and clothing trades are most important. The dominant industries of Pittsburgh and Cleveland are steel and its by-products. New Bedford specializes in the cotton mill industry. Memphis and Columbia are markets of the rural South, with lumber distribution as an additional function of the former.

The varied interests of these geographic centers might have been of less importance save for the fact that, during the deflation of 1920–21, different industries were struck at successive points of time, and the several sections of the country and types of cities reflected in fair measure the order and seriousness of the deflation. New Bedford and Boston had a harder winter in 1920–21 than in 1921–22, so far as employment proper is concerned. The former

but rarely available. Moreover, many agencies that help the homeless man are not—or not sufficiently—in accord with this principle.

The Bowery Young Men's Christian Association in New York City, for instance, will not discriminate against the non-resident. On the same ground, of the principle of rescue by salvation, many missions will not so discriminate. Such discrimination is not exercised in many of the institutions established for the homeless, as in the Helping Hand Institute of Kansas City. In that city, however, there is a peculiar situation which justifies the policy.

For favoring resident applicants to employment bureaus, the necessary time and machinery is usually lacking. As against the comparative success of the Mayor's Unemployment Committee in Hartford, the experience, by contrast, of Boston, with its state appropriation for clearing up the metropolitan district, of most state and city public employment agencies, of American Legion employment bureaus, of employers' organizations and others, is not encouraging.

had recovered to a fair degree by the winter of 1921–22. Boston was recovering, but too slowly for visible improvement. New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, began to feel the depression in employment shortly after the beginning of actual deflation in the summer of 1920, while their social agencies were not made aware of the change by an increase of applications until the autumn of 1920. It continued to grow steadily worse—with the natural seasonal fluctuations up to the spring of 1922, so that 1921–22 was a second and worse year of depression for these cities. But the rate of depression varied considerably in different cities due to the dependence of their inhabitants upon particular industries; it was much worse, for instance, in the steel and iron centers of Pittsburgh and Cleveland than in the other cities mentioned, and it was in these centers that recovery was longest delayed. Sioux Falls, the Twin Cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis, and Kansas City, Mo., live on the agricultural industries. Depression followed a reduction in the purchasing power of the farmer, which in turn was brought on by the fall of prices of agricultural products. Thus, for these places, the winter of 1921–22 was practically the first heavy winter, and the situation did not become wholly grave in either Sioux Falls or Kansas City.

2. Financial Reserves of the Working Population. Some industries had had higher wages and longer periods of prosperity than others. Some had principally given work to a steady, resident population through many years, while others had drawn in great numbers of new workers during the peak of war-time prosperity. In some industries the head of the family or its adult males alone were engaged, while others included entire families. All these factors helped to determine the financial resources and reserves of the workingman and his family. Their ability to pull through the depression depended not alone on the period of unemployment or the date of the resumption of activities but, perhaps, even more on their resources and reserves at the time when the deflation set in.

These differences in the economic structure of the several cities and in the nature of the resources of the worker's family were reflected in the character of the relief problem. Often the task of the social agency grew steadily more difficult—even when employment was on the mend—for the effects of the period of unemploy-

ment on the worker's reserves in funds, morale, and health had been slow in manifesting themselves. Not only the reserves of the worker but those of the whole city were subject more or less to the same influences.

Even the nature of relief given often depended, in a measure, on the extent of individual reserves and upon the duration of the depression—the latter determining largely the proportions in which relief measures included service alone, material relief, or work relief. At first, service is paramount; soon material relief must follow, in increasing ratio. Lastly, work relief must be found, for those at least whose mental health is threatened by the strain of unemployment. Material relief alone, of course, does not remedy a growing sense of prostration, of smothering debts, and of idleness without end. Most of the work relief observed in the present study came some time after the full weight of the depression had been felt. As the spring of 1922 brought at least temporary employment, work relief was the first measure to be discarded by the social agency. Material relief, though reduced in scale, continued, and the need for service was not only not abated but, in the opinion of many workers, would probably be needed for months.

3. Attitude of Employers and of Workers. There are two groups that have been especially concerned with unemployment and with its effects on the worker. These are employers as a class and workers as a class. Both groups are, indeed, inextricably part of the community and share in its interests and solicitudes on social questions. But, by the very fact that this particular relief problem grew out of a disturbance in the field of employment, they are concerned with its class aspect. In this case, their interests, as seen by each group, are antagonistic. Where conscious and organized, they are generally hostile, or at least not friendly or co-operative. What was their attitude during the emergency of 1921–22?

The period preceding the depression had been one of general prosperity. Employers reaped large profits. Workers enjoyed high wages, and labor unions prospered. Returns from capital invested mounted, the margin of profit expanded; it was good policy to avoid labor troubles that would stop the flow of profits. On the other hand, this was a good time for demands by the worker. Demands were granted, and they increased apace. To all appear-

ances there was better understanding between the two groups. In fact on both sides there was a building up of strength, a preparation for what the turn of events might bring.

Deflation contracted the source of profits. The employer could not continue production and he was obliged to let men go. Neither could he in many instances continue to pay the high wages of the war period to those who remained. The pool of labor created by unemployment could be freely drawn upon. The employer was, therefore, in a position to get cheaper help, and workers were forced to compete with one another. This was an opportune time to strike at organized labor. Reduction of wages, increase of hours, snubbing of labor organizations, driving home to the laborer that his life depended upon the employer, were temptations hard to resist. There were numerous efforts to break the pride of the worker, to disrupt his organization, to punish the leaders by dispersing their constituency. Many employers and employers' associations took full advantage of the opportunity, while others, led by a sounder social philosophy or by more intelligent leaders, refused to do so. The situation was certainly not conducive to generous efforts by employer for worker.

The laborer, on the whole, saw chiefly the negative side of the medal. Accustomed to attributing high profits to the employer, he would not believe that wages *bad*, in any instances, to come down. He read the challenge to organized labor where it existed and sometimes where it did not. He felt that his union was his only protection, but saw it weakened by attacks from the outside and often by incompetence and dishonesty from within. He was obliged to undercut and compete with his own fellows and thus to handicap his entire group. On the other hand, he had resources for tiding over the depression such as he had never had before. The high wages, the larger proportion of the family that had been working, the comparatively short slack periods during the preceding years of prosperity had given him a reserve and made him confident, militant, stubborn.

During the period of the greatest depression came the almost country-wide strife—strike and lockout—in the building industry. Strikes in the garment industry threatened; the strike in the textile industry and in the packing industry broke out; in the mining

industry trouble was brewing; railroad labor was in a precarious state. The "open shop" movement leaped into militant strength. There was a constant addition of fuel to the fires of labor controversy.

What effect did all this have upon the relief problem of cities?

Some employers were increasingly more reluctant to contribute to the social agencies which, naturally enough, helped principally the workers. Some scored the improvident worker who had spent his high wages on silk shirts, automobiles, and victrolas. Others were honestly unable to contribute or to contribute as freely as before. With honorable exceptions in every place visited, industrial plants made little effort to help their discharged workers. The greatest aid came possibly from those firms that continued production, whatever the motive, on part time and for alternate shifts of force and often manufacturing for stock—a precarious undertaking in such times with credit and markets shrunken.

Labor itself, in some cities, boycotted the welfare federations that had undertaken the joint financing of all social work, regarding them as allies or tools of the employer. This weakened the common effort for relief. Reluctant to admit their economic predicament, the unions were slow to make open and organized efforts toward the systematic relief of their destitute members. Few took formal steps, though a great deal of relief was given in individual cases, in an informal manner, and in some instances even in co-operation with employers.

Neither the employers nor the workers got together on a statesmanlike plan to relieve distress. But, in failing to plan against the recurrence of such emergencies, these two groups were no different from the general public of which they are part.

The problem of relieving the destitute is difficult enough in normal times. During the emergency, there was constant assault upon the established standards of the agencies and the ever-present difficulty of reconciling emergency relief with the basic principles of relief and of social case treatment. The community itself was often torn with factional strife and with the hostilities of capital and labor. In the following chapters a more detailed analysis will be attempted of the task of the social agency under these circumstances during the emergency winter of 1921–22.

CHAPTER V

THE TASK OF SOCIAL AGENCIES IN MEETING THE EMERGENCY

OUTRIGHT relief of the unemployed whose resources are exhausted comes from the community through its social case work agencies. Those in need are brought to the attention of the agencies in a variety of ways. The homeless man usually makes direct application, and families are often referred to the social agencies by others. Frequently friends or relatives, who have been helping a family, apply for relief for them. Instances were reported, in many of the cities, of landlords reporting families in need because of unemployment when arrears in rent had become considerable. Agencies engaged in forms of social work other than case work also frequently refer families to the case work agencies. There is a considerable number and variety of these—children's aid societies, Red Cross chapters, hospital social service departments, visiting nurse associations, as well as the regular family welfare agencies. There is no absolute distinction in the case work group of social agencies between relief-giving and non-relief-giving types, and there is no strict uniformity in the range of tasks undertaken by members of the group.

In times of economic depression there is increased demand for many of the usual types of service given by social agencies, whether the service includes material relief or not.[1] Not only is this true of free dispensary treatment, free hospital care, and child placement —services that may in a sense be regarded as material relief or its equivalent—but also of such services as legal aid, mental hygiene, chattel loans, and finding employment. Most social agencies at such times carry a heavier load than usual, both in quantity and in type of service rendered, although their own resources may be subject to shrinkage from the very causes that increase the demands upon them.

[1] See Chapters IX and X, Part II, especially diagrams 6, 7, 18, 19.

It will not be possible to describe in detail the emergency changes and adaptations observed in each one of these classes of service, and the present chapter will deal mainly with the type of agency which presents the difficulties of social work at such times in a concentrated form; namely, with the family welfare societies.

Not all family welfare work is done by the same type of agency. There are, to begin with, the organizations dealing with special groups, such as the Catholic and Jewish. There are bodies representing different tendencies as well as different patronage; for example, in New York the Charity Organization Society and the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, in Pittsburgh the Associated Charities and the Association for Improvement of the Poor; also interlocking agencies such as are found in Boston and Hartford, and family welfare societies carrying a specific case work service for other private or for public bodies, as in Kansas City, Mo., St. Paul, and Memphis. Nevertheless, the similarities in the family welfare group are greater and more numerous than their differences. By selecting the non-sectarian organizations for discussion in this chapter we shall include the most typical of the group.[1]

I. RESPONSIBILITY FOR INITIATIVE AND ACTION

Generally speaking, family welfare societies were the first among the social agencies to feel the effects of the depression and the first to start some constructive measures. Visiting nurse associations were a close second. Is it the responsibility of family welfare agencies to initiate action in an unemployment depression? Is it their place to take leadership in guiding or stimulating community responsibility? Answers vary, and vary in part with the size of the city. In a sense, however, there lies a real responsibility with the family agency, unless some other equally responsible body assumes

[1] More particularly, these include the Boston Family Welfare Society, Boston Provident Association, Family Welfare Society of New Bedford, Mass., Charity Organization Society of Hartford, Conn., Charity Organization Society and Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor in New York, Society for Organizing Charity of Philadelphia, Associated Charities of Columbia, S. C., Associated Charities of Memphis, Tenn., Associated Charities of Pittsburgh, Associated Charities of Cleveland, United Charities of Chicago, Central Charities of Evanston, Ill., Associated Charities of Minneapolis, United Charities of St. Paul, Minn., Family Welfare Association of Sioux Falls, S. Dak., and Provident Association of Kansas City, Mo.

it effectively. The increased demands upon its service and the demoralization threatening family life justify its assumption of leadership. How far that responsibility extends depends upon the nature and relations of other local agencies, including the public organizations concerned with family relief and welfare. Where there is a central council of social agencies the responsibility would seem to belong naturally to the latter, once its attention has been called to the situation. Its existence, in a sense, automatically removes initiative during an emergency from the family agencies. Boston, New Bedford, Pittsburgh, and Memphis have such councils, but unfortunately these failed to take any initiative. In Minneapolis, Chicago, and Kansas City, Mo., however, the central councils did assume responsibility in full measure and represented the social agencies in their relations with public bodies and with the general public.

When is it time for the social agency or council of agencies to start action? Not before there is some menace of a coming emergency, for there must be facts with which to approach the community. Not, however, so late that the necessary measures for relief cannot be taken in an efficient, competent, and deliberate manner.

In Philadelphia a committee of the Board of Directors of the Society for Organizing Charity called upon the Mayor of the city in December, 1920, urging upon him the necessity of expediting public works. On December 9, representatives of the agencies affected by unemployment met and formed a committee on unemployment, and before the end of the month had called upon the Mayor, urging the appointment of a committee on unemployment and special appropriations to the City Department of Public Welfare for unemployment relief.[1] At this time the records of the Society for Organizing Charity showed a progression of unemployment cases as follows:

Week of December 1st	68
Week of December 11th	140
Week of December 18th	151
Week of December 25th	166
Week of January 1st	209[2]

[1] Letter from Karl de Schweinitz to Spencer Erwin, February 9, 1922.

[2] During the next five weeks the figures were 258, 299, 335, 377, 370. In January, 1921, the Society for Organizing Charity had to refuse accepting any further cases of unemployment.—Karl de Schweinitz.

Cleveland also acted early and promptly. In November, 1920, an informal committee of the Associated Charities approved by the Welfare Federation,[1] called upon the Mayor, the newspapers, a number of civic organizations and industrial firms, urging that no publicity be given to the coming unemployment distress or to efforts for relief, that no general public committee be appointed, and that firms attempt to retain as many as possible of their working force. The experience of the 1914–15 depression had shown them that early publicity tended to distort the public view and to increase the complexity of an already difficult situation. Their efforts were largely successful. Chicago's efforts also started in the winter of 1920.

The time for assuming responsibility is as early in the emergency as possible. How early that may be depends upon the experience of the agency, its standing in the community, and the affiliations and standing of its executive.

Regardless of what common effort may come from the community as a whole, the social agency itself has a number of problems to solve in order to meet the demands upon it. Most important among these are such matters as the raising of funds, administrative readjustments, personnel, publicity, changes in plan of work, in standards, and in the burden laid upon the case worker.

II. RAISING FUNDS

1. In Cities Having Financial Federation of their Social Agencies. Additional funds to meet the emergency—at least during 1921–22—were one of the greatest difficulties of the social agencies.[2] Where financial federation of social agencies has taken place, the responsibility for supplying funds rests eventually on the federation. Success in federation cities has not been uniform in this respect. Cleveland is an outstanding example of work well planned and well done. Expecting unusual demands upon the agencies, the Welfare Federation had included in its proposed budget for 1922 an appropriation for emergency relief (chiefly for the Associated

[1] James F. Jackson, General Secretary of the Associated Charities, and Prof. C. E. Gehlke, of Western Reserve University.

[2] Such public welfare departments as carry on regular outdoor relief obtained additional funds through appropriations.

Charities and the Cleveland Chapter of the Red Cross) of $457,000. This sum became available for use. Kansas City, Mo., included, in estimating its budget, an emergency fund of $25,000 (and at the end of the spring of 1922 was still within its limits of expenditure). The New Bedford Family Welfare Association received an increased appropriation from the joint financial campaign, and, in view of the share of relief borne by the Overseers, and of improved conditions in the winter of 1921–22 as compared with the preceding winter, the association managed to see its task through.

Of the five cities studied in which social agencies had been united in financial federation for more than one year, two—Minneapolis and St. Paul—experienced difficulties in raising the necessary funds. Due perhaps to stringent financial conditions that had affected all donors, or else to inflexibility of method in raising money, or to both, the federation in each city failed to raise its campaign goal by about 20 per cent.[1] The result was the reduction of grants to the family welfare agencies of the two cities for the fiscal year by 20 per cent.

Nevertheless, expenditures mounted. Material relief expenditures in December, 1921, had in both cities attained the mark of double the monthly budget, and indications were that that rate of expenditure would continue. It was the responsibility of the federations in the first place and of the boards of directors of the family agencies in the second place to meet the situation. Minneapolis met it in good time and in adequate manner. St. Paul supplied the necessary funds after disheartening delay, with uncertainties that severely tried the morale of the family agency. In Minneapolis the board of directors of the Associated Charities was authorized, in January, 1922, to raise the necessary funds for service by loan, and to continue expenditures for relief against the balance available in the federation treasury.[2] The St. Paul Federation failed to take

[1] To what extent the unofficial boycott of the federations by the labor organizations of the two cities was responsible, is a difficult thing to ascertain, especially in view of the fact that some of the leading labor men in both cities were distinctly friendly to the federations. A rather guarded editorial in the *Minnesota Union Advocate* (St. Paul) preceding the Chest campaign of 1922, could even be interpreted as endorsing the federation, despite the continued refusal by organized labor to be represented on its board of directors.

[2] The Associated Charities budget of $76,000 for service and $60,000 for relief had, by the 20 per cent cut, been reduced to $62,000 and $48,000 respectively. Expenditures for service were forced up to a rate of $72,000 per annum, thus creating an expected deficiency of $10,000. The authorization of a loan was for this sum. $5,000 were given anonymously and the rest would have been raised by a loan, but for timely discovery that an unexpected balance in the treasury of the federation was more than sufficient to supply the deficiency. Relief expenditures were expected to reach the mark of $72,000 or $24,000 over the budget, but within the supplementary authorization by the federation.

action in time to prevent the fear of shutting the doors of the United Charities before the summer. A supplementary campaign for $75,000 for emergency relief was at last undertaken in January, but brought disappointing returns. It was spring before there was assurance that no organization would be compelled to suspend operations.[1]

It would seem then that a majority of the federations in the cities visited were able, by statesmanlike conduct, to supply the needed emergency funds; but that the mechanics of federation, without vigilant thought and the application of social emergency technique, is likely to work serious hardships on the constituent agencies and their clients—especially upon those agencies bearing the responsibility for the actual relief work.

2. In Cities Not Having Financial Federation of Social Agencies. Nine of the cities visited had no financial federation. In three of these—Hartford, Sioux Falls, and Evanston—the family agencies did not approximate a point of financial exhaustion that would require extraordinary efforts for raising additional funds. The conditions in these cities had not grown desperate.

In the remaining six cities (Pittsburgh, Chicago, Memphis, Columbia, Boston, and New York) no new method for raising funds not commonly known and practised by social agencies was introduced, but there was a decided intensification of the ordinary efforts.

The Pittsburgh Associated Charities had been raising its funds,

[1] Expenditures for relief by the St. Paul United Charities for the year 1920–21 had been $20,000; in estimating the budget for the following year no increase was planned for, despite the menace of unemployment. Moreover, the campaign came 20 per cent short of its goal, thus reducing the amounts available even below that of 1920–21. Meanwhile relief expenditures had risen to a rate requiring $40,000 for the year. In adjusting itself to the 20 per cent cut in the budget, increases in personnel and in salaries were eliminated. Even with this sacrifice, however, funds threatened exhaustion by March 1, 1922. Of the federation's supplementary campaign for $75,000 for relief, only $30,000 had been raised by the first part of April. The United Charities got another lease on life until May 1st. At last, on April 15th, the Board of Directors of the United Charities was authorized by the federation to raise $20,000 by a loan against 1922–23 funds of the federation. Thus, at length, the United Charities escaped the impending suspension of activities.

month by month, from a mailing list of contributors containing some 2,300 names distributed evenly over the year. In the general secretary's experience about 50 per cent of these would respond after one to three letters and notices. An additional 40 per cent would contribute after personal visits. The Associated Charities did not deliberately limit its intake of cases. The work of the association during the emergency increased alarmingly. The following figures indicate the growth of the task:

ASSOCIATED CHARITIES OF PITTSBURGH

	1920	*1921*	*1922*
	Families cared for		
January	568	649	984
February	571	629	1,020
	Expended for Relief		
January	$1,483.12	$1,687.89	$5,050.88
February	1,382.61	1,641.98	5,766.48

While the Associated Charities was frankly unable to meet the actual demand for relief, its monthly expenditures for the winter of 1921–22 had reached more than three times the amounts for corresponding months of the preceding year. The additional sums were obtained entirely through personal solicitation by the general secretary.[1] This method, it is true, more than tripled the income during the emergency months. But it was a hand to mouth existence for the organization, and incidentally for the clients, and funds in the end were admittedly short of actual needs.

The United Charities of Chicago had adopted the "campaign" method of raising funds. At the end of December it had raised approximately two-thirds of its budget for the year. The usual "teams," display advertising, buttons, and leaflets were used. In addition, the general secretary devoted the major part of his time to public addresses and educational visits to donors and prospective donors. Little doubt was entertained as to the eventual success in raising the necessary funds. Conditions in Chicago were not much worse than in the preceding year. What additional burden fell upon the United Charities was balanced by increased county appropriations for mothers' pensions, which released a considerable sum expended by the association in previous years to supplement mothers' pensions. Reference to the depression was freely made in appealing for funds, but in all other respects the method had no emergency features. The United Charities was able to meet the needs of applicants for relief to the usual degree.

[1] John Yates, general secretary, interviews December, 1921, and March, 1922.

The Memphis Associated Charities and the Columbia Associated Charities both receive funds from the public treasury, and part of their endeavor for additional funds was directed toward securing increases from this source. The former, counting in addition on substantial sums from box office receipts for Sunday performances in moving picture theaters, was in fair financial condition during the winter of 1921–22.[1] Columbia was not so well off, and in February, 1922, the Associated Charities neither knew how it would raise the necessary funds nor had it made definite plans for doing so.

Both the Boston Provident Association and the Family Welfare Society of Boston used their customary methods of raising funds. The executive of neither organization considered the results equal to meeting all the needs of relief. The latter Society, in its appeal for funds, had mentioned the distress from unemployment conditions. A number of replies stated that workingmen, having extravagantly expended their high wages for useless luxuries, were largely to blame for their predicament and did not deserve aid. Thoughtless and superficial as were such replies, they showed the unwisdom of emphasizing the unemployment distress to the contributing body of the organization, and, therefore, appeal on grounds of unemployment was omitted. This left but the usual modes of appeal, applied in greater intensity—requests for larger sums from the contributing public and from endowment funds, such as the Permanent Charity Fund and the Weber Charity Corporation. But, while larger funds were obtained than in previous years, the need could not be adequately met by the private agencies,[2] and considerable responsibility had to be shifted to the public relief authorities. There was still another method

[1] For further details, see Appendix, p. 234.

[2] Interviews, Stockton Raymond, Associated Charities; letter from Boston Provident Association, April, 1922.

left—that of general public appeal by the use of the press and other publicity. But the experience of the past, as well as the attitude of the regular contributors, eliminated that method.

Expenditures for the relief of destitute residents by the important private family welfare agencies of New York City during the winter of 1921–22 show comparatively little increase over the preceding years, and indicate no such degree of distress among families as would have called for emergency measures. Comparison with the volume of case load carried by the agencies and with expenditures in 1914–15 makes this inference even more striking.

Varied as have been the methods of raising money employed by the several social agencies here considered, there has been uniformity on this point at least, that no general public appeal through newspapers or other publicity channels of that nature for "funds to relieve the unemployment" was made or participated in by any of the representative social agencies. The serious *quantity relief* problems of previous emergencies were thus avoided.

III. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS

1. Standards of Case Work. When the load of active cases carried by the visitor of a social agency rises from 40 or 50 to as high as 70 or even 80, some sagging in standards of case work may well be expected. If, moreover, the group composing this increase in the case load presents rather strong uniformity in the reason for their application for assistance and in the kind of aid required, one may anticipate a leveling effect upon case work. Both these factors, increase in average case load and unusual proportion of unemployment cases, were operative in the winter of 1921–22. Even where the staff was increased to the limit of possible supervision, as in the Cleveland Associated Charities,[1] the average case load rose occasionally to 85 per visitor.[2] The Minneapolis society estimated an average of 70 per visitor during the winter;[3] in St. Paul the figure rose from 52 in September, 1921, to 84 in April,

[1] Four additional experienced visitors, 35 students in training as against 21 of the previous year, and six "aids."

[2] Miss Mildred Midnight, district secretary, interview of May 10, 1922.

[3] Frank J. Bruno, Associated Charities, interview of June 27, 1922.

1922;[1] in Memphis the average visitor's load was occasionally as high as 95;[2] and so on in other cities as well.

No such case load can be carried by a visitor with the maintenance of high standards of work. The lowering of standards was generally admitted and complained of as much by visitors as by executives. An interesting sidelight is thrown on reduction of standards by the increase in the relative number of active and inactive cases in the case load of agencies, as given by Minneapolis and St. Paul. In Minneapolis the ratio of inactive to active cases under care was considered reasonable at 10 per cent or, at the utmost, 20 per cent. During the winter of 1921–22 it had gone above 30 per cent and, with some visitors, approached 50 per cent.[3] In St. Paul during September the situation was as follows:

> The inactive cases were 41 per cent of the active, . . . in October, after a house-cleaning, the situation is normal—16 per cent of the active cases. . . . In November it is 27 per cent, in December 31.7 per cent, in January 40.2 per cent, in February 54.7 per cent, in March 58.9 per cent. . . . That means that there is a point of saturation beyond which no more active work can be placed on visitors. Not only did cases which were inactive suffer, but the case work became more or less superficial.[1]

Not only the number of cases made for inadequate service but also the large ratio in that number of cases which presented, upon superficial examination, an unemployment problem only and seemed to require, therefore, little more than a job or material relief. The Jewish Social Service in Boston, which has had a comparatively light unemployment burden to bear, showed, for January, 1922, 27.4 per cent unemployment cases in the total case load, as against 17.55 per cent for the corresponding month of the preceding year, and 6.81 per cent for January, 1920.[4] The Associated Charities of Minneapolis showed nearly 60 per cent unemployment in the total case load of the average month of January

[1] E. G. Steger, United Charities, letter of July 24, 1922.

[2] Miss Mary Russell, Associated Charities, interview of February 27, 1922.

[3] Those cases that had received service within a calendar month were considered active cases for that month.

[4] From Maurice Hexter, Director Federated Jewish Charities of Boston.

to March, 1922, as against 21 per cent for 1921, and a little over 2 per cent for 1920.[1] The percentage of unemployment, entering as an important factor into new applications, shows the same overwhelming increase. Thus, in St. Paul this percentage rose from 1.5 per cent in the winter of 1919–20 to 27 per cent in 1920–21, and 45.5 per cent in 1921–22.[2]

2. Changes Both in Service and in Relief. On the whole it has been service rather than material relief that suffered in the depression of standards of work. The reduction in service was naturally to be expected in an emergency. It has been a gratifying fact that adequacy of relief suffered little or no diminution. It is difficult to describe in just what particular service to families had to be curtailed. It was a general curtailment beginning with the preliminary study of the special difficulties involved in each family dealt with and ramifying into all branches of case work. There was no lack of excellent case work, but it was necessarily less frequent than usual. Early in the winter the comprehensiveness of initial investigation was reduced by many agencies in their unemployment cases. In cities in which the transfer of such cases to a public department had been arranged for, this limitation of inquiry was accentuated and became, in fact, imperative. Most cases were classified for transfer or retention at the time of application. Even where no system of transfer to public agencies had been adopted, but where the usual policy was followed of discouraging the application of clients because of unemployment only, when uncomplicated by distress, the tendency was to make the decision as to disposition of the case at the time of the first interview. The emergency district of the Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity went so far in dealing with unemployment cases as to make deliberate changes in its usual case work practice. Miss Libbey reports:[3]

In the first interview it would be important to discover those items which should be understood to be of special importance rather than an inclusive list:

[1] Compiled from records of the Minneapolis Associated Charities.

[2] Records of the United Charities of St. Paul, September to February of the years quoted; procured from E. G. Steger.

[3] See footnote, p. 79.

The date and circumstances of the beginning of unemployment.
Earnings in last job and in other jobs held for last three years.
How family has managed in the period of unemployment.
Present situation.
Future prospects of work.
The family's plan.
If there had been a previous period of unemployment or any financial crisis, how did they meet the situation?
Health, especially at the present time.
Children's problems.

In the outside investigation an effort would be made to consult with
The last two employers.
One relation on each side.
Present church.
Present medical sources.
One of the following in the previous neighborhood group: the church—a landlord—a neighbor—a tradesman—a school—a physician.

In determining which of the relatives should be seen, the one who the facts indicated might be most helpful would be selected rather than those nearest at hand.

In fact, even this outline proved too elaborate for the emergency and was condensed in practice. It may be a debatable question whether some of these changes in procedure necessarily meant deterioration of service when applied to unemployment cases alone. If, however, as appears likely, these changes had to be extended through pressure of work to other cases also, then it is hardly to be doubted that the changes were undesirable.

In the matter of material relief also, changes in policy and procedure were temporarily introduced. But these changes related mainly to technique. Family welfare agencies did not, on the whole, reduce their standards of relief. Their own financial straits were met by reducing the number of applicants accepted rather than by impairing the adequacy of relief granted. Possibly, also, relief from public funds was more freely utilized by the private agencies than at other times. It will be profitable to examine in greater detail some of these changes in the distribution of material relief by social agencies, especially in such items as food fuel, rent, clothing, and so on.

Food. The majority of family welfare agencies adjust the allowances granted to families to scientifically constructed budgets. Variations take place with the fluctuation of the cost of living. Cost of food items in the budget had decreased, therefore, in many cities within the years covered by the unemployment emergency, since the cost of foods in general had decreased. Any reductions in allowances due to this decrease are in no sense to be considered reductions in food allowance. Indications are rather to the contrary. Many agencies discovered early in the depression that among the first items to be dropped by the family from its food budget was milk. It became necessary, therefore, to supply this item in larger quantities. Where malnutrition was discovered in any members of families under care there was still further increase of milk supplied by the agency. The method of supplying milk in kind or by orders upon milk dealers was strictly observed during the depression. The type of family under the care of case work agencies rarely appreciates the food and health value of milk. Many families, if left to their own choice and given food allowances in cash, would eliminate milk in favor of other foods.

The importance of insisting on adequate food supplies was manifested in other ways as well. The distribution of food supplies in kind, now abandoned by practically all modern family agencies except in the case of milk, was less frowned upon. The practice of giving relief in kind now obtains chiefly with public departments. Many large social agencies—notably the Cleveland Associated Charities, the Chicago United Charities, the Associated Charities of Minneapolis, the Charity Organization Society of Hartford—utilized, during the emergency, the distribution of food supplies by the public departments to supplement material relief given from their own resources. Even where the total allowance available from public funds amounted to no more than supplies to the value of $8.00 a month per family (as in St. Paul), it was a considerable lift to the social agency.

In this connection again, the deliberate policy adopted in Philadelphia is instructive. The Society for Organizing Charity there recognized the constant danger from underfeeding and the paramount importance of facing the revival of employment in at least good physical condition and without further strain on the already

much tried credit with tradesmen. The society feared that "if the food allowance were given in cash, many times there would be too great pressure on the family to use it for other things, thus defeating the object of the budgetary food allowance." Ordinarily the society gives a cash allowance to families and, wherever there is poor management, teaches them how to use their money. "In families of the unemployed, however, groceries were sent, the only cash allowances being for meat and sundries. . . . An adequate supply of milk was sent to each family needing assistance."[1]

The greatest relative increase in expenditure for food took place in the composition of material relief given by public departments. This is due to the more extensive custom in such departments of providing relief in kind and of giving comparatively little case work service.[2] The Trades and Labor Assembly of St. Paul, which acted as an emergency relief agency for union members, also gave the bulk of relief in kind, mainly in the form of food.[3] The difficulty with food distributed in kind, especially from central distributing points where it is obtained by the distributors in bulk and purchased by them in large quantities, is that families receive supplies ill-fitted to their needs and that the desirability of promoting balanced diets is lost sight of. When these same families receive supplementary aid from a private agency as well, a rather difficult technical problem is imposed on the visitor or home economist.

Fuel. Unfortunately for client and agency, the months of depression are the very months in which practically all normal expenditures are heaviest. This applies to food, clothing, and shelter, but especially to fuel. On the other hand, this fact has fortunately led in the course of years to the building up of comparatively rich resources for relief in the form of fuel. Most cities have some kind of private coal fund or endowment. Practically all public departments include fuel in their material relief

[1] Report to the Board of Directors. See footnote, p. 79.

[2] See chart on increase of grocery orders in the Department of Public Welfare, Cleveland, Ohio, contained in diagram 20, p. 210.

[3] Fred Siegel, secretary, Trades and Labor Assembly, St. Paul, letter, June 5, 1922.

—generally in the form of coal, occasionally in gas. Coal is almost universally given in kind rather than cash, and is delivered to the client either from a central depot or by order to local dealers. Some cities, such as New York, have quasi-public agencies—coal committees for the supply of fuel to the indigent.

On the whole, there has been perhaps less difficulty in the matter of fuel than in any other aspect of the material relief problem. Public departments have been more freely utilized by private agencies for supplying fuel than for any other purpose. Occasionally difficulties arise from the quality of fuel supplied. In one city, at least, among those visited, it was with great difficulty that the public department was persuaded to send a better quality of coal—one that could profitably be used in stoves such as were generally found in the homes of the clients. But, ordinarily, the matter of fuel has offered little difficulty to relief agencies.

Rent. Undoubtedly the question of rent has been one of the most puzzling to social agencies. It will be recalled that, following the outbreak of the war, rents increased enormously. The building of homes had been largely suspended; influx to cities large and small had created an intensified demand for housing. Both apartments and furnished rooms went up in price. This increased demand was met by a general financial ability to pay that was previously unknown and a careless willingness to pay that seemed to call for exploitation on the part of landlords. The increased cost of building materials and labor added their share to high rentals. As usual, congestion in the already overcrowded districts became relatively heavier than in other districts. Rents in the poorer quarters of the cities which were especially swelled by the industrial influx increased even more heavily in proportion than rents elsewhere. This was especially true in the sections inhabited by colored people, where rents are usually higher in proportion than elsewhere, and in which the influx of new residents was heaviest.[1]

The depression in industry and employment brought no reduction in the cost of rentals. The exodus from cities was slow in

[1] Colored population in cities increased to an unprecedented extent during the boom of war industries. The Chicago Urban League estimated about 100 per cent increase, reaching over 100,000 in 1921. The Cleveland Negro Welfare Association quotes about 34,000 in the 1920 census, as against 8,000 in 1910.

starting and never reached very great dimensions. The demand for dwelling places continued high, the supply low. Among the attempts of the unemployed to carry on, removal to cheaper quarters has been mentioned as one of the ways adopted; the doubling up of families and multiplication of lodgers as another. This removal created greater demand for rooms in the poorer sections and forced up the rentals there. Meanwhile the price of building materials had come down, and the erection of houses took a new start. The result in many of the cities was a gradual and sometimes considerable reduction of rents in the moderate priced homes and a continued or even increased pressure on low priced houses in the poor districts. The doubling-up of families and multiplication of lodgers tended to increase rents in the apartments thus occupied.[1] In the face of this situation families were helpless and distress increased. The number of evictions mounted, and again the colored suffered most.

Family agencies almost universally complained of the high rents and the added burdens resulting therefrom, to both client and agency. Reductions in expenditure for food by the families under the care of the Minneapolis Associated Charities were largely counterbalanced by increases in their rentals. Fifty per cent increases within a year in the colored section of Pittsburgh were not uncommon. In view of this situation, as well as in accordance with the general policies of many agencies, there was no change in the practice of refusing to pay back-rent for periods preceding the date of application, such payment being regarded like payment of any other back debt as aid to the creditor, and therefore tending to demoralize the basis of credit. Moreover, public welfare departments of most of the cities visited gave no rent as a form of relief under any circumstances.[2]

The outstanding fact remained, however, that rents were high and that they imposed upon social agencies a serious relief burden. Two instances of deliberately planned temporary changes in rent

[1] Cases were cited by the Urban League in Pittsburgh, in which the landlady kept careful tabs on the number of persons in each house, and when she had reason to believe that additional lodgers were taken in she would raise the rent accordingly.

[2] This policy in the Public Welfare Department of the city of Minneapolis was revised by the Board of Public Welfare, upon representations made by the Associated Charities during the emergency.

policy may be worth recording here. One occurred in Cleveland, the other in Philadelphia. Largely because of unemployment distress, several of the districts of the city of Cleveland contained very considerable percentages of families temporarily in care of the Associated Charities. As might be expected, rentals paid by these families and falling upon the society's shoulders were disproportionately high.

In Cleveland, as elsewhere, landlords had made extraordinary profits on original investments and had, moreover, neglected repairs. Conscious of the increasing rent burden and of the impending limits of the society's resources at rates of expenditure necessitated by such high rentals, some advisory case committees decided to set arbitrary rents which were deemed reasonable, pay those rents for families under care, and leave to the landlords the choice of acceptance or petition for writs of eviction. To all appearances, at least, the plan succeeded in reducing some of the rentals in the district, although when these families got on their feet again they usually had to pay at the old rates. Basing its action mainly on the temporary nature of unemployment distress (as compared with regular allowance cases) the emergency district of the Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity did not include rent in its budget for families aided, but paid rent whenever in any given case it seemed unwise to permit the family to go more deeply into debt.

Clothing, Incidentals, Transportation, and Loans. There was little or no occasion for social agencies to change their policies on items of clothing, incidentals, and transportation except in so far as the work of other agencies or of temporary bodies affected their own work. There was considerable collecting of old clothes, overcoats, and so on, by women's societies, firemen, American Legion posts and others, to be taken into account. Some public departments increased their efforts in the matter of distributing clothing, and especially shoes. On the other hand, many of the "relief" type of agencies, and especially public departments, made no provision for incidentals, such as carfare to the place of work when temporary jobs were obtained. Occasionally the family welfare society was called upon for supplementary relief of this nature.

In the matter of transportation, the only extraordinary situation of importance was brought about by the re-migration of colored families to the South. Such cases occurred from time to time but demanded no new definition of policies. Frequently aid would be given by relatives of the family who had remained in the original place of residence.

In the cases of those re-migrating to their old country homes social agencies did not themselves supply transportation. The powers of the state and federal government for deportation of alien charges upon the community were perhaps more frequently resorted to than usual, but, according to information received, generally for the purpose of aiding applicants who desired to return to their native lands. It was also stated by workers of some of the agencies that such re-migrations were aided in considerable numbers by the consular offices of their respective countries, but no direct negotiations with such consulates were reported.

There was more than the usual demand upon social agencies for loans, both direct and upon collateral offered. On the whole, little was done in that direction, except by Jewish agencies, most of which include some free loan arrangement, and by Red Cross chapters, which also include a loan system among their basic modes of relief. Requests were made for payment of instalments due on homes purchased on the instalment plan, but not with sufficient frequency to justify the adoption of definite policies toward such requests. As a result of the attempt by many unemployed men to eke out a living in some small business, such as street vending and the like, there was considerable demand for aid in the form of small initial capital or license fee. Here, again, no change of policy was involved, but chiefly the question of the wisdom of the procedure in any given case. Few activities of this type have not, some time or somewhere, been attempted, and aid of social agencies requested, with the exception possibly of illicit liquor manufacture and bootlegging.

3. Differential Treatment of Racial and National Groups. More than ever, in the unemployment emergency of 1921–22, did the characteristics of racial or national groups become important factors to consider in the treatment of applicants. In the first place, the depression affected the several groups in strikingly dif-

ferent manner and to varying extents. The agencies were so keenly aware of these differences and of the consequent modifications in the treatment required that any mention of the subject is justified only by its importance in the story as a whole.

Generally the Negro population suffered most seriously. The deflation struck the Negro first and hardest. In the discharge of workers they were first to go. In any resumption of activities they were the last to be called back, both because of existing prejudices and because of their low standing in seniority. Not only was the ratio of unemployed among them high, but their natural resources were comparatively low. Standards of health, sanitary and living conditions among them, never too high, were depressed still more. To the social agency they presented, in the first place, a problem in quantity: their relative number among new applicants was universally higher than among the whites.[1] This meant greater demand for colored or other specially qualified workers, greater need for co-operative health service and for attempts at re-migration, mass methods as against individualized treatment..

In the southern cities also, the Negro clientèle increased; not so much because of the return of the Negro industrial workers from the North—there was comparatively little of that—but because of the influx of colored farmers with their families. As has been observed earlier, many of these, mostly tenant farmers, had been ruined by the boll-weevil, were unable to continue on the farm, and flocked to social agencies, for whom the latter, unprepared, were able to do little more than give emergency relief. This sudden city-ward movement of Negro farmers had not abated by the spring of 1922.[2]

It may be said generally of family welfare agencies North and

[1] In Cleveland the public welfare department estimated Negro applicants at 80 per cent of the total; the Associated Charities had to subdivide its district in the Negro section and establish a new temporary district.

[2] This problem is so closely related to the entire problem of the cotton industry in the South that it can hardly be dealt with separately. In South Carolina the boll-weevil struck with full force in 1921 for the first time. In the states contiguous to Memphis (Tennessee, Mississippi, Arkansas) the boll-weevil is an older visitor, but was joined in 1921 and 1922 by a drop in cotton prices that severely intensified the distress. Whether a co-operative and joint publicity in the states affected directed toward the discouragement of city-ward migration would even scratch the surface of the difficulty, at least so far as social agencies are concerned, it is hard to tell. It may be worth attempting.

South that they treated the colored family with equal liberality. So far as relief and service are concerned, no deliberate discrimination was practised against them.[1] The homeless colored men did not fare quite so well. The Association for the Improvement of the Poor in Pittsburgh, the Helping Hand Institute in Kansas City, Mo., the Salvation Army in Memphis, gave no lodging to Negroes. Neither the Church Federation of Pittsburgh nor the colored Young Men's Christian Association in Kansas City was quite able to supply the deficiency.

What saved the homeless Negro from suffering was, in the first place, the generosity and mutual helpfulness of the Negro population in general. Many single men were taken in and given at least lodging, if not food, by comparative strangers of their own race. Both colored and white social workers certify to this fact. The good cheer and optimism of the Negro was a further aid. It took such qualities as those and both initiative and ingenuity to do what the homeless Negroes did in Chicago, who, as already mentioned, constructed for themselves improvised shanties on the lake front and managed to keep under shelter there for a good part of the winter of 1920–21. In many of the communities, organizations for the welfare of the Negro, such as the Urban Leagues, did excellent work in serving their fellows. Most striking and effective among these was the Urban League of Chicago. Its enviable record of service covers not only the work of the normal year but also emergency service in supplying employment, shelter, meals, advice, interpretation of the needs of the colored people to the community, and obtaining co-operation of the city's social agencies in its own program of aid.[2]

If there were any innovations in the technique proper of dealing with Negro families, none of the agencies disclosed them. There was, however, an extension of the principle of utilizing colored advisory committees for guidance and suggestion in colored case work.

[1] The director of relief of the Cleveland Public Welfare Department stated that he continued the equal treatment of indigent Negroes—constituting some 80 per cent of the applicants—despite considerable pressure to discourage him. Most of these Negroes were drawn into Cleveland in the industrial boom after the war.

[2] For figures showing its service to homeless men, see p. 159; for a chart of its employment service, see p. 207.

In Kansas City, Mo., the Mexican population presented a special problem for treatment. Since, however, none of the other cities had this problem in any serious dimensions, it is hardly necessary to discuss it except in comparison with the general treatment of Negro families. During the winter of 1920–21, an excess of Mexican population, previously drawn in by the industries, was set adrift and, eventually, with the co-operation and at the joint expense of the Kansas City Chamber of Commerce and the Mexican government, was expatriated to Mexico. There is, however, in normal times, and was in the winter of 1921–22, a considerable Mexican settlement in the city. Families of this group, when applicants at the Kansas City Provident Association, are, with few exceptions, not given the same case work service as other families, but merely relief as needed.[1]

In contrast to the Negro and Mexican groups, the Jewish population was in less serious economic condition than the general population in most of the cities visited. Smaller representation in the manufacturing industries, greater thrift, more highly developed and numerous organizations for mutual help, are probably the chief factors resulting in this more favorable situation during the emergency. In all but the smallest cities, Jewish social agencies with professional staffs care for all the needy of the group. There was nowhere an overflow of applicants from this service that would have necessitated aid from the general family agency and a consequent modification of technique for the purpose.[2]

4. Special Treatment of Unemployment Cases. The attitude of social case workers to problems presented by "unemployment cases" swings in wide curves between two extremes: one, that there is little if any difference between "unemployment cases" and those of the usual run of families; the other, that unemployment cases are a group by themselves, requiring little more than a job

[1] Miss Marie E. Hubbard, district secretary, Kansas City Provident Association, interview of May 11, 1922.

[2] The largest relative increase in the case load of Jewish agencies was probably that of the Jewish Social Service Bureau of Chicago, The average case load per month, during the period of October to March, inclusive, rose from 725 in 1919–20, to 858 in 1920–21, and 1,373 in 1921–22. This, despite the fact that the number of families receiving regular relief decreased from an average per month of 330 in the calendar year 1920, to 261 in 1921, and 194 in the first four months of 1922. Figures from M. J. Karpf, superintendent.

or material relief. Which attitude will eventually prevail is a question of importance both from the standpoint of technique in treatment and from that of the family agency's future relations to unemployment relief programs. It must be clear from the foregoing pages that, while all case work standards suffered to some extent because of the sheer weight of the load brought on by the depression, it was the new cases—mostly unemployment cases—that suffered most. In most instances this was so simply because of the difficulty of making a good start on each case when time for the finer insights and services of case work was lacking.

Universally, the family agencies observed among new unemployed applicants a rising ratio of representatives of higher economic strata than was usual among their clientèle. Skilled workers, mechanics, small business men, and even representatives of the professional classes appeared. Applicants at the emergency district in Philadelphia showed 70 per cent not formerly known to the society—an unusually high percentage.[1] With the arrival of spring and the opening up of employment, whether temporary or permanent, there was a shrinkage of unemployment cases in proportion to the general case load that still further accentuated the special character and greater resiliency of this newer group. In the number of homeless men the same decreasing volume was manifested. Minneapolis, New York City, Cleveland, and other cities were enabled to discontinue their temporary shelters before the expected date by the exodus of their charges to jobs.

These are only a few of the factors leading agencies to the adoption of differential treatment of unemployment cases, which, in a few cities, became explicit. In Boston, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia the differentiation took the form of limitation of "intake," or the reference of such cases to public agencies. In Philadelphia, with the organization of the emergency district, unemployment cases became entirely segregated from the general case load; in Minneapolis, the end of the winter found the Associated Charities more determined than ever to refuse all purely unemployment cases in future emergencies; in practically all the cities visited, a simplification and foreshortening of investigation and treatment in these cases resulted.

[1] Report to Board of Directors, see p. 79.

CHAPTER VI

THE TASK OF SOCIAL AGENCIES (*Continued*)

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

INCREASE in the work of the social agencies during the emergency would, because of its volume alone, have entailed administrative problems. These have occasionally been complicated by questions of policy and by technical difficulties.

1. Personnel. Practically all the agencies had to increase their staff for the winter of 1921–22. That meant increasing the service budget at a time when sufficient money even for material relief was obtained with difficulty. The Associated Charities of Minneapolis increased the service budget by $10,000 over the allowance for the year. The family welfare agencies in Boston, Hartford, Cleveland, and other places also found it necessary to increase the staff of visitors. The United Charities of St. Paul failed to increase its staff only because of the inability of the federation to supply the necessary funds.[1]

The importance of expenditures for service as compared with material relief, even in emergency work due to unemployment, was repeatedly demonstrated. Many cases were "kept open" when relief was no longer needed merely because workers lacked the time to do the necessary follow-up work. On the other hand, cases were sometimes closed before they had been judged ready for closing, merely because the family under care had made no renewed requests for aid for some time.[2]

The greatest limitation upon the work of the Cleveland Associated Charities came, in fact, not from lack of resources either for relief or for service, but from inability to obtain the necessary

[1] Not only were the necessary additions to the staff omitted, but anticipated salary increases, estimated by the general secretary to be in the neighborhood of $6,000, were voluntarily foregone by the staff in view of the financial difficulties of the organization.

[2] Miss Frances Taussig, general secretary, United Hebrew Charities, New York City, interview of April, 1922. Also Cleveland and elsewhere.

personnel. The demand for experienced case workers throughout the country had exhausted the supply. Workers in training were given as much work and responsibility as they could bear. Volunteer aid was drafted to capacity. A new plan of utilizing "aids" was tried.[1] It was found, however, that expansion by the use of inexperienced workers defeated itself because of the additional demand that it made upon the already overburdened supervisors.

Owing to the unusually heavy work and the trying nature of it, visitors did not stand the winter's strain as well as usual. Vacations and leaves of absence were needed more than ever. The clerical and stenographic help was also in greater demand and bore greater hardships.

2. Division of Labor. In a few exceptional instances new functions assumed by the family agency necessitated administrative changes in the distribution of personnel, but these changes did not materially affect the distribution of labor within the organization.[2] The unequal distribution of the case load among the different district offices of family agencies was more serious. The occupational, racial, and ethnological distribution of the working population was bound to create different degrees of distress in the different parts of the cities. The district offices of family agencies experienced, therefore, different rates of increase in the case load. While the advantages of having such offices distributed throughout the city and easily accessible to their clients were more than ever apparent, it was a difficult matter to adjust the distribution of cases and the expansion of the staff to an uneven expansion of case load. Even where, as in Minneapolis, an extra visitor was added to each district, the case load per visitor still varied from 50 or 60 in some cases, to 80 or more in others. The Cleveland Associated Charities found it necessary to divide one of its districts—in which the bulk of the colored population lived—into two parts and to create a new district office. Such an arrangement is not lightly

[1] "Aids" received the average pay of workers in training. They reported to the visitors and worked under them, making no direct entries in the records themselves. There were six such aids in the organization during the winter.

[2] The Associated Charities of Pittsburgh assigned one of its workers as employment secretary to relieve the other visitors and to concentrate job-seeking done by visitors. The Associated Charities of Minneapolis assigned one of its workers to the "Gateway," to take charge of the municipal registration of homeless men; similar changes, but less distinct, were made in Cleveland and Boston.

made, in view of the probably temporary nature of the office and the heavy overhead expenses entailed.

The most important experiment in emergency distribution of labor was that of the Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity. The story of the emergency fund of $25,000 for unemployment expended by this organization has been told in part elsewhere.[1] The method of organizing its personnel for service was unique and considered successful. It was summarized by Miss Betsey Libbey in a report to the Board of Directors as follows:

. . . It was midwinter and the thirteen districts of the society were staggering under a load of work 11 per cent greater than in the previous year, when they were carrying a large part of the city's unemployment, and 50 per cent greater than in the winter of 1920. The district staff had been increased by only two visitors. Every worker was carrying a maximum load. The administration of this fund in the next two or three months would bring, inevitably, a large influx of new work. No one could tell in advance how it would be distributed—which districts would get the largest share. Even when workers are available in an emergency it is almost impossible to distribute them at a number of different points so that each district will have its quota at the time they are most needed. Few, if any, trained workers would be available. The new personnel would be almost entirely untrained. With the best management, the burden would fall upon the permanent staff, already overburdened at the time of the year when strain is greatest. It would mean bringing all the case work of the Society to an emergency level.

Largely for these reasons it was decided not to handle the unemployment work through the permanent districts, but to organize an emergency district. This was done—not only to maintain the standard of work with the families known to the society and to protect an overburdened staff, but also because it was believed that in this way better service could be given to the families of the unemployed.

Rooms were secured at the central office—the supervisor of district work took charge of the new district temporarily. A member of the Board of Directors gave part time to supervising some of the visitors and at the beginning of the second month gave full time, becoming the superintendent. The Application Department of the Social Service Building received all applications for the district, and a central office clerk, who supervises the relief registrations, took charge of the finances. Three new

[1] See Appendix, p. 239, also Chapter III, p. 79.

stenographers were trained a few days in the district offices and then assigned to the unemployment district.

Already the districts were doing a considerable amount of work with the unemployed. . . . It was decided that the districts should continue to take these problems . . . and the new emergency office then would handle only one type of case—unemployment problems with no other complications.

While it cannot be said that it requires less skill and knowledge to deal with a family whose only or main problem is unemployment, in a large number of instances a case worker trained in family work will not be called upon to use such a diversity of knowledge and skill as is needed in a majority of family adjustment problems. However, the best work with straight unemployment problems will be done, perhaps, by a person trained in family work who has developed a sound technique. . . .

It was for this reason that it was decided to use only trained workers in the unemployment office. Three were taken from the districts where the regular work of the Society would be least disturbed, and were replaced by untrained workers. Each of the visitors had at least two years' experience in family work and one of them much longer. Two new visitors were secured, one with long experience in family work and the other in medical social work. Two trained volunteers completed the new staff, one who gave half time and the other, a physician, two days a week. As the distances were great in the extreme northeast and northwest sections and cases in that territory probably would be few, two of the outlying districts volunteered to take care of unemployed families in that part of the city. Definite territories were assigned to the visitors, but each helped the other temporarily when it was necessary.[1]

The arrangement worked out to the complete satisfaction of the society, so that, should a similar situation arise again, the same method would be repeated. The fact that this plan was in operation for a period of only two to three months and that it was devised for the expenditure of a specific sum given for unemployment relief alone, would not seem to affect its applicability to any period of industrial depression.

Such agencies as had made any definite arrangements for sharing the burden of unemployment cases with the public authorities employed a variety of ways for distributing the load. In some

[1] Report to the Board of Directors of the Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity on the Administration of the $25,000 Fund for the Unemployed.—Section I, prepared in May, 1922, by Miss Betsey Libbey, Supervisor of Districts.

instances cases were entirely transferred, in others joint responsibility was carried, while in still others new applicants were simply referred to the other organization, and no record of their application made. Any difficulties involved pertained rather to case work technique. It was difficult, for example, after a transfer had been made, to retain enough contact to ascertain whether proper treatment was given to the family; and occasionally there was cause for anxiety on this score. Further difficulties were experienced in the cases of families that, for one reason or another, drifted back from the public to the private agency.

3. General Problems of the Executive. In addition to adjustments within the organization, such as those discussed, the administrative head of the agency found himself confronted with many problems of readjustment. The securing of needed personnel was a constant chore. Keeping visitors fresh for their tasks by analytical study of the cases under their care, without straining them to the breaking point, seemed desirable. Adapting the usual relations with other private or public agencies to suit the emergency; formulating policies and getting them accepted by the Board of Directors; calling or attending conferences that related to the general situation; raising funds or planning for emergency fund-raising campaigns; stimulating or guiding unemployment committees; arranging for the assumption of new temporary tasks—such are but a few of the extra burdens borne by the executive of a social agency during a winter of unemployment emergency.

V. THE CASE WORKER'S BURDEN

The burden of all the increase in work and of the difficulties involved in the adaptation of technique to emergency demands fell most heavily on the shoulders of the case worker. The sheer quantity of the work was overwhelming. If she had a conscience and pride about the standards of her work, the irresistible sweep that crushed down those standards depressed her. She did many things that she did not approve of and had to continue doing them. Her usual resources failed her. The client had exhausted most of his resources before application, and advice would create no others. The society's financial strength seemed less certain than

usual. She could find no work for her client when that was evidently the "treatment required." Her task was longer and harder, and results decreasingly satisfactory. Co-operating agencies were also overburdened, and the aid to be expected from them was less than ever.

Perspective was difficult. Only by steady plodding and more hours of toil a day than mind or body reasonably could bear was she able to get through her daily grist. She had no time or poise to relate her daily labors and the principles of her changing technique to a comprehensive case work philosophy or to their relation to the general economic situation.

The morale of the clients deteriorated, and she could give little stimulus. At times the growing hostility of the unemployed man to the social structure which rendered him helpless made it more difficult for him to co-operate with the case worker. Especially when he conceived that he was unfairly or ungenerously treated by the social agency, his antagonism would be directed against the visitor and her advice.

In one case, at least, the very existence of the family agency was threatened by financial difficulties, and to the case worker's other troubles was added the worry of insecure tenure of position.

It is no more than should be expected that under this burden many case workers gave out. The number of "breakdowns" was high, and periods of enforced absence often long. The case worker's burden became the executive's burden—but only until her place could be taken by some other case worker. It was her shoulders, in the last analysis, that carried a burden which should have been more evenly distributed if it was to be borne.

VI. PUBLICITY

Some social workers in Minneapolis feared that the publicity given to municipal care of the unemployed in that city was attracting a number of homeless men who would otherwise have stayed away. The Chicago city fathers refused to open the municipal lodging house for fear that homeless men would be drawn into the city—yet homeless men were there in large numbers. The Mayor's Committee on Unemployment and the Central Charities of Evanston attributed to the aid of the press in giving generous publicity

to their work a great part of their success. Social workers in Pittsburgh complained that the press refused to give publicity to anything dealing with the subject of unemployment except of an optimistic nature. The publicity given to the picturesque activities of Urbain Ledoux (alias Zero) in Boston, where he "sold" the unemployed on the Common in the manner of the traditional slave auctions, and to abortive attempts to do the same in New York, was severely censured by some social workers in those cities. Cleveland attributed its success in dealing with the unemployed to the absence of publicity. The work of the American Legion-Red Cross Employment Service in Kansas City, Mo., was made possible largely through the co-operation of the local press, yet the employment service of the American Legion in New York avoided publicity, and similar services in Cleveland, although utilizing the public press generally, took no part in the "Unemployment Week" conducted by the national organization of the Legion.

Are these real or only apparent contradictions as to the value and use of publicity? And is publicity through the public press the only effective channel? If not, what other channels are there for publicity, and of what value are they? Did the experience of social agencies with publicity methods in the cities visited throw any light on these questions?

We may assume "publicity" to mean the deliberate process of bringing to public knowledge and attention facts or ideas deemed useful for the accomplishment of the purposes of the person or organization utilizing it. The value of publicity may, then, be differently judged, depending upon:

1. The character of the person or organization resorting to it
2. The immediate purposes to be accomplished
3. The effectiveness of the particular method of publicity used for accomplishing the purposes sought
4. The question of "who is the public" to be reached.

1. Who Seeks "Unemployment" Publicity and for What Purpose? The fact is that not the social agencies alone have been seeking publicity in connection with unemployment. Newspapers want unemployment publicity, for it makes "copy," fills the papers, increases circulation. Unless strong contrary motives are brought into play, as was the case in Pittsburgh, newspapers

may be depended upon to bring the situation before the public. The homeless man also profits by publicity—or, rather, that group of homeless men which is inclined to panhandle or is already in the professional beggar class. Publicity softens the heart of the public toward him, enables him to pose as a worker out of a job, and opens the purse of the man on the street who is solicited for aid. The politician wants publicity for his party; and if the work of a mayor's committee, its hearings or resolutions, may be made to redound to the credit of the party, he is not slow to publish it abroad. Many organizations seek publicity, not only to further the work actually in hand, but also to promote the interests of their own institution.

2. Reasons for Unemployment Publicity Sought by Social Agencies. For what purposes did social agencies seek publicity during the winter of 1921–22, in connection with the unemployment situation? An incomplete list of the chief objects would include:

a. Funds for the agency to carry on its work
b. Jobs for the unemployed
c. The goodwill and co-operation of the public in support of any plans proposed for the aid of the unemployed
d. Stimulation of the municipality, public press, firms, individuals, agencies, or the unemployed themselves, to do or leave undone, as the case may be, whatever the occasion requires.

a. *Publicity for Funds.* Whether the social organizations usually concentrated on appeals by mail or by personal solicitation, or by "campaigns"; whether or not they used the "50 neediest cases" appeal in the press; whether they made special appeal by mail or through the press for particular families, no fundamental change in method was adopted during the emergency. None made a general public appeal for funds through the press to aid the unemployed. No general funds for the relief of the unemployed were raised by the spectacular methods so thoroughly discredited in previous unemployment emergencies.[1] Even where enforced suspension of work through lack of funds was threatened—as in the case of the St. Paul

[1] An occasional American Legion post or other veterans' organization would hold a tag day—a method long since discarded by social agencies—but even these were few in number as compared with previous years.

United Charities—no public appeal was thought of, despite the fact that such appeal would not have been made directly by the agency itself but through the financial federation.

b. *Publicity for Jobs.* With scarcely an exception, the family agencies took no direct part in employment service and had practically no share in the publicity planned or carried on for the purpose. They were, however, very much concerned with the degree of success of the employment service, especially where it was carried on by the mayor's unemployment committee, with which the family agency was frequently called upon to co-operate. Apparently unlimited press publicity was useful and welcomed by the employment service itself, whether conducted by a mayor's committee or by an American Legion post. Always, however, it was necessary to emphasize and to reiterate that *residents of the city only would be served*, and to substantiate that claim by giving unquestioning preference to residents. Press publicity for jobs, valuable as it was, would have remained ineffective unless followed up by other types of publicity. As already indicated elsewhere, letters were used to a slight extent only;[1] telephone calls to employers or prospective employers were constantly and universally used; at least two employment services (The American Legion-Red Cross of Kansas City, Mo., and the Mayor's Committee in Evanston) distributed cleverly designed blotters to advertise the service.

Some of the family agencies took direct part in "publicity for jobs" by requesting local employers to adopt or extend the part-time employment system so as to make possible the *retention* of jobs by as large a number of workers as possible. The efforts of such agencies met with varying degrees of success, measured largely by the degree of awakened social responsibility on the part of employers. An informal and practically self-appointed committee of the Cleveland social agencies which tried this method abandoned it only because of the conviction gained that most firms in the position to do so had already adopted that general policy.[2]

[1] See Chapter III, p. 73.

[2] James F. Jackson, Associated Charities, and Prof. C. E. Gehlke, Western Reserve University, interviews of December 13 and 14, 1921.

c. *General Publicity.* This term would include efforts made to obtain the general public goodwill for any proposed plans and the stimulation of groups, bodies, and individuals toward some activity or restraint deemed advisable. By the fundamental principles of publicity, such a thing as the general goodwill of the public, vague as that is, cannot be obtained except by specific appeal and in connection with definite propositions. It is necessary, therefore, to have clearly in mind what those propositions, purposes, or plans of the social agency are, how they affect the unemployment relief situation, and to what group they may properly be addressed.

Again, an exhaustive list is impracticable, but among some of the desirable ends would be the following:

1. To induce firms to retain as many as possible of their working force on part-time or on alternate shifts
2. To encourage the municipality, county, state, or federal governments to undertake or expedite any contemplated public works within the city
3. To urge householders and business men of the city to let whatever repair, cleaning, or odd jobs they can find be done during the emergency months
4. To restrict the employment service to residents
5. To restrict relief, especially by municipal authorities or unemployment committees, to residents only
6. To discourage nonresidents, both families and single men, from coming to the city
7. To assure decent temporary care, with a work test, for the homeless, and to make it known to the giving public that this care has been provided
8. To obtain, when necessary, municipal action such as the opening of a lodging house, suppression of panhandling, inspection of lodging houses
9. To discourage the opening of soup kitchens, bread lines, and the like
10. To prevent indiscriminate giving on the streets, at back doors, or through mushroom organizations
11. To co-operate with any centralizing undertakings inaugurated by an unemployment committee

From this brief list it is evident that any publicity should, if possible, be centralized or at least co-ordinated; that it should be carried on with some technical skill; that different types of publicity serve different purposes; that each agency should subordinate its own immediate purposes to the desired general end in view. A few examples from the experience during the winter of 1921–22 will serve to illustrate these principles.

The Chicago Conference on Unemployment, as we have seen, appointed a subcommittee which took entire charge of all general publicity except what was specifically assigned to some other group.[1] To this subcommittee a member of the staff of one of the prominent local newspapers was assigned to provide all the technical service for press publicity during a limited period, after which the chairman of the conference relieved him. Press publicity for the discouragement of an influx of homeless men was assigned to another committee, and the publicity in connection with possible fund-raising, if that should prove necessary, to still another. The last mentioned did not have occasion to function. The general publicity committee included among its tasks publicity for jobs, for the work of the State Employment Service, for a needed municipal lodging house, for the work of the Conference, and for that of the Mayor's Unemployment Commission.

For finding or creating jobs, for obtaining action on the lodging house, and for stimulating retention of workers by firms it was not enough to reach the general public; it was necessary to find the particular people of whom action was expected. Press publicity was only cultivating the ground. Several supplementary methods described earlier were therefore adopted:[2] A "procurement" staff made personal visits to potential employers; the Woman's City Club organized an elaborate system for finding and clearing householders' jobs, utilizing as part of the process local press publicity, moving picture theaters, addresses to women's clubs, to churches, and personal solicitation.[3] The Church Federation gave space in its bulletins to the desired publicity material, observed an unemployment Sunday, and collected money in the churches. The chairman of the Conference paid personal visits to employers and

[1] See Chapter II, p. 56, also Appendix, p. 226.
[2] See Chapter III, p. 64 sq., and Appendix, p. 226.
[3] See footnote, p. 68, Chapter III.

addressed important gatherings of these. The subcommittee of the Conference on the municipal lodging house arranged for hearings before the Mayor's Unemployment Commission.

In Evanston the executive committee of the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment carried the whole burden of publicity in that city. It included in its membership the general secretary of the Central Charities, and for part of its work utilized the routine administration of the society. The Central Charities was very directly concerned in all the publicity of the committee. Despite the comparatively greater efficacy of the press as a direct publicity organ in a small community, even here it was supplemented by the distribution of blotters, by announcements in the churches, and by personal visits to employers, and close relations with municipal departments. One of the outstanding and important phases of the publicity in Evanston was its constant insistence on service for residents only.

Most of the harmful publicity has been, on the whole, associated with the problem of the homeless man. It is axiomatic that the resident homeless man must be cared for. It is clear that it is not humane or practical to discriminate against the nonresident homeless to the extent of absolute refusal of help. A desirable arrangement, therefore, would include, in the first place, the availability of facilities for such men; further, knowledge on the part of the general public and of the homeless man in town that these facilities existed, but without advertising them beyond the town's borders; and, finally, assignment of the care of the homeless to the agency or agencies especially fitted to cope with it.

Cleveland very nearly satisfied these requirements. Facilities were adequate. The general public knew, if not of the specific facilities, at least of the fact that the Wayfarers' Lodge would take care of any unbefriended applicant. To increase specific knowledge on the part of the general public, small cards distributed through strategic channels, such as the police department, clubs, contributors, and the like, were placed in the hands of citizens. When solicited by a homeless man, the citizen could hand him one of these cards, directing him to one of the wayfarers' lodges and entitling him to food and shelter there. No press publicity of these available facilities appeared for some time, and no glowing descriptions of the excellent care given the men were sent broad-

cast—flattering as this would have been to the community and to the agencies concerned.

In contradistinction to the Cleveland situation, Minneapolis, which also took adequate care of its homeless, abounded in press publicity which, in the absence of a work test adequate to the emergency, brought not a few men to that city who might otherwise not have come. Chicago had neither municipal nor privately conducted shelter for the men, but the publicity connected with efforts to reopen a municipal lodging house, fruitless though it was in positive achievements, undoubtedly attracted men from the outside.[1] Boston had inadequate facilities, but attracted many homeless men through the dramatic appeal made by Mr. Ledoux to the benevolent public. New York also suffered from the activities of Mr. Ledoux.[2] While the city was able to take care of the physical needs of the men who came, no one who knew their day by day deterioration there would claim that New York was a good place in which to mobilize the homeless.

Soup kitchens, bread lines, and "missions," which are among the best agents to attract and hold homeless men and afford generous publicity to the donors and managers, were kept fairly low but could not be abolished altogether. They prospered in New York and Chicago, to some extent in Memphis, and probably elsewhere.

Much of the above discussion of publicity may not be directly applicable to the service of the social agencies, but it pertains to that of temporary emergency organizations with which social organizations may be affiliated, with which they must co-operate, and the work of which directly affects their own. It is important that any publicity conducted by such emergency organizations or on behalf of the emergency work of permanent agencies be critically studied. It should be recognized that publicity is not one thing but many things. It presents differences in purpose, requires differences in method, applies to different groups, and may be negative (deliberate avoidance), as well as positive (definite seeking of public attention).

[1] In fact, newspapers stated at one time that the lodging house was actually opened, reproducing a photograph of applicants at the lodges, when in truth the lodging house was not opened and the appropriations made late in the winter remained unused.

[2] The opinion of Major Underwood, of the Salvation Army, who was in charge of the municipal shelter, and of R. P. Gates, director of the Joint Application Bureau.

CHAPTER VII

RELATIONS OF SOCIAL AGENCIES

I. INTERRELATIONS OF PRIVATE AGENCIES

LESS during an emergency than at other times can any social agency safely attempt to perform its own mounting task unmindful of the work of others. The conferences of family welfare and health agencies in Boston, called at the instance of the Instructive District Nursing Association, led to the adoption of a plan to clear all the employment work of the agencies through the Industrial Aid Society. The United Charities of Chicago had an operating arrangement with the Christian Industrial League to refer to the latter all homeless men applying to the former and to have them cared for at the expense of the United Charities. "Work relief" arrangements in Philadelphia brought the family agency there into special relations with several other agencies not only for the emergency period, but for future co-operation as well; in Kansas City, Mo., an arrangement was made by which all work relief cases were referred to the Helping Hand Institute, the number of hours and rate of wages to be determined in each case by the family agency (Provident Association and Jewish Educational Institute respectively).

Co-operation under these circumstances assumed the form more and more of co-ordination of work. The above instances were chiefly of that type, and they might easily be multiplied. Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Memphis present examples in dealing with homeless men; Philadelphia, in work with the families of the unemployed; New York, in the work of agencies for the homeless men, and so on. The only limits upon this type of co-ordination of effort and division of the field of service have been in the initiative of executives, the mutual goodwill of the organizations, and their respective financial resources, equipment, and personnel.

In cities where agencies had joined into financial federations or central councils of social agencies, initiative for emergency work

had in a sense been removed from executives of the agencies; or had, at least, to function through the channel of the federation or council machinery. A kind of "social contract" is assumed when agencies become part of such a combination, a contract that in many instances during the emergency was profitable to all its parties, but in others was more or less embarrassing. Not only is the initiative of individual executives partly inhibited, but, in the case of financial federation, resources and equipment are determined by the latter; and the very existence and usefulness of a central council require the subordination of individual initiative to representative action through the council. Emergencies make unusual demands upon such central organizations. They test their value and strength. For this reason a somewhat detailed discussion of the experience of centralized endeavors in 1921–22 seems imperative.

1. Cities with Financial Federation or Central Council of Social Agencies. It may not be considered as within the function of pure financial federations to make policies or to initiate deliberations for modifying social service in unusual situations; that is rather part of "councils" of social agencies. Few federations are, however, *pure* financial federations. Developments of the last few years have produced so many varieties of federations and councils that the only practicable classification for our present purposes is one which distinguishes central organizations that assume the responsibility of financing member agencies from those that do not. The former add to their other responsibilities of leadership and co-ordination the very serious one of assuring the necessary financial support for most of the social work of their cities. Cleveland, Kansas City, Mo., Minneapolis, New Bedford, and St. Paul among the cities visited have such financial federations.[1] Boston, Chicago, Hartford, Memphis, and Pittsburgh have councils of social agencies and are not federated for joint financing.

In five of these ten cities the central organization assumed leadership and rendered valuable assistance to the constituent social agencies in dealing with their unemployment problem. In

[1] Philadelphia had just organized its federation in 1921 and was in the first year of operation; it is therefore omitted here.

Chicago, the Central Council ably and consistently carried the function of representing the interests and desires of social agencies in respect to the emergency, not only before the general public and the press, but also before the Mayor, the Mayor's Unemployment Commission, the civic bodies and associations, and the State Employment Service. The activities of the Chicago Council fully vindicated the cession of initiative by individual agencies to a representative body created by the agencies. In Minneapolis, activities were less elaborate, but direct and effective. Representations to the City Council, which resulted in the adoption of the city's policy toward homeless men, were made through and by the central council and after a study by its staff. The Cleveland Welfare Federation, besides proposing to the Community Chest measures of adequate financial preparedness for the winter, also lent its sanction and approval to informal committees, such as those described elsewhere,[1] which interviewed municipal authorities, the press, employers, and civic organizations.

In preparation for a possible increase in the burden of social agencies in Kansas City, Mo., during the winter of 1921–22, an emergency appropriation of $25,000 had been asked for by the federation—called the Council of Social Agencies—to cover unforeseen expenditures over and above the budgetary allowance to the several agencies. The situation in Kansas City did not develop to serious enough dimensions during that winter to impose a severe tax on the resources of the relief agencies. Only $10,000 of the emergency appropriation was requested by the Provident Association. Other requests were made not because of the extra burden due to the emergency but because the original appropriations had been insufficient for the normal tasks of the agencies. The Hartford Council was in close relation with the Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, before which it represented the interests of social agencies.

No leadership in dealing with the community's unemployment problem came from the central organizations of social agencies in the other five cities. That, though a sin of omission only, is a serious one in times of emergency. In one city, however, namely, St. Paul, more positive consequences followed, in that the federa-

[1] See Appendix, p. 228.

tion there, upon which devolves the responsibility for financing the social agencies of St. Paul, had failed to provide an assurance of their support for the entire year of the emergency.[1]

It would seem, then, that while the existence of a central organization of the city's social work facilitates fruitful action, the mere machinery, without energetic guidance, must fall short of the needs of the hour.

II. RELATIONS WITH PUBLIC WELFARE DEPARTMENTS

One of the perennial problems in the field of relief has been to determine the proper zones or functions of public as against private agencies. It is clearly outside the scope of this study to enter into a discussion of that problem, except in so far as the emergency situation has contributed a new factor to it or has been materially affected by it.

In very few of the cities visited were the private agencies financially equal to the emergency burden. Some family welfare agencies did not regard it as their proper task to meet the unemployment relief burden. Some went as far as their resources permitted, but entered into no special arrangements with public departments. Such was the case in the St. Paul United Charities and the Chicago United Charities. The southern cities visited—Memphis and Columbia—received an increase over the usual subsidy from public funds. The Minneapolis Associated Charities[2] assumed and carried its burden of family relief for part of the winter, then arranged to transfer all purely unemployment cases to the public department. The Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity was compelled to seek such an arrangement early in 1921. The private family welfare agencies of Cleveland, Hartford, and Kansas City, Mo., among those visited, came nearest to carrying the burden as it came to them. The Cleveland Associated Charities expanded its staff, increased its relief expenditures and, to some extent, its functions. Even so, however, it depended on the public department for much supplementary relief. The Charity Organization Society of Hartford managed to pull through with an earlier spring appeal than usual, and the Kansas City

[1] See Chapter V, p. 102 sq.

[2] Name changed in 1922 to Family Welfare Association.

Provident Association met its demands by using but $10,000 of the emergency fund provided by the financial federation. Boston and New Bedford both had had definite arrangements with the public welfare departments by which, during the emergency, they transferred a considerable part of their extra burden to the city.

Public welfare departments generally had to share the burden in some form or another. Undoubtedly, the principle that emergency unemployment and its relief are public burdens would have been more generally and more enthusiastically accepted by private agencies but for the fact that, because the case work standards of many public agencies are still comparatively low, any transfer of function to them by private agencies is made reluctantly.

Reference to public departments here denotes the regular, permanent city departments, not temporary emergency bodies. The different public departments met their responsibilities unevenly. Boston, between its Overseers of Public Welfare and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Department, probably bore the major part of the extra burden. New Bedford certainly did. Cleveland made a creditable extension of its work. Chicago and St. Paul did little; New York and Minneapolis took the homeless men as their special charges.

The great achievement for both public and private relief agencies in the winter of 1921–22 was that, whether relief came from public or private sources, it was always given through the regular permanent organizations and was, though with great variations of degree, as nearly as possible individualized. No public distributions scandalized the rational conscience of intelligent communities, at least so far as the extent of our study makes possible this generalization.

1. Emergency Arrangements. The division of the relief burden among public and private agencies, where deliberately undertaken, follows as nearly as possible the relations of those agencies in normal times. Space will permit a few instances only.

Boston. Boston is typical of those cities in which a long history of philanthropy has created a multiplicity of funds, endowments, and agencies. Most of them were established at a time when the city was much smaller than it is at present. The loyalties built up around each and their functional division of the fields of service

render difficult any plan of combining, pooling, or supplementing them. The present generation has succeeded in establishing a high degree of co-ordination, but there is still some lack of flexibility to meet new conditions and raise funds sufficient to meet an unemployment emergency.

In ordinary times, besides the usual denominational distribution of responsibility and the inter-organizational division of labor, the general policy has obtained that, because of the relatively larger resources of the private agencies for service and their correspondingly smaller resources for relief as compared with the public department, the Family Welfare Society (and to a certain extent the Boston Provident Association) would accept applications and, after the necessary consideration, would refer to the Board of Overseers of the Public Welfare the cases requiring continuous cash allowances.[1] This remained the arrangement during the emergency also, and, because unemployment cases tended to require more continuous relief, the reference of unemployment cases to the Overseers became quite general.

Philadelphia. In Philadelphia there is in normal times no public outdoor relief. In the 1914–15 emergency an appropriation by the city of $100,000 for the aid of the unemployed established a new precedent.

> Unemployment in Philadelphia first appeared to the social agencies in November, 1920 [reports the general secretary of the Society for Organizing Charity]. . . . The increased funds received by the social agencies were not enough to meet the situation. . . . When in January (1921) the Society for Organizing Charity announced that by the end of the month it would be unable to receive additional cases of unemployment, and when other social agencies of the city explained that they were working at the limit of their capacity, the Department of Public Welfare, recognizing the city's responsibility, undertook the care of those persons in need of financial assistance because of unemployment. . . . On January 16, 1921, Councils appropriated $10,000. . . . By agreement with the social agencies the Department [of Public Welfare] undertook to help those families in which unemployment alone was a problem. Families in which unemployment was complicated by sickness or other domestic difficulties were referred to private organizations, which were thought to

[1] Stockton Raymond, general secretary, Family Welfare Society.

> be better equipped for the more intensive work that was involved in such households.
>
> The $10,000 appropriation included no provision for administration, and the social agencies loaned volunteers and regular workers to the Department for its unemployment work. . . . It was impossible to continue the loan of workers beyond a period of about three months. Even with the additional workers, the staff of the Department of Public Welfare was insufficient, and by the autumn of 1921, for lack of workers, the Department in many instances was obliged to make families wait for three weeks and even longer before they could be visited. . . .[1]

Altogether the city appropriations for this purpose in 1921 totaled $14,000. In 1922 the city's only response to public pressure for a $100,000 appropriation was to include in its 1922 budget the sum of $2,500, which was all but exhausted within the first month. When no further appropriations were forthcoming, a generous donor contributed the sum of $25,000 to be expended through the Society for Organizing Charity for the relief of distress due to the unemployment of family breadwinners.

The division of labor here is clear. All outdoor relief in normal times is given by private social agencies. With the coming of unemployment, the public department agreed to take the new burden but was prevented from doing so by the miserly city appropriations. The private agencies had reached the limit of their financial resources. Thus, for a considerable period there was no aid to be had from any source. The public conscience was not touched, and the private purse responded inadequately.

Minneapolis. Minneapolis saw the public department assume the burden of caring for the homeless.[2] The family burden was carried simultaneously by both public and private agencies. The applicant made his own choice. Standards were poles apart, and the public department did not use the "Exchange" of information. There was no co-operation between the executive of the public department and the private agencies. The controlling subcommittee of the Board of Public Welfare, to which the executive officer of the Division of Relief of that Board is responsible, was more

[1] Letter from Karl de Schweinitz, general secretary, to Spencer Erwin of the Board of Directors, Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity, February 9, 1922.

[2] See Chapter VIII, p. 170 sq.

friendly. When, in the course of the galloping increase in the case load of the Associated Charities, recourse to public resources had to be made, the transfer and clearing of unemployment cases was arranged through the Board of Public Welfare. The division was simple. All applicants applied where they pleased. The public department took all comers. The Associated Charities referred those applying because of unemployment to the city department, except where other complicating factors rendered retention advisable. This arrangement was due largely to the recognition on the part of the Associated Charities that the emergency burden was likely to become heavier than the association would be able to bear, either financially or from the standpoint of good case work results, and to its determination early in the winter, in view of the generally increasing burden upon the organization from other sources, to consider simple unemployment cases as not properly within its field and to refer them to the public department.

Cleveland. Cleveland offers, in a sense, the simplest system of division of labor. The public department is regarded as one of the many social agencies in the city which co-operates with other social agencies. It is not financed or controlled by the Welfare Federation, but is affected by the influence and standing of the federation. In accordance with legal requirements and to the limit of its appropriations, staff, and equipment it takes its share of the burden.[1]

Here and there new public bodies or new functions of old public bodies developed, affecting the situation but little, except in regard to the quantitative distribution of labor. Thus the assumption of the care of unemployed veterans by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Department in Boston more than quadrupled its load.[2] The similar assumption of a new burden by the New York Public Welfare Department, on the other hand, added comparatively few: 1,228 in January, 1922, as against 968 in January, 1921.[3] With the exception of some state relief bodies, such as the Connecticut State Fund for Soldiers, there was neither state nor federal attempt to

[1] Since this was written and beginning January 1, 1923, the public outdoor relief work of Cleveland has been transferred to private management.

[2] Of the total load in 1921 about 80 per cent were of this group.—Harvey G. McKenna, director.

[3] Victor S. Dodworth, Director, Bureau of Investigation, New York City, Department of Public Welfare.—Interview of March 9, 1922.

establish new relief bodies that would further complicate the division of labor for relief among the social agencies.

III. RELATIONS TO CIVIC BODIES

In their capacity as service organizations the social agencies entered into definite co-operative relations with mayors' committees where these also had undertaken some service activity. Such was the case in Columbia, Evanston, and Hartford, where those committees conducted employment services and received applicants referred to them by the social agencies. Similar relations due to the emergency developed with the public employment services in Boston, Chicago, and, to some extent, in Cleveland. These have been discussed elsewhere.[1]

Chambers of Commerce. The ascendency of city chambers of commerce and the effect of this ascendency not only upon social agencies but on social work as a whole, is a matter of far-reaching importance which has never been adequately studied. The undefined relations now existing undoubtedly complicated the emergency situation of those social agencies covered by the present study.

In St. Paul, for example (up to the spring of 1922), one-half of the members of the Board of Directors of the Community Chest were appointed by the St. Paul Association.[2] In Kansas City, Mo., the body responsible for collecting funds for the federation is a bureau of the Chamber of Commerce. In Pittsburgh, the Chamber of Commerce, through a subcommittee, was making plans for a financial federation, without direct representation on that committee of the social agencies to be affected, through either their respective boards or executives. The proposed constitution (which failed of adoption) provided for an overwhelming representation (direct and indirect) of chamber of commerce influence. These are outstanding examples, but others could be quoted not essentially different.

Whether this active participation of chambers of commerce in the financial control of social agencies would seriously affect the

[1] See Chapter III, p. 63 sq.

[2] The new plan provides for a board composed, besides the chairman, of 18 members, of whom nine are representatives of social agencies, three appointed by the St. Paul Association, three by the women's clubs, and three by the Trade and Labor Council. The Labor Council has refused to accept representation.

policies of those agencies in the normal course of events is a question that has not yet been answered and, in fact, hardly raised.

The development of the general activities of the chambers of commerce, and particularly their increasing influence on the finances and policies of social agencies, placed them in a natural position to assume active leadership in the community effort for the relief of unemployment and its concomitant distress. But at this point the basic difficulty with these chambers asserted itself. Their membership is very largely of the employing class; their interests, whenever a possible division between capital and labor presents itself, are naturally with the former. It was the general policy of employers and of all the business interests during the depression of 1921–22, to interpret the situation in accordance with their personal interests. Even if not influenced by the desire of many individual employers to make the best of the unemployment situation through effecting reduction of wages and weakening the workers' morale, the chambers generally were reluctant to admit the seriousness of the situation because of the presumptive effect of such admission on local business. Optimism was fostered and intense efforts exerted to keep up a hopeful tone.

It was inconsistent with this policy to take very active steps toward the appointment of unemployment committees or in any way to emphasize the slackening of prosperity. The actions of chambers of commerce, therefore, ranged from failure to take positive leadership in unemployment relief to the lending of moral support to anti-trade-union organizations which distinctly opposed aid to the unemployed.

Under the circumstances, social agencies, in their efforts to increase to the utmost possible their resources for the aid of the unemployed, often found themselves in embarrassing situations—occasionally accused by labor, on the one hand, of being controlled by capitalist interests, and by the employers of holding views and sentiments subversive of social order.

IV. RELATIONS WITH INDUSTRY

The most difficult fact to establish in this study has been the kind and amount of aid obtained by agencies from the two groups most directly concerned with unemployment; namely, industrial

plants and workers' organizations. The writer, therefore, must content himself with indicating some of the general types of help given by these groups, and note briefly a few instances of each.

1. Aid from Employers. It is generally conceded to be to the advantage of industrial plants to have a plentiful supply of labor available from which to pick and choose as the need develops. In industries requiring some skill or acquaintance with the operation of the plant, this desideratum implies the desirability of having access to workers who had previously been employed in the same or similar industries. If any revival of activities is expected, it is to the plant's interest to prevent an exodus of laid-off employes. This may have constituted one motive for helping them, either directly or by co-operation with relief agencies. A sense of social responsibility, however, and a personal interest in employes rendered idle through no fault of their own have undoubtedly been the chief motives in many of the plants where relief measures were devised and carried out. In others, contractual agreements between employers and trade unions provided quasi-relief measures; while in still others it was the remaining employes, with the administrative and material help of the employers, who aided those laid off.

In casting about for additional resources to help carry the overwhelming relief burden, the Associated Charities of Pittsburgh in a few isolated cases appealed for aid for some of their clients to their former employers. One such case is recorded as early as January, 1921; another in August of the same year. The success in these few cases prompted further appeals in the autumn and winter that followed. By the spring this had become a substantial resource for relief.[1] It appears, moreover, from the records of some of those aided, that they were old employes who had a moral, though no technical, right to help from the plants by which they had been laid off. Data from eight of the plants to which appeals had been made show that the men had been employed by the firms

[1] One hundred and four family case records in the office of the Associated Charities show 31 refusals to aid as against 73 cases aided. Of the latter 29 were given part-time work, 24 material relief, and 20 were given both by the plant management. Twenty-two firms were thus approached, either through their welfare departments or through officials ranging from agent to vice-president. None of the cases thus aided received supplementary aid from the Associated Charities. The heads of families aided averaged 4.2 dependents each.—Summary by Miss Nell Scott of Associated Charities, May, 1922.

that helped them for periods averaging from a year and a half to twelve years.

An active sense of social responsibility led the management of the International Harvester Company to adopt a series of emergency and relief measures during the 1921–22 depression.[1] Seniority in years of service and the extent of need were the guiding principles. In September, 1920, first the most recent employes and those of low productivity were released. Then followed reduction of hours per day and days per week of work; then, by agreement of the working force, further reduction of personnel and rotation of available employment among all those remaining on the payroll, the selection of the latter being determined by efficiency, needs, length of service, and so on. When shutdown of plants was necessitated, advance notice was to be given and the work to be so arranged as to bring shutdowns into the summer, and the period of operation, as far as possible, into the winter months. Employment managers acted to a limited extent as agencies for securing work elsewhere for as many of these laid-off men as possible. Meantime, manufacturing for stock was continued to the limits of safety.

Specific relief measures included the acceleration of retirement on pension of old employes; also the establishment of a loan fund for laid-off employes in need, either with or without collateral loans on company stock owned by employes; and a campaign, centrally supervised, for home gardening.[2] The Welfare Department of the company, through which the loan plan is administered, notified the United Charities of Chicago immediately after adoption of the plan, to refer back to it all such former employes applying at that agency as had been in the employ of the company for three years or more. Loans made to the men were to be paid back without interest at the rate of approximately $1.00 a week.[3]

A firm which prefers to remain anonymous, while unable to adopt emergency measures on such a large scale as those of the Harvester Company, shouldered, nevertheless, responsibility for the relief of

[1] Willoughby Walling, chairman, Chicago Council of Social Agencies, interview December, 1921; Miss Sara Southall, welfare worker, International Harvester Company, interview March, 1922; A. H. Young, manager, Industrial Relations, International Harvester Company, letter, May 10, 1922.

[2] A. H. Young, International Harvester Company.

[3] Miss S. Southall, International Harvester Company.

its needy ex-employes, removing to that extent a portion of the imminent burden from the family agency. Within a month of the suspension of work, the homes of all the apprentices were visited to ascertain conditions, and in four instances work in plant upkeep was given to boys where assistance seemed to be required. The wages for these boys were paid from a special fund which had been created for the purpose. Subsequently, the homes of all employes on the payroll at the time of the shutdown in 1921 (some 350), and later all those laid off previously during 1921 (about 150 more) were visited. About 1,000 visits were made during the winter to carry out the policy of not allowing employes to be forced to apply to relief agencies. Positions were found for 150 men, coal was purchased, clothes furnished, landlords and creditors called upon. The family society was notified to refer to the employment manager any applicants who were found to be employes of the firm. Only four such applied.

In developing its plans, as above described, the International Harvester Company had consulted the "work councils" of employes and had given them some participation in the administration of its system of relief. In the anonymous instance, the firm shouldered responsibility for initiative, cost, and administration. In the men's clothing industry in Chicago, contractual agreements between employers and trade union distributed evenly the preventive relief burden by rotating available work among all employes on the payroll.[1] This arrangement eliminated to a considerable extent any responsibility on the employer's side and left the burden of relief measures largely on the shoulders of the workers.[2]

[1] For the system adopted in the corresponding industry in Cleveland, see p. 147.

[2] An arrangement operated jointly by the employes and employers, and resulting in considerable relief activity, was brought to our attention from one of the cities not visited during the present study. A joint Unemployment Emergency Relief Committee composed of four representatives of employes and five of the management, undertook the charge of relief of unemployed persons laid off by the General Electric Company at West Lynn, Mass. One per cent of the weekly wages for thirteen weeks was contributed voluntarily by 75 per cent of the personnel, and then extended for ten weeks more. The company contributed $20,000 in the form of "work relief" through wages on repair work. The distribution of relief was in the hands of the committee of ten, and the voluntary contributions of the employes were deducted from their weekly wages. Between January 7 and March 18, 1922, $11,616.29 in relief had been expended on 305 cases, and $14,500 had been expended on wages and material by the company for "work relief." The material relief went almost entirely to grocery and coal orders.—Thomas Watt, secretary of the committee, letter April 21, 1922.

2. Aid from Workers. In their individual capacity, workers had been helping their unemployed fellows from the very first, as relatives, friends, neighbors, lodge brothers, acquaintances. Social agencies had dealt with them as such in normal times as well as in the emergency. With workers organized into trade unions, the relations of social and relief agencies are somewhat different.

The social worker is aware that many of the fundamental policies of trade unionism bear directly or indirectly upon questions relating to unemployment. One of the basic needs that have led to collective bargaining is that of securing the employment of the individual, through the method of tying such employment up with the



Diagram 1. Guaranteed funds paid in by manufacturers and paid out to employes, men's clothing trade, Cleveland, June 1 to December 1, 1921

employment and interests of the entire group. An incidental but important aspect of the struggle for shorter hours, elimination of the speeding-up process, limitation of the number of apprentices and even of members, limitation of overtime work, and similar policies has been the effort to spread out employment and to extend it to as large a number of workers in the trade and for as long a period during the working year as possible.[1] One effect of trade

[1] The contract between the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Chicago and employers in that city includes, among numerous provisions, an elaborate machinery for settling differences between employers and individual employes, and especially for regulating the discharge of any employe. Moreover, distinct provision is made for the distribution of available work in off seasons, so as to give all employes as nearly as possible an even chance for work.

Agreements between employers and employes in the women's garment industry in Cleveland add another exceedingly interesting feature to the measures for reducing seasonal unemployment—measures that applied in the 1921–22 emergency as well as in normal times. By this agreement each firm guarantees forty-one weeks' employment to its employes each year, the employe bearing the risk of the remaining eleven weeks of the year. For each week under 41 per year the employe is entitled to two-thirds of his weekly wages. To provide funds for this purpose, every employer who is a party to the agreement sets aside each week a sum equal to 7½ per cent of that week's payroll. This plan not only places a premium on good business management but also provides the necessary funds for meeting the wage deficit for the weeks short of the guaranteed period of employment. The figures used in the diagram opposite were supplied by F. C. Butler, manager of the Cleveland Garment Manufacturers' Association. They cover the working of the plan for its first period of six months and indicate the extent of its success.

unionism has been to build up the financial security and independence of the worker. Unionism has stimulated thrift and the accumulation of savings. A direct result of this has been the better financial preparedness of union members to bear unemployment of any kind, whether by reason of strikes or from other causes.

It was, in fact, one of the most noticeable phenomena observed by family agencies that the number of union members among applicants was surprisingly small.[1] Testimony on this point was very nearly unanimous. Special studies by some of the agencies confirmed the impressions gained from the general records. Members of trade unions were both proportionately and absolutely a very small part of the case burden.

There is always a certain amount of relief of needy members carried on by unions. Many of these local organizations vote financial aid to members in individual cases when, because of sickness or any other misfortune, the member gets into financial straits.[2] Rarely, however, is such aid given in cases where unemployment is the only difficulty. Very few local or national craft unions, and probably

[1] The union is not merely concerned with filling all vacancies from among its own members, but also seeks to send its members to jobs in the order of their need as measured by the period of their unemployment. A waiting list, roughly constructed with this in view, is kept by a number of unions. One of the unofficial functions of union members is, moreover, to spread information among fellow-members about available vacancies. The Brotherhood of Steam Shovel and Dredge Men actually provides in its constitution that "any member knowing of a position for a brother member must assist in securing him the position."—From manuscript notes of Paul Wander, New School of Social Research, New York, N. Y.

[2] The Trade and Labor Council of Sioux Falls owns two houses which are occupied, free of rent, by widows of members. This is a rather unusual form of trade union relief.

no local or state federations of labor, have any formal unemployment relief or insurance system.[1] Some craft unions and local federations have, however, formal or informal understanding with the local relief agencies by which any applicant to the latter is referred to the union or federation for relief. Such an understanding was distinctly had between the Associated Charities of Minneapolis, for example, and the Trade and Labor Council of Minneapolis. Less explicitly the arrangement existed in St. Paul and it has been growing up elsewhere. In Sioux Falls, S. Dak.—for reasons rooted in local history and the size of the community—the trade unions make a regular contribution to the family welfare agency which takes care of union members in need.[2]

In January, 1922, a revolving fund of $25,000 was set aside by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Chicago to be used for loans to unemployed members in need. Details of the use of the fund were not available at the time of the study, but it was stated that the fund was being used to a considerable extent.[3] The Trade and Labor Councils of Minneapolis and St. Paul had established "commissary funds" for the aid of unemployed union members. These funds were established by authority given by the Minnesota State Federation of Labor to local federations of the three large cities in the state, Duluth and the Twin Cities. The details of the administration of the funds varied somewhat in the two cities visited, but in both, outright grants were made, generally in kind, and the fund consisted of contributions from individual workers and craft unions.

[1] An interesting method of aiding union members by relieving them of the burden of membership dues was written into the constitution of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen in 1921. The amendment reads: "Any member of a local lodge who, without fault on his part, is unemployed for a full calendar month, shall be entitled to an unemployment stamp for that month and thereby excused from the payment of regular monthly dues upon complying with the following provisions in relation thereto: (a) He shall register his name, etc. . . ." This follows the precedent established by similar action in 1918 by another craft union (International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers), and may possibly have been stimulated by the regular unemployment benefits derived from assessments paid out during the depression of 1914–15 by the International Photo Engravers' Union.—Data from Paul Wander, New School of Social Research, New York, N. Y.

[2] In 1920–21 the Trade and Labor Council of Sioux Falls contributed $600 to the Family Welfare Society. In 1921–22 the Council made no appropriations, leaving it to the individual constituent craft unions to do so.

[3] Sam Levin, of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Chicago, interview of April 14, 1922.

Between three and four thousand dollars were thus expended in each of the Twin Cities during the winter of 1921–22.

Had it not been for the extremely strained relations between capital and labor in Minneapolis and St. Paul, and the unfriendly attitude of organized labor toward the financial federations of both cities, the relations of the social agencies to the unemployment relief policies of the labor unions would undoubtedly have been more co-operative and profitable to both clients and organizations.

CHAPTER VIII

THE HOMELESS MAN

THE homeless man is in a sense the least important of the many problems facing a community during local or nation-wide employment depression. The amount of suffering he represents and the social cost of his neglect are incomparably less in quantity and seriousness than that of the families in which the bread-winner's income has been cut off. Yet he stands as the symbol and measure of the community's inability to meet the emergency. He is the most conspicuous manifestation of unemployment. His needs stare the public in the face. He appears in groups, in many guises recognizable to the least observant and most indifferent. He is on the street, the doorsteps, at the regular hangouts—generally in the most populous part of town. He is not lost among helpful friends, taken up by neighbors, tided over by tradesman, relative, trade union, and lodge. He has none of these ties—at least not in the community where he is "homeless." He supplies, moreover, the opportunity of the grandstand philanthropist, is grist for the mill of the yellow journal, confounds the economic theorist or industrial reformer, and is a godsend to the irresponsible agitator.

Important or not, he compels public recognition, he forces the issue. He may number one hundred or ten thousand, no one knows. But he is insistent, and will remain so as long as the community continues its bungling ways. For the present, at any rate, he must be met as a problem, and to do this the community must know him. Is he the same in emergencies as in normal times, in summer as in winter, in New York as in Memphis or Kansas City? Is he the responsibility of one community, of many, or of none? How can he be dealt with?

I. THE HOMELESS MAN IN NORMAL TIMES

1. Resident Homeless. Occasionally in normal times a man without family or other close ties, a continuous resident of the com-

munity but living in a furnished room and eating in restaurants or boarding, will find himself for one reason or other jobless and resourceless. His home is where he lodges. If he is unable to pay his rent he is homeless. He may for a time, perhaps a day or a month, become a charge on others, but ordinarily such cases are few.

Always in normal times there are men without family ties incapacitated physically, mentally, or by long disuse of their energies from making a living on a decent scale, who remain year in, year out, in the same city. They live in miserable rooms in the worst quarters or in lodging houses; beg, or pick up trifling odd jobs; occasionally pilfer; and are a drag on the community life. They are practically unemployable.

Always along with these there is a third type, sometimes hardly distinguishable from the second. Briefly described, this is the "bum." He also is *resident.* He would never think of undertaking such an energetic adventure as to seek a living in an unknown environment. He may be the product of blind-alley occupations, of drink, of long illness, of fatal social charm in his earlier years, or of simple laziness. In normal years he manages most of the time to pick up enough for a living on lodging house standards. He is not averse to panhandling. Sometimes for a short while he may take a real job. He would as soon apply to a social agency as not, provided it were not too inquisitive or did not make too many conditions. But his experience has demonstrated that "charity" does not yield as profitable a living as does "bumming."

It is doubtful whether even in normal times it is the resident homeless that give the community or the social agencies most serious concern. All but the first type mentioned present problems in the solution of which the organic co-operation of local public authorities and of the state is essential, though rarely available. It is the transient homeless man that receives most attention from social workers.

2. Transient Homeless. Among the transient homeless there also are several distinct types, varying somewhat in character, and considerably in number and proportion in the different communities and sections of the country.

There is, as among the resident group, the usually self-supporting

single man who occasionally becomes "strapped" and in need of assistance. He follows his trade or fortunes goaded by ambition and hoping to better himself. There is neither theoretical nor practical reason to discourage him. When he gets into difficulties he deserves aid as much as anybody.

The mentally or physically incapacitated or handicapped, and the shiftless, tradeless, purposeless, when blessed with the additional frailty of the *wanderlust* by original inclination or by accidentally acquired habit, becomes the vagrant or tramp, the truly homeless and constantly transient.

Runaway boys and girls add a third category of nonresidents well known to agencies dealing with the homeless.

The migratory laborer, created by the development of the American industrial system, is little known in the eastern section of the United States but a familiar figure in the Middle West and on the Pacific coast. In the Middle West he is depended upon to harvest the nation's wheat in the summer, to fell timber and cut ice in the fall and winter. On the coast he harvests the tremendous fruit crops produced in Washington, Oregon, and California and carries on the longshore work of their ports. The present study did not extend to the coast and, therefore, no direct observation could be made regarding the coast group of migratory laborers. Chicago, Minneapolis, St. Paul, Sioux Falls, and Kansas City, Mo., all of which were included in this survey, are, however, in that section of the country directly affected by the migratory labor of the Middle West. Estimates of the number of such workers vary by wide margins but rarely stand below one hundred thousand. The Great Lakes district, represented in this study by Cleveland, adds its quota of sailors and waterside workers—all seasonal laborers.[1]

It is uncertain whether this large army of seasonal and migratory labor can properly be called transient or nonresident. Classification is equally difficult whether we use statutory definitions or are guided by the sense of responsibility of the community which they regularly visit in their peregrinations. Many of them are constantly and perennially migratory but always return in slack time to some central city which they use as base or headquarters.

[1] Railroad and other construction also constitutes a large field for the labor of the migratory worker.

Kansas City, Mo., Minneapolis, and Chicago are such cities. While the men who make these cities their headquarters may not satisfy legal requirements of residence in them, they are more truly residents there than anywhere else. And in so far as these cities represent the clearing house, labor market, and trade center of tremendous areas composing rough economic units, they are the places of residence of numbers of migratory workers who toil in the industries of those areas. Yet, strictly speaking, by statute or community consciousness they are nonresidents and transients.[1]

Many of these migratory workers are bona fide residents of one of the states included in this section or belt, but leave their own farm work or other more or less regular occupations for the ready cash of the seasonal job. They are decidedly transients in the communities in which they happen to be at any time during their cycle of temporary jobs, but are residents, even technically, within the section which they serve.[2]

Nobody denies that these men are real workers, that they prefer work to idleness, that they deliver their "wages' worth" of labor, that they are honest, sturdy, decent citizens. To a certain extent

[1] The use of illustrative figures in this connection, especially if obtained during the emergency, is of doubtful legitimacy. The few items that follow are, therefore, quoted with great hesitancy: Of 3,302 homeless applicants in Minneapolis between December, 1921, and April, 1922, who gave information as to their whereabouts prior to application, 965, or nearly 30 per cent, stated that they had been in Minneapolis over one year; 697, or 21 per cent, less than one year; 792, or 24 per cent, at irregular intervals in Minneapolis, and only 848, or 25 per cent, appeared to be strictly transients.

A special count of some 10,702 harvest laborers passing through the Federal Employment Service at Kansas City, Mo., in the summer of 1921, who gave information as to occupation, place of residence, age, et cetera, throws further interesting light on this point. Of these, 2,722, or more than one-quarter, came from Missouri, the state in which the distributing headquarters is situated. A total of some 60 per cent (6,384) came from within the wheat states to which their labor was directed; and if we add the quota of two neighboring states, Illinois and Indiana (1,207 and 295), we find that more than three-quarters of the total came from the wheat belt itself. The central transportation and business centers of this area are Kansas City, Minneapolis, and Chicago.

The occupations of applicants are classified into some 87 categories; the items of farmer and laborer absorb 7,081, or nearly 70 per cent, of these. Again, some 65 per cent of the total were putting in their second season or more, more than one-third of them the fourth season or more. Over 9,000 of the 10,702 gave their age as under forty—the age of hard labor. These figures point indirectly but perceptibly toward a proper classification of these men as real residents of an area constituting an economic unit.

[2] This group necessarily includes a larger number of married men than the others, but their families rarely accompany them. The migratory family is still quantitatively a small problem. See also preceding footnote.

they have developed a class-pride based on their consciousness of bearing a fair share of the world's work—a share that is difficult, often unpleasant, dangerous, and heart-breaking. In the *Hobo News*,[1] edited by the International Brotherhood Welfare Association (a rather informal organization financed largely by a wealthy devotee of hobo life), they and their work are glorified and exalted, but always as workers, not as martyrs. We need not go the full extent of this editorial devotion and yet give credit to the labor and intentions of the men. We certainly must recognize them not only as an unsolved problem of industrial organization, but also as a puzzle in community economics.

For a considerable portion of the working year—it is not known for how much more than that of the resident craftsman—the migratory laborer is unemployed. Like his steady urban brother he figures on this period. He enters upon it with some cash savings and expects to supplement them by pick-up jobs during the slack season. Living in lodging houses on a modest standard, he can ordinarily pull through until his next season of employment. His chief source of trouble is that he is unable to force upon such lodging houses as he is compelled to live in sanitary standards of acceptable decency. Even the *Hobo News* appeals to the community conscience to enforce some minimum standards of sanitation and security through the public authorities.

When the migratory worker does temporarily come to the end of his resources, whose responsibility is it to help him? Shall the city in which he happens to be at the time add his care to her share of the general burden? Is it fair to assume that most communities will thus share the burden? May it be regarded as an unfair addition to the regular burdens of any municipality? Should all the communities within a certain territory join and proportionately share the load, or each take what accident may bring her way? Will the help extended to such a man in need constitute a demoralizing precedent and result in an accumulation of dependents and a stimulus to dependency? The manner in which the various cities have answered these questions during the past year should be considered in some detail.

[1] The *Hobo News*, published monthly by the International Brotherhood Welfare Association, 410 Clinton St., Cincinnati, Ohio.

Recent Complicating Factors. Two factors have in the past few years complicated the entire question of the homeless man. They are, the legions of men drawn to the cities by the war industries and then set adrift by the deflation, and the returned ex-service men seeking readjustment.

A considerable proportion of the hastily recruited supplementary force of the war industries probably consisted of single men and women. In so far as these were without families or away from them, they did not become integral members of the neighborhood or community in which they worked; they did not easily form those ties or build up those relationships that constitute the best possible emergency resources in time of distress. Any deflation, ever so slight, was bound to affect first of all the situation of the unattached and potentially homeless.

The ex-service man, during his absence, had been replaced to some extent in the economic system. When he returned, his job often had been filled by others or was later eliminated by the employment depression. This in itself would have been serious enough. In addition, his state of health upon return frequently was impaired, many had lost the habit of concentrated application, had developed larger aspirations, or assumed the attitude that the country should manifest its debt to them by special indulgences, particularly by continued economic support. These psychological effects were emphasized by the nervous wear of camp and battlefield. In not a few cases the nervous constitution had been undermined or even the mental balance disturbed. These facts and new political and social issues created by the formation of veterans' organizations are too well known to require more then mention.

II. THE HOMELESS MAN IN 1921–22

As this study was made in a second winter of unemployment distress, comparison with situations in the cities visited as they were in normal times was, at least by direct observation, impossible. The homeless man problem, therefore, presented itself in its emergency phase.

1. Resident Homeless. Unemployment had rendered homeless many who had previously been self-supporting though unattached residents. These men had usually constituted no part of the case

load of the usual family welfare agency. When, during the emergency, they applied to these, they were referred elsewhere. They were not "families," and therefore not considered cases subject to treatment by the family welfare societies. Homeless men, as defined by the agencies in normal times, included generally only transients—migratory laborers, the handicapped, vagrants, and tramps. Thus treatment of the normal resident homeless men at the time of emergency was largely based on such a definition, regardless of the fact that they were laid low by extraordinary conditions only, and are not of the type for whom repressive measures were originally conceived.[1] Refusal to aid the shiftless would come with better grace if the community were in a position to say that it had cared adequately and promptly for those ordinarily self-helpful but rendered helpless by the intensive depression in employment. Family agencies in Columbia, Memphis, Cleveland, Evanston, were, to the limit of their resources, in position to say so. Other cities, though equipped with special agencies for the homeless, had planned their service for the more usual type of homeless applicant and were only to a limited extent able to take care of this newer group created by the unemployment emergency.

Those comparatively unemployable, either because of some handicap, physical or mental, or because of long-standing disinclination to work, probably also increased in actual numbers, though not at the same rate as the group previously discussed. To begin with, competition for the odd pick-up jobs was increased by the addition of the involuntarily unemployed, who were generally

[1] This may seem too sweeping a statement, but it is only a generalization of conditions actually encountered in most of the cities visited. The Hartford Charity Organization Society, the Boston Provident Association, the Boston Family Welfare Society, the Chicago United Charities, the St. Paul United Charities, the Kansas City Provident Association, refer homeless men, whether resident or nonresident, to other agencies, the latter even including in that category the married man with a wife if there are no children. Efforts are not always made before such referral to ascertain whether the organizations to whom the applicants may be referred render case work service of the same rank as that of the referring agency. New York's Charity Organization Society and the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor have for years been dealing with homeless applicants, resident or other, through their Joint Application Bureau, independently of the case work supervision of either society. This bureau has admittedly paid little attention to the resident homeless. The Cleveland Associated Charities, alone of the family agencies visited in the large cities, has been giving case work service to the homeless man as part of its regular routine, through a special assistant. Normally, of course, this work is chiefly for transients, and here also it is not strictly supervised.

better workers. The number of those resorting to begging and panhandling increased. Also, ex-service men partly disabled, receiving small sums from the government, and formerly supplementing their income by light jobs, were forced into the pool of the unemployed and swelled the numbers particularly of those physically or mentally impaired.[1] Many agencies, public employment offices, employers, and private citizens were suddenly faced with these types, of whom they had formerly seen but little, but who were now forced into the category of public charges. Being either incapacitated or lazy, they were more apt to seek aid than others and often stamped their own brand of inadequacy upon the entire army of homeless. As at any other time when men of this kind were given employment, they accounted for themselves poorly; they neither worked well nor stayed on the job.[2]

Few communities are normally prepared to give adequate care to the handicapped. Few have the systematic co-operation of public and private agencies or public institutions at hand to discipline the shirker. In the emergency, both types are amalgamated in the mass of unemployed homeless, and render the apparent character of the mass less desirable.. The ex-service man, moreover, when disinclined or unable to exert himself, further confuses the possibility of adequate classification and treatment by drawing about him the loyalties and indulgences given to the veteran.

In several of the cities, ex-service men received aid of a special nature not open to others and were, therefore, little of a burden to the social agencies. Thus, in Hartford the Connecticut State Fund for Soldiers relieved the unemployed ex-service man.[3] In

[1] Red Cross chapters in the cities visited report uniformly an increased number of new and renewed applications from disabled men. The chapters found that aid in the form of material relief had to be increased at a rate greater than the increase in applications. The data of the Cleveland Red Cross chapter are especially illuminating on this point.

[2] Few figures are available to show what portion of the homeless in an emergency this group constitutes. A summary study of 2,000 cases reported upon in New York City in 1914 places the physically handicapped at 11 per cent, the mentally deficient at 10 per cent, the habitually idle at between 2 and 3 per cent, or a total of nearly one-fourth of the whole number. See "The Men We Lodge," by John A. Kingsbury, published by the Advisory Social Service Committee of the Municipal Lodging House, New York City, September, 1915.

[3] The fund is $2,500,000, and the interest on it is available for such use. It is distributed by the American Legion.—Interview, Red Cross Home Service secretary, Hartford chapter.

Boston the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Department carries a heavy relief burden.[1] But in most places he has been one of the constituent parts of an undifferentiated mass of homeless men demanding attention and relief.[2]

2. Transient and Migratory Homeless. In what respect did the problem of the transient homeless man during the employment depression differ from the same problem in ordinary times?

First, in numbers. Nobody knows just how many homeless men there are in any city. There is no record of the fluctuation of occupants of commercial lodging houses from month to month or year to year. If there were, it might not give a complete answer. In many cities lodging house facilities are steadily decreasing, large philanthropic or semi-philanthropic workmen's hotels increasing, and the night shelters of small religious missions disappearing. A study of the lodging house situation in Minneapolis in 1920 showed a reduction in available rooms in five years of 2,258 out of 7,781, with a further reduction anticipated of some 4,000 beds in the five to ten years to follow.[3] The same study cites the discontinuance of five "mission" shelters during the preceding year.

The number of homeless men cared for by philanthropic or municipal agencies is a more reliable and more accessible index.

[1] This is a municipal office authorized by permissive state legislation. "State Aid" is given to Civil War veterans at a maximum of $6.00 a week; "military aid" to war veterans unable to work, and "Soldiers' Relief" to veterans ablebodied but in need. Eighty per cent approximately of this latter group were unemployed. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts reimburses the city for the total amount of "state aid" and half of the expenditures for "military aid." During the calendar year 1921, approximately one million dollars were expended by that office, and the case load grew from 2,062 in January to 4,369 in December. $1,400,000 was estimated for 1922, exclusive of administrative expenses of about $45,000. By January 1, 1922, the case load had gone to 4,991.

[2] The question has been raised whether the discharged soldier has not taken back into his private life an abnormal lack of the sense of responsibility, and whether for that reason he has not contributed more than his share to the number of homeless and jobless. When we consider the large number of men who have seen service, the answer is not easy. Eight hundred and eighty-seven out of 3,315 homeless men who were registered for relief in Minneapolis in the winter of 1921–22, or about 26 per cent, were ex-service men. Cleveland lodged 1,132 different ex-service men during the winter, which is estimated to be about one-third of the total. This may be a perfectly fair ratio. The extraordinary decrease in the percentage of men under thirty years of age given lodging in the Helping Hand Institute of Kansas City during the war years and the rebound after the armistice, would also lead to the inference that a fair ratio of ex-service men among the homeless can reasonably be expected.

[3] Study by Rev. W. C. Paul, Union City Mission, Minneapolis, Minn., in manuscript.

Cleveland, giving shelter and food through the Associated Charities (in co-operation with the American Legion in 1921–22), shows for the periods November to March inclusive, 1918 to 1922, the following record of lodgings given:



Minneapolis, through the Union City Mission, has a normal capacity of approximately 100 men; it added capacity for some 800 during the winter of 1921–22; the *new* men registering for December, 1921, numbered 1,333, and for the succeeding months, through March, 1922, 818, 419, and 575 respectively. The Pittsburgh Association for Improvement of the Poor records lodgings other than for cash averaging 725 per month for the period of April to September, 1920, with 1,573 for the corresponding period in 1921; 1,461 for October, 1920, to March, 1921, with 2,327 for the corresponding period of 1921–22. The Chicago Urban League found itself inaugurating a new service of giving meals and shelter from January, 1921, to June, 1921, mounting in one month to a peak of 4,841 lodgings and 10,247 meals, and averaging 2,817 lodgings and 6,682 meals per month.

The Helping Hand Institute of Kansas City, Mo., has kept accurate records for a series of years. Its figures are as follows:

1913	87,284	1917	94,468
1914	81,046	1918	83,338
1915	87,133	1919	86,397
1916	98,083	1920	91,868
		1921	128,103

The transient homeless men differed in the emergency from the usual group in composition as well as in numbers. To the itinerant laborer or the man seeking to better himself in the normal course of events were added the cohorts of single men drawn to the cities

by war industries and now set adrift by the deflation. Many, in vain hope of finding work in some other community, knowing nought of the new home but despairing of work in their own communities, joined the march—usually toward the big cities. Social agencies frequently expressed their surprise at this unusual and unexpected element among the transient as among the resident. They were not the bums, the vagrants, or even the migratory workers, and they were not accustomed to the conditions and treatment more or less familiar to these groups.

Finally, there were the migratory workers. It is hardly accurate to say that they increased in number. But they drifted more to the centers of congestion as the chance for work shrank. They sought, first, the labor market and, second, shelter which is known to be more readily available in the large city than in the smaller community. Moreover, not only was their total number in these cities greater than usual, but the proportion of those who had not been able to save enough or to supplement their income sufficiently from pick-up jobs was considerably above that of normal times. A larger number of them, therefore, tended to become public charges.

3. The Task of Dealing with the Homeless in the Emergency. The cities here considered faced, therefore, a condition that may be briefly summarized as follows: Inadequately prepared to meet the normal season's problem of the homeless man, lacking a clear analysis of the problem, they were suddenly faced with it in increased dimensions, complicated by new factors that demanded attention. Moreover, it was clear that any system adopted would have its good or evil effect, not only on the men themselves but also on precedents established for the community's dealings with the homeless in normal times. The emergency task in these cities presented itself, therefore, in the following general forms:

1. To take care of the extra load of resident and transient homeless who were real workers but in need of temporary relief and shelter, and to do this without making them permanently dependent.

2. To prevent the shiftless, both resident and transient, from taking advantage of the temporary expansion of public generosity at the expense of the earnest worker.

3. To prevent duplication of effort within the community and duplication of relief to the applicant.

4. To prevent the increase of persons leaving their own communities in the bootless search for opportunities in other cities which already had their own burden of homeless.

4. Regional Differences. It may be well before summarizing the experience of the cities studied to recognize that they fall into several sectional groups presenting special characteristics in the composition of their homeless men. Their efforts are determined by these different characteristics and should, therefore, be judged accordingly. In fact, any constructive, co-ordinated plans for service to the homeless man would have to be devised on the basis of such sectional differences and in units determined by them. Sectional or regional committees, representing communities in which the character of the homeless man problem is, on the whole, homogeneous, would probably arrive at a better comprehensive plan for social agencies than any committee of nation-wide representation.

Boston, New Bedford, Hartford, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Evanston have a homeless man problem with similar characteristics in the main, despite differences of size and minor local factors. They might be termed the eastern region.[1] Columbia and Memphis represent the southern region; Chicago, Minneapolis, St. Paul, Kansas City, Mo., possess distinct characteristics of the Middle West or wheat belt region. The far West, as already mentioned, has a group character of its own. There are probably also small cities situated along the main lines of transcontinental railroad traffic and other commercial or railroad arteries that present a type of their own. Possibly Sioux Falls might be classed among these.

5. Treatment of the Homeless in the Eastern Cities. In the eastern region it was the increase in the number of homeless men that was the chief difficulty of those dealing with them. The usually *self-supporting resident man* rendered homeless was cared for to some extent in New York by the Joint Application Bureau of the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor and the Charity Organization Society, in Cleveland by the Associated

[1] Evanston, though a suburb of Chicago, does not share the characteristics of that city in respect to the problem of the homeless man.

Charities, in Evanston by the Central Charities, along more or less case work lines, made more difficult by the large case load and, in some cases, by limited resources. When the number became uncomfortably large, the tendency was to plan for this group in the same way as for the transient. The *physically handicapped* were cared for in some cases by special organizations or by special departments of social agencies. The Boston Industrial Aid Society is designed to find work for the handicapped; the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor conducts the Crawford Shops for the aged and infirm.

The *unemployable* requiring institutional treatment presented no new problems nor did the *runaway child*. Of migratory labor there is, in this section, little to speak of.

Cleveland and New York are, on the whole, the most satisfactory representatives of cities in the eastern region that dealt adequately with the homeless man in 1920–21. A somewhat detailed discussion of what was done on their behalf in these cities is therefore justified.

Both Cleveland and New York took timely and adequate measures to provide shelter and food, the former financing them from private funds through the Welfare Federation, the latter from public funds through the temporary municipal organization for the relief of unemployment.

Cleveland. Cleveland has no municipal lodging house. Shelter and food for the homeless is provided in the Wayfarers' Lodge conducted by the Associated Charities.[1] The manager of the lodge refers to the special agent of the Associated Charities dealing with the homeless those applicants who in his judgment require or deserve further service. This agent spends his afternoons at the lodge. It is understood in Cleveland that the transient homeless as well as resident are referred to this institution. The institutional standards of the lodge are not of the highest, but those adopted are assiduously lived up to and the institution shows no neglect. There is no medical examination, the bedding leaves much to be desired, but night clothes are supplied and fumigation is practised. The

[1] The institution was established originally in 1881 as the Bethel Lodging House, situated at 1440 West 10th Street, at that time the center of lakeside seafarers' traffic. The present capacity is 110 men and 7 women.

building is old and the arrangement not very efficient. The personal attention given seems old-fashioned, but kindly and competent. Meals are nutritious and simple. A three-day limit for transients, subject to the superintendent's discretion, is enforced. A work test in the form of wood cutting is provided in the basement, but the tasks are light and hardly a real test. Except where mass treatment cannot be avoided the usefulness of the test is at best questionable.

In normal years the number of persons given lodging fluctuates considerably, going up in the winter and also in the spring with the opening of lake steamer traffic. The average daily lodgings are usually low. From October, 1919, to September, 1920, the average number was 12. The next year, beginning to show the effects of the depression, sent the average to 59.6, reaching in February, 1921, the 95 mark. This increase seemed to take on threatening proportions. Plans were therefore made to meet any emergency that might arise in the winter of 1921–22, and the federation budget included, in addition to funds for the maintenance of the permanent Wayfarers' Lodge, a further sum of $57,000 for the equipment and maintenance of emergency quarters. The appropriations were found to cover the needs of the winter. Two additional lodges were opened and kept open from November, 1921, to April, 1922. Shelter and food were provided for all homeless men in need. The personal service of the Associated Charities continued as usual. There was no occasion for soup kitchens or bread lines, and so far as we could discover none was opened.

Of the three shelters conducted during the winter, the original one, the Wayfarers' Lodge, with capacity of 114, was used as a clearing house and for transients, who were allowed to remain only a limited number of days (with judicious exceptions). Residents of Cleveland were removed to a new shelter, where no time limit was enforced but where the work test was developed to a more satisfactory degree. Occupants were required to perform four hours' work for four credits, entitling them to three meals and lodging. The general standards of this new institution were considerably superior to those of the old lodge—in fact, were quite satisfactory. They included baths, towels, night shirts, medical examination, bedding with sheets and pillow cases, better food, and

reasonable space for social intercourse outside the dormitories. The third shelter was referred to as the Barracks. It was for ex-service men, both resident and transient, and for overflow from the other lodges. Proof of military service was required. Accommodations were flexible to the limit of several hundred. Semi-military discipline obtained. The general institutional standards were good. A work test was enforced, as in the second lodge just described.

The "work test" in these shelters was developed to an extent which, while not perfect, was unusual for an emergency period and superior to many attempts in normal times. Of the methods used, the woodyard in the Wayfarers' Lodge was least satisfactory. The labor provided for residents and veterans was a far better "test"; in the first place, the requirement was for four hours a day instead of for less than two hours, as at the lodge. Those not used in maintenance work at the lodgings, or in unpaid odd jobs at private institutions, were set to cleaning streets or rough labor in the "city storage yard," under foremen provided either by the city or by the Associated Charities. Some, indeed, assigned to city work put in eight hours, but received more substantial meals in return. Ex-service men were sent to work in charitable institutions, construction work at the city hospital, and other odd assignments, besides maintenance work in the Barracks. In addition, the American Legion employment bureau had fair success in finding for them remunerative odd jobs. That this work did *test* would seem to have been proved by the fact that, when, in the autumn, necessary tools were obtained and supplied to men in the shelters, their number showed a marked decrease.[2]

The financial administration of the three lodges was under the

[1] It is instructive to make a brief comparison here with conditions in some of the other cities of this regional group. Hartford's Open Hearth Association made no improvement or modification of its plant or administrative system, which is designed mainly for the shiftless transient or "down and out-er." Boston's Wayfarers' Lodge, conducted under the Overseers of Public Welfare, was closed for repairs during the heavy emergency period, and an unheated temporary structure was used for lodging. Pittsburgh opened up a drill room and permitted all comers to stay overnight as long as there was room (using cells to supplement the room). Lodgers slept on the bare floor, carpeting it with their bodies to the limit of its area, defying all principles of hygiene and sanitation. They were given coffee and bread in the morning and evening. There was no time limit.

[2] So reported by Franklin T. Jones, of the Associated Charities. Unfortunately, there are no figures available to show the exact amount of labor performed in comparison with the time spent at the lodges.

general supervision of the Cleveland Associated Charities. Each shelter, moreover, was supervised by a special committee of citizens and a joint committee of the three. The Barracks was administered under the immediate direction of the Ex-service Men's Welfare Committee of Cuyahoga County, representing the several veterans' organizations.

In the main, Cleveland seems to have performed its fourfold emergency task for the homeless: It gave food and shelter, so that none needed to suffer for want of the necessities; at the same time the temporary nature of the relief was emphasized and classification introduced to avoid developing a spirit of dependence. Exploitation of charitable help by the irresponsible and shiftless was substantially reduced, if not entirely prevented, by the work-test and by such case work as was feasible; it was also reduced to some extent by the distribution of cards to Cleveland residents to be used wherever persons solicited aid, directing these to the Wayfarers' Lodge. Duplication of effort or relief was prevented by concentrating the entire service under one management (in this case the Associated Charities) with its interlocked committees for each shelter. Finally, the avoidance of commendatory publicity and freedom from the necessity of making public appeals for funds probably aided in keeping the influx within reasonable limits.

New York. New York City has scores of agencies dealing with the homeless, serving probably the greatest variety of types of homeless of any place on this continent. The majority of these agencies do not give institutional shelter or food. Up to the year 1921 there had not been any serious attempt to bring these agencies together for deliberation, co-operation, or co-ordination of their activities. There is a municipal lodging house in the city, accommodating some 640 men and 200 women, conducted by the Department of Public Welfare. The Bowery Young Men's Christian Association, with 353 beds, represents the best type of privately conducted institutional care on denominational lines. The Joint Application Bureau of the Charity Organization Society and the Association for the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor is the leading non-institutional case work agency for the homeless, co-operating with other case work agencies in the city and outside.

In ordinary times the comparatively low number of homeless

men makes small demands on the municipal lodging house, even in the winter. Applicants were received originally on a limit of three days in any one month. This was raised successively to five and seven days. The lodging house is used also as a temporary shelter for some of those seeking admission to the city eleemosynary institutions, and whose applications are still pending. Applicants are required to work on alternate days, either at maintenance work in the lodging house or in other institutions of the city, and may use intervening days to look for work. The institutional standards, such as sanitary conditions, bedding, and food are of a high order. There is no personal service or any attempt at case work.

The institutional standards of the Young Men's Christian Association are even higher and are supplemented by a variety of personal service. The Joint Application Bureau, on the other hand, gives no institutional care of its own, but arranges for it with lodging houses and restaurants of a rather poor caliber; it attempts some "work test" in the Charity Organization Society's woodyard, and an approximation to case work which is constantly improving.

There are in New York, during most winter seasons, bread lines and "missions" chiefly in the congested downtown quarters of the city.

New York City has retained a keen memory of the homeless man emergency of 1914–15, when overflow dormitories, opened by the administration of the municipal lodging house, quadrupled the normal capacity, when churches were invaded by the homeless, bread lines flourished, and yet (or perhaps in consequence would be more accurate) the public had reason to feel that many men suffered hunger and cold.

Early in the autumn of 1921 the Mayor of New York City called a conference to consider the conditions likely to prevail during the ensuing winter. Subsequently, under permissive state legislation, he appointed an Industrial Aid Bureau and a large advisory committee. A subcommittee of the latter was appointed to concern itself with providing shelter for the homeless. The chairman of this committee, Major Underwood of the Salvation Army, was authorized to proceed in his discretion and was assured of the necessary city funds for the purpose. Three shelters were opened by this committee during the course of the winter of 1921–22. They

were financed by the city and administered by the Salvation Army, under supervision of the subcommittee of the Mayor's advisory committee. Standards and methods in these shelters were modeled after the municipal lodging house, but the general treatment was more liberal, the restrictions less stringent. All specific time limits were removed. During the entire winter the shelters and lodging houses thus provided were at no time filled to total capacity. There were at all times more food and lodging available for homeless men than were needed.

In the course of the autumn and winter, through the efforts of Roy P. Gates, director of the Joint Application Bureau, the majority of the important organizations in the city dealing with homeless men joined in a Co-operative Bureau for the clearing of homeless applicants at all the agencies represented. A central registration bureau was established and financed by the member organizations. Duplication was largely reduced and the beginnings of a permanent organic policy made. By the end of the winter, member organizations joined a Federation of Agencies for Homeless Men, for the development of a statesmanlike plan of dealing permanently with the homeless in New York City and for establishing co-operative relations with other cities.

Despite these activities, missions and bread lines continued. Spectacular performances by Mr. Ledoux started several mushroom societies for relieving the homeless in Bryant Park. Picturesque appeals and a new bread line were features of the winter work of one of the prominent New York churches. None of these attempts gave assurance of substantial aid. In the opinion of competent observers, they attracted men from other cities who were seeking adventure, and many others who came in the vain hope of receiving real help.

New York City had provided the necessary relief for the homeless. Exploitation of that city by the shiftless was reduced through the Co-operative Bureau and its clearing house, and through consistent publicity showing up the panhandler. Duplication also was in large measure prevented by this Bureau. But the influx was not checked, partly because of the abnormal attractions of the city itself and partly due to the many spectacular activities of the type just mentioned. A most important step was taken, however,

by the organization of the Federation of Agencies for Homeless Men.

6. The Southern Region. The southern region was, so far as homeless men are concerned, less affected by the unemployment depression than other regions. Transient travelers appealing for aid or shelter to social agencies or police stations seemed little more in evidence than in other years. The practical solution of the transient problem seems well within the possibilities of a division of labor among social agencies—such a division as was established in Memphis, for example, where the Salvation Army accepted full responsibility for the homeless.

7. The Middle-Western Region. It is in the Middle West, with its migratory labor, that we find the most difficult situation. The summer and autumn of 1921 were meager seasons for the workers here. Fewer than usual were able to swing the circuit, because of the high railroad fares. The wages offered were low, "due to two reasons, the first being that with wheat at a very low figure farmers could not well afford to pay more; the second, that with the great numbers of men reported to be out of employment, the response would be sufficiently great. . . ."[1] Wages quoted by the Farm Labor Office began with $2.25 to $2.50 a day with board,[2] and advanced to $3.00, $4.00, and eventually $5.00 a day.[3] Wages for picking or husking corn in the autumn had gone down to 4 cents a bushel, as against 7 to 9 cents in 1920 and 10 cents in 1919, while monthly wages had dropped to $35 in 1921, from $80 a month in 1920 and $55 in 1919.[4] Lumber work in the woods of Minnesota shows a similar shrinkage, thus further reducing the opportunities of the migratory worker.[5] The short season of ice cutting offered lower wages than ever, and road work in places paid

[1] Report by A. L. Barkman, field representative, United States Department of Labor, co-operating with state labor bureaus in distributing harvest labor in the wheat belt, October 15, 1921.

[2] Bulletin No. 3, United States Department of Labor, United States Employment Service co-operating with Missouri State Department of Labor, June 3, 1921.

[3] Bulletins Nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, etc.

[4] Data from records of Joseph H. Hamilton, county agent, Minnehaha County, S. Dak. Mr. Hamilton also placed on harvest labor in July, 1921, 500 men as against 850 in July, 1920.

[5] The Ninth District Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis reports an average number of men employed in lumber manufacture in 1920–21 of approximately 65 per cent of those employed in 1919–20.

exceedingly low rates.[1] It was to be expected, therefore, that the men in these occupations would reach their wintering places with less cash reserve than usual. Had employment in the cities been plentiful, they could still have managed to pull through with the usual odd jobs. But the cities did not present such opportunities. Great numbers of those generally spending their winters in Kansas City, Mo., Minneapolis, and Chicago were bound to become public charges in the course of the winter, and many undoubtedly made for these centers who would otherwise have remained in smaller towns.

These three cities are not only the important labor markets and gathering points of migratory labor, but also represent three distinct community attitudes and measures to meet the problem of this "transient" labor.

Kansas City, Mo. Kansas City has for years recognized the nature of migratory labor and its problems. Private social agencies have assumed the entire task of meeting them. The Helping Hand Institute serves the purpose.[2] It is a non-commercial lodging house and social center. Beds can be obtained at 15 and 20 cents a night, and rooms at $2.25 and $2.50 a week. The institution has a capacity of 425. During the winter of 1921–22 a temporary shelter was equipped with 250 additional beds. The institutional standards are of a high order, and the size of the undertaking adequate to the needs of the city. A majority of occupants pay for their lodgings;[3] those who cannot pay, work, and for this purpose extensive stone-breaking operations are carried on to supplement the maintenance tasks.[4] The amount of work done by the institution fluctuates from season to season and year to year with the conditions of migratory labor.

The number of applicants registered at the Institute in each fiscal year ending August 31, since 1915, is as follows:

[1] Wages offered for ice cutting at Sioux Falls at the beginning of the season were said to be 25 cents an hour, later rising to 30–37 cents. Road work in the same county was advertising for labor at 25 cents an hour.—Theodore Bock, Family Welfare Association, and H. Abel, Trades and Labor Assembly, Sioux Falls, S. Dak.

[2] Maintained at present by the financial federation, and formerly by the usual methods of social agencies.

[3] Over 70 per cent of the total during the nine years, 1913–21 inclusive.

[4] This part of the institution is also available as a work-test for the use of other social agencies.

1915	20,551	1919	928
1916	5,872	1920	1,157
1917	3,256	1921	4,711
1918	1,153	1922	6,288

Kansas City, Mo., had a less serious condition of unemployment in 1921–22 than Minneapolis, but was prepared for any emergency regarding homeless men, without special publicity, without bread lines, and without fear of attracting "outsiders" for whom the city felt no responsibility.

Chicago. Neither Chicago nor Minneapolis make provision comparable to that in Kansas City. Both, probably, have much larger migratory populations during the autumn and winter months. Both have municipal lodging houses. In Chicago, as has been stated, the lodging house has been closed for years; in Minneapolis it is unfit and avoided by the self-respecting homeless. Chicago has a Dawes Hotel and a Salvation Army Workingmen's Palace to provide cheap lodging for the indigent. It has several small, ill-equipped but earnest denominational agencies for the homeless, such as the Christian Industrial League. It has scores of "flops"[1] and "cat missions."[2] The majority of the homeless, resident or migratory, who cannot afford the ordinary commercial lodging house prices or get into the semi-philanthropic cheap hotels or the respectable missions, must patronize the unsanitary flops, commercial or "missionary." No provision for the homeless on a scale large enough to compare with the facilities of Kansas City, Mo., has been attempted. The campaign by the Unemployment Conference of Chicago in 1921–22 to urge the city authorities to open the municipal lodging house failed against such specious objections as the fear of attracting the homeless of the entire Middle West. No account was taken of the economic obligations of Chicago as the production, transportation, commercial, and labor center of immense contributory territories.

Minneapolis. The attitude of Minneapolis is best represented by the following extracts from a memorandum attached to recommendations submitted to the city Board of Public Welfare by the Council of Social Agencies in the fall of 1921:

[1] Floor space provided generally at 10 cents a night, the occupant sleeping in his clothes or supplementing these by newspapers spread on the floor.

[2] A name employed to designate organizations (calling themselves missions), which collect money by the use of a large staff of solicitors and spend a disproportionately small amount of the collections in serving a meal per day or giving "flopping" space to a roomful of homeless men after religious services.

> The city is facing a crisis in the number of unemployed homeless men in its midst. These men are in general the workers in the agricultural districts and construction projects in the summer and the woodsmen of the winter. Minneapolis is their distributing center. They have returned to Minneapolis with the first coming of cold weather and are unable to find work. There is no place to which they can be sent because outside of Minneapolis they have no home. It, therefore, is the responsibility of Minneapolis to take care of them. We have satisfactory evidence that if there was work they would not be here. For the last four years there has been sufficient work to absorb all workers and the city had no unemployment problem. There was work, and the men took it. Therefore, it is a just inference to make that these men cannot find work, that they are not vagrants, and that they have a just claim upon all of us for decent treatment.
>
> The city of Minneapolis assumed responsibility for the care of these men when it erected its lodging house. Whatever may have been its past history and however satisfactorily it has met those needs, it is obviously inadequate and probably unfitted to meet them at the present time. For good reasons or for bad, the bulk of the men will not avail themselves of its services. It has not been used to capacity in the five weeks since the cold weather has started although in that time men have slept out of doors, have crowded into the Missions where they have been willing to sleep on the floors without mattresses, and in at least one instance the experience has been attended by almost fatal results. So far as we can make it out, the cause of this unwillingness to use the Municipal Lodging House is complex. . . .
>
> When the severity of winter broke five weeks ago the agencies in the Gateway District dealing with transient men referred everyone to the Municipal Lodging House. Most of these men, however, did not go, but preferred to sleep under the bridges, in alleys, in box cars, or anywhere else where they could get protection. Upon becoming acquainted with these facts the Union City Mission and other agencies opened their places, first for lodgings and then for lodgings and meals to these men. These places were immediately taxed to capacity, showing that there was a large number of men not reached by the Municipal Lodging House who needed and would accept this sort of care. . . .
>
> Obviously, the location, the capacity, and the equipment of the Municipal Lodging House cannot be changed over night or as a physical plant materially altered during the continuance of the present crisis. We do

believe, however, that the Board of Public Welfare should meet this responsibility and submit the following considerations, which should be in mind in working out any plan.

General Considerations

The three essential elements in the treatment of transient unemployed men are:

(a) Registration
(b) Lodgings and Meals
(c) Work test

(*a*) *Registration:* Arrangements should be made for a central registration bureau, so located as to be conveniently situated with respect to Bridge Square, with enough workers to take care of the men promptly and humanely; to direct them to the proper places for lodging and for meals; and to administer the work test.

(*b*) *Meals and Lodgings:* Obviously, the Municipal Lodging House is inadequate to meet this situation, and the resources of the city for these services should be used as far as possible; the men given an order at the Registration Bureau for meals and lodgings at the most appropriate place. Possibly some differentiation in the place for meals and lodgings for ex-service men is possible and desirable.

(*c*) *Work Test:* The older form of work test was a rock pile or a woodyard or some other form of manufactured work. It has been demonstrated that it is possible to organize an unemployment bureau which will seek temporary jobs and secure enough of them to act as an adequate test of all who apply. This, however, is one of the most important parts of any plan for handling homeless men and its success is largely dependent upon the resourcefulness and ability of those responsible for its administration. Without an adequate work test any city would be flooded with the undesirable type of dependent men and those who make their living by looking for work and failing to find it.

May we therefore submit to you the following recommendations. . . .

1. That the city assume responsibility for these homeless unemployed men. . . .

2. That it establish at the Gateway Comfort Station, if possible and otherwise desirable, a Central Registration Bureau. . . .

3. That in order to give the men who apply the services which they require, it should issue orders on such lodging houses, including the Municipal Lodging House, as are available. That it should also do the same with respect to meals and that the bill against the city should be these receipted orders.

4. That it place upon those who are in the Central Registration Bureau the responsibility for developing the work test through employment bureaus, if possible, and, if not, through any other means at its disposal. The work at the Municipal Lodging House, at the Union City Mission, at the other Missions in the city, and work in other city institutions could be used as a means of supplying the work test.

5. That the Board of Public Welfare or this special committee call a conference of the agencies in the city dealing with the homeless men in order to reduce the amount of duplication and pool their contributions. Such a Conference should include possibly the Municipal Lodging House, the Union City Mission, the Salvation Army, the Volunteers of America, and the Associated Charities. In return, the social agencies of the city in general would be willing to render any service possible to meet this unexpected and heavy load.

6. The cost of this would fall into two classes: first, service, and second, relief.

In the main these recommendations were carried out. Rev. W. C. Paul, director of the Union City Mission and manager of the St. James Hotel, took charge of providing shelter and food. From the hotel (which in normal times is a high grade workingmen's hotel) and the mission lodging house as a nucleus, service was extended to cover the needs of the entire body of homeless men. They averaged about 900 through the greater part of the winter, dwindling fast in numbers as spring approached. A total of 3,315 separate individuals were registered. The city of Minneapolis made an initial appropriation of $35,000 and later a supplementary appropriation of $10,000, which sufficed for the winter. The "work test" plan practically fell down. The city authorities (strongly representative of labor sentiment) were opposed. The executive officer of the Public Welfare Department was not in harmony with the private agencies in whose hands lay the administration of the work, though it was financed by the city.

The normal responsibility for the relief of the transient homeless of Minneapolis was recognized both by the government and the philanthropic conscience of the city. The dual responsibility in financing and administering raised difficulties. But the method of successful procedure was clearly visible, and there should be no difficulty in devising a plan for the next emergency.[1]

[1] One definite result is already visible in the permanent assignment to the Union City Mission of a case worker supervised and paid by the Associated Charities of Minneapolis.

III. SUMMARY

Sufficient proof has accumulated, as a by-product of the winter activities of the various cities visited, to indicate that the problem of the care of the homeless man, in so far as that care is the responsibility of individual communities, is not unsolvable. The solution must take cognizance of the present industrial organization of the country, such as it is. This organization presents different characteristics in different sections, which fact suggests the desirability of regional units of treatment. The best standards of care thus far attained have been under the administration of private social agencies, but these are often financially unable to bear the burden and have been compelled to seek public aid. Dual administration has not worked satisfactorily as yet, but it may well be that the difficulties encountered are not irremediable. It has been shown that where the greatest approximation to adequate treatment in normal times obtained, there the emergency was more easily dealt with. Social agencies have, in some places, failed to assume responsibility for homeless men of the type entitled to local aid, even though aware of the fact that the community had made no provision. Finally, it would appear that the best way to prepare for treatment of the homeless in an emergency is to analyze carefully the problem of the homeless in normal times, and meet it adequately and consistently. Such an analysis would undoubtedly lead to at least three major provisions: facilities for those that are in need of temporary aid; repressive and protective measures for the shirker and "bum" on the one hand and, on the other, for the pathological group like drug addicts, feeble-minded, and others; and a more organic, systematic co-operation of the public and private agencies that deal with the homeless.

Little attention has been given in this chapter to the homeless woman, because she is represented by very small numbers and is usually adequately cared for, within existing standards, by local organizations. Nor has space been given to the discussion of such agencies as the Good Will Industries, the Salvation Army, the Travelers' Aid Society, and other organizations that deal with the homeless, because these are more concerned with them in normal than in emergency times and this chapter necessarily deals more with the latter. Their utility in emergencies is, in general, proportionate to their services in normal times.

PART II
GAUGING LOCAL NEEDS

CHAPTER IX

THE USE OF EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS

WHEN this study was undertaken there was some doubt as to whether the several cities to be visited presented conditions of distress calling for emergency relief action. The existence of unemployment was not questioned, but its extent was known to vary from section to section and from city to city. This depression followed the extreme post-war prosperity, and there was no absolute certainty that extensive unemployment necessarily meant widespread or intense distress. In the absence of such distress there would be no occasion for emergency measures of relief. It was necessary, therefore, first to ascertain the general conditions in the cities visited. Only if conditions warranted extraordinary relief activity would the continuance of the study be justified.

Except for the greater pressure of time and for the limited knowledge of local conditions, the investigator was in much the same position as would be a local committee endeavoring to answer such questions as: What is the status of employment in this city? How is it changing? What is the extent of the distress? What specific indices are there in the community by which to gauge either the extent or the trend of the economic distress which does exist?

Presumably the best guide for answering these questions would be statistics of unemployment. But few figures on unemployment have ever been available in the United States.[1] It is commonly accepted, moreover, that the actual number of unemployed or the amount of idleness cannot well be ascertained. Even where strictly unemployment statistics were gathered—as in New York

[1] The figures of the Massachusetts and New York labor departments, based on periodical reports by local trade unions of their unemployed members, have been the nearest approximation to representative unemployment figures. In New York State the collection of these figures was discontinued in 1914. For detailed statement of the status of employment statistics, see "Charting the Course of Employment" in Business Cycles and Unemployment. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1923.

and Massachusetts—it was a restricted sample of unemployment, not a measure of the total amount of enforced idleness, that was obtained. It is further accepted that current knowledge of the trend is more important than knowledge of precise numbers at any given time, whether figures relate to employment or unemployment, and that the facts of employment are both more practicable to obtain and more significant than those of unemployment. In several sections, notably in New York, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts, data have been collected over a number of years that show the trend of employment.[1] Similar data have been gathered in certain cases by business associations and in certain industries for the country at large by the United States Department of Labor. There has not been wide knowledge or use of these figures, however, and they have, in many cases, been published so long after compilation that they contributed little to public intelligence on the subject at the time. Moreover, representing large territories, the published figures are of only limited value for guidance of a local community.

The periodical publications of the District Federal Reserve Banks on business conditions have become increasingly useful in furnishing information on fluctuations in the general business conditions which bear directly on the local prosperity and employment of their respective districts. Recently, figures relating to employment, often drawn from state departments, have been included as a regular feature in a number of these publications. They do not, however, any more than reports of the state departments referred to, give data on the employment situation for individual cities.

It is data on the local status of employment as reflecting the economic condition of the working population that are needed for the community and its social workers. Little use was made, therefore, by local workers, of the above sources of statistical information in the field of employment.

I. DATA USED IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN 1921–22

The employment information most used for determining the trend of distress due to unemployment in local communities has

[1] New Jersey collected such information until 1918, when other activities of the bureau concerned crowded this service out.

been of three general classes: 1. Surveys of unemployment; 2. Statistics of public employment offices; 3. Employment statistics. The first of these classes includes local registration of the unemployed, special surveys by state bureaus, and surveys by private agencies. The second class comprises reports of state or federal employment services. The third consists of figures gathered by the United States Employment Service, by an occasional District Federal Reserve bank, and in a number of communities by private agencies. These several classes of information will be commented upon briefly to indicate the extent to which they have been serviceable.

1. Registration of Unemployed by Mayors' Committees. President Harding's Conference on Unemployment incorporated in its recommendations a cardinal point that emergency committees in cities should register all those desiring work (keeping registration for relief entirely separate from that for employment) and that they should publish the number "dependent upon them for employment and relief, that the community may be apprised of its responsibility." This registration was conceived as independent not only of relief as explicitly stated, but also, by implication, of specific employment service. In two of the cities visited in this study, Columbia and Evanston, where the Mayors' committees had established employment bureaus, registration of the unemployed was carried on, but was in nowise different from registration at any other public employment bureau. In Hartford, also, the Mayor's Committee registered men for assignment to the relief work established in the city departments and in several charitable institutions and hospitals. Here, also, registration constituted specific application for work. In St. Paul, again, though in different form, registration was for jobs. Here, however, the procurement of jobs was feebly prosecuted, providing little incentive for the unemployed to register and resulting in only about 800 registrations, a number so small as to give opportunity to the Citizens' Alliance to represent the unemployed as unwilling to work.[1]

In Minneapolis only, of the fifteen cities visited, so far as this

[1] The Citizens' Alliance of St. Paul is an organization for the advancement of the "open shop" movement. The relations between trade unions and this organization are hostile. The above reference is based on an interview with Ernie Davidson, secretary of the Citizens' Alliance, January 10, 1922.

study showed, was there an attempt to take the registration of the unemployed seriously, and there the attempt proved a failure. On the one hand, as earlier explained, the local Citizens' Alliance issued a bulletin advising employers against responding to any possible appeal for jobs that might result from the registration,[1] and, on the other hand, the labor group accused the administration of requiring registration at the city hall in connivance with the enemies of organized labor for the express purpose of making the number of unemployed appear low, inasmuch as workers from outlying sections could not well afford carfare or time to go to the city hall when they might be spending both in looking for a job.[2] It is fair to assume on purely psychological grounds that the system would have failed, as there was no incentive for the unemployed to bother with registering.[3]

There seems to be little, in the experience observed in any of the cities visited, to recommend this method of ascertaining the number of unemployed in any American community.

2. Surveys by State Departments. In at least one state, Minnesota, an official department, the Industrial Commission of Minnesota, at the request of the President's Conference, attempted in the fall of 1921 a special survey of the number of unemployed. The figures obtained in this survey were both incomplete and contradictory. Returns from the three largest cities of the state including St. Paul and Minneapolis had not arrived in time to be reported to Washington with those for the rest of the state; therefore, estimates supplied by the district director of the United States Employment Service were substituted for the missing figures. The estimates were:

For Minneapolis	5,000	unemployed
St. Paul	9,500	"
Duluth	7,000	"

[1] Citizens' Alliance of Minneapolis. Special Weekly Bulletin No. 146, October 14, 1921. This organization is of the same character as the Citizens' Alliance of St. Paul, of which it is the prototype.

[2] R. D. Cramer, editor *Labor Review*, Minneapolis, interview of January 5, 1922.

[3] From Baltimore another type of difficulty with registration is reported. There police stations were made the places of registry. Of course, the unemployed were not attracted. When they failed to appear it was easy for interested publicity to declare that the emergency had been exaggerated.

The "final estimate" of the Industrial Commission given when the returns on its own survey had at last come in, were

For Minneapolis	9,447	unemployed
St. Paul	5,392	"
Duluth	5,010	"

In obtaining this "final estimate" both the distribution of the questionnaires and their analysis were left to persons not connected with the Commission. The figures supplied earlier by the district director of the United States Employment Service were also estimates and had been obtained in similar fashion.[1] These figures illustrate the uncertainty of such a method of survey, even when conducted under the auspices of a state labor department.

3. Surveys by Private Agencies. Here and there social agencies attempted to make local surveys of the employment situation. Such an attempt was made by the Associated Charities in Memphis, and by the Family Welfare Society jointly with the Chamber of Commerce in Sioux Falls; but in neither of these cities was the inquiry sufficiently successful to warrant publication of the figures, despite the very excellent questionnaire sent out in Memphis and the generous returns in Sioux Falls.

Local Federations of Labor in some of the cities took part in surveys of unemployment conducted at the request of the President's Conference. Very few and only highly organized trade unions keep regular record of the rate of employment among their members. Knowledge of the employment situation among union members depends generally upon the type of employment service undertaken by their officials. In some trade unions the secretary can tell almost to a man the number employed at any time. In others his guess is little better than the next man's. Such information, where available, is in the hands of the officials of the several local craft unions and possibly of their national organizations. Local federations of labor or "trade and labor councils," having no right to demand such information from member unions, do not usually make it part of their functions to request or record it. At best,

[1] From memorandum for Commissioner of Labor, J. D. Williams, by J. M. Sullivan, field representative in charge of survey, October, 1921, in the files of the Industrial Commission, St. Paul.—In Minneapolis the Mayor, in St. Paul the St. Paul Association, was entrusted with the distribution of questionnaires and analysis of returns.

therefore, if local federations were to collect figures giving either the number employed or those unemployed, a change in method would have to be devised for compiling the information on a community basis.[1] In any fair-sized city complete union figures would probably involve arrangements with several hundred separate unions, whether made by the local federation or otherwise. Trade unions, or more particularly local federations or labor councils, did not prove a practical means of obtaining data on the extent of unemployment at the time of this study and are not on the whole the most promising channel for future inquiries.

Chambers of Commerce stood out as the logical organizations to make the specific employment surveys requested by the President's Conference in 1921. They generally had the equipment, resources, access to employers, and the standing in the community that would give authoritativeness to their findings. Because of their equipment, resources, and access to facts, they would seem the most acceptable bodies for the study of local employment situations. In some instances, as in the case of New York and Cleveland, they did excellent work of this kind. To make chambers of commerce quite satisfactory, however, as the channel of inquiry, it is imperative that every suspicion of a bias in gathering and interpreting facts be entirely removed. This would probably mean that some arrangement should be made by which the chamber of commerce would serve by offering its equipment and connections but would leave the actual collection and compilation of returns in the hands of a disinterested group. To this end, a central unemployment committee of the type discussed in an earlier chapter may often prove to be a most useful instrument.[2]

4. Public Employment Service Reports. Statistical returns of public employment bureaus are usually not very reliable. Significant terms, definitions, and record forms for this type of service have not yet been sufficiently standardized, and the extent to

[1] Figures of the number of trade union members without employment, published periodically by the Massachusetts Department of Labor, are obtained separately from the officials of each trade union reporting. The data for June, 1922, as reported in the *Massachusetts Industrial Review*, October, 1922, pp. 22–24, came from 1,061 separate unions distributed over the state and having a membership of 215,518.

[2] See Chapter 11.

which such bureaus cover their field of service varies very considerably from state to state. For this reason the reports of public employment offices affiliated with the United States Employment Service, which are periodically consolidated and published by the latter, have been of limited value both for general use and for local guidance.[1] There are, however, exceptional public employment services, the reports of which satisfy the conditions of a reliable index. Such is the Illinois Free Employment Service. The state



Diagram 2. Applicants at Chicago offices of the Illinois Free Employment Service per 100 jobs available, by months, 1920 to 1922

advisory committee for this service has been compiling, and, since September, 1921, has been publishing an easily understood index presenting the number of applicants for each 100 jobs available. This index for Chicago is presented in Diagram 2. It records the course of the unemployment emergency with a great deal of accuracy.

[1] These consolidated reports of local public employment offices affiliated with the Federal Employment Service must not be confused with the *Industrial Employment Survey Bulletin*, discussed below, which was issued monthly by the same office from January, 1921, through May, 1922.

The further development of public employment service will greatly enhance its usefulness to social agencies by giving them such valuable guides as are exemplified by the foregoing. Social workers should do everything possible, therefore, to strengthen this form of service.

5. Employment Statistics of the U. S. Employment Service. From January, 1921, through May, 1922, the United States Employment Service published monthly an *Industrial Employment Survey Bulletin* containing data concerning employment gathered from a number of different cities throughout the country.[1] These published figures have had the virtues of relative continuity and comparability, have followed the more profitable line of recording trends in employment rather than numbers of unemployed, and have been consistently prompt. An additional, and from the standpoint of local use, cardinal virtue of these figures has been the fact of their being reported in detail for the separate cities. It is for this reason particularly that they have been of value.[2]

One of the great weaknesses of these figures for the present purpose has been the fact that, while the industrial distribution of reporting firms for the country as a whole has been fair, for the individual cities it has been largely a matter of chance. Returns were obtained from such establishments only as employ in "normal" times over 500 persons. In cities, however, where a large proportion of the manufacturing is carried on in small plants or where the smaller manufacturing plants produce different commodities from those of the larger ones, the figures, collected as they were only for the large establishments, would not be dependable guides.[3]

[1] 1,428 firms distributed among all the important industries in 65 cities were represented by these data.

[2] Evidence in regard to the reliability of the figures reported is not uniformly favorable; in some cities there seems to have been particular ground for doubting their accuracy.

[3] Returns of questionnaires collected by the Chamber of Commerce and Family Welfare Association in Sioux Falls, would seem to indicate that, in cities of its type at least, the employment figures of the smaller concerns, if proportionately selected, may cover a larger number of employes than those of the large concerns and give a better cross-section picture of the situation. Here, only 5 out of 102 firms making returns had over 100 employes (only one had over 500), and these totaled for January 1, 1922, 1,293 employes as against 1,269 reported by the smaller firms, although all the large firms in this city made reports and only a small proportion of the smaller firms.

6. Employment Statistics of Federal Reserve Banks. District Federal Reserve banks issue their publications periodically, and, in so far as they have included employment figures among items regularly collected and presented, their data have the value of continuity and comparability. The district bank of Minneapolis, for example, accompanied its production and distribution figures for the mining and lumbering industries of the district, during the depression of 1921–22, at least, with employment figures for those industries, and for a limited period collected and published data on general employment in other lines as well. As a rule, however, while equipped with technical staff, these institutions are not in position to devote the necessary time and labor to such inquiries. Moreover, such banks obtain data for a considerable territory, including many communities, rather than for the several communities separately. The special inquiries made by the Minneapolis Bank for Minneapolis and St. Paul were exceptional and unusual.[1]

II. LOCAL COLLECTION OF EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS

The experience of the emergency just passed shows clearly that there was a demand for local employment statistics, that a variety of sources were consulted by communities for such information, and that none of those sources were satisfactory for furnishing a dependable index of the employment situation in the community. The demand for local data in times of emergency is insistent. Even in New York, where excellent employment statistics have been collected and published for the state and where almost half the population of the state is concentrated in one city, so that the figures for the state might have been deemed relatively significant for the city, the emergency winter of 1921–22 brought a local attempt to obtain employment data for the city. This effort was fostered by the Industrial Aid Bureau[2] and executed through the Merchants' Association. While, therefore, the paramount importance of employment statistics gathered by state departments and co-ordinated by the Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics, as proposed by the com-

[1] Some of these inquiries were made in part by request of the writer, who is especially under obligation to J. F. Ebersole, statistician of the Ninth District Federal Reserve Bank, and Miss Aurilla E. Smith of that office for placing at his disposal the results of the inquiries.

[2] See Chapter II, p. 40.

mittee on employment statistics of the American Statistical Association,[1] should be recognized, and while their extension and perfection will be of advantage alike to business men, civic bodies, and social workers, we have also to realize that they will not furnish, at least as now planned, the local information that should be available for emergency periods. If figures published by state departments can be presented in such a manner that the important separate communities in the state may find their local data there, a great deal of emergency study by cities can be eliminated. Even then, however, it will be desirable to have statistics not only for manufacturing industries, as has been chiefly the case heretofore, but for at least trade, building industries, and transportation in addition.

Until, therefore, these conditions are fulfilled, the chances are that local inquiries in the field of employment will continue to be made. Such inquiries have often been conducted without requisite knowledge of the statistical methods adapted to the task. The reason lay occasionally in the composition of the body under whose auspices the study was conducted, and often in lack of competent guidance or in failure to appreciate the importance of the fundamental principles that apply.

In offering the suggestions regarding the collection of local employment statistics which are herewith presented, the investigator assumes that they would be collected, if possible, under the auspices of some such survey committee as was proposed in Chapter II. Such a committee would presumably include a person experienced in statistical research to supervise the work or would obtain the services of such a person for the period of the study. The procedure recommended here is little more than a brief summary of methods that have already been used and found successful. In the actual collection and presentation of figures, matters of primary importance are a proper selection of firms, the suitability of the questionnaire employed, an adequate follow-up to get returns, and competent analysis and interpretation of results.

1. Selection of Firms. For a well-proportioned distribution of data the firms selected should include both small establishments and large ones, and all important industries in proportion, including, according to the nature of the city, trade, transportation, public utilities, and civil service, as well as manufacture; it should probably include not only those enterprises strictly within the city limits, but those in the larger metropolitan area which constitutes the entire industrial and commercial unit. A careful analysis of the distribution of employes in the industries and trades of the city should be the first step. Obviously, figures need not be obtained for all firms. A sampling which included 10 to 20 per cent of the entire wage-earning population would probably suffice. Firms employing approximately that percentage should be so selected as to give a proportionate distribution of industries. This is the method generally used by state departments collecting employment data; it was pursued by the Merchants' Association of New York, and to some extent by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its inquiry of February, 1922.[1]

2. The Questionnaire. The form and wording of the questions asked are of no less importance than the selection of firms. Questions must be clear and unequivocal; they should be answerable in most cases either by *yes* or *no*, or by figures. There should be no doubt as to the definition of terms and no room for difference in interpretation. Moreover, the answers should lend themselves directly to tabulation. An example will suffice to show the kind of questions to be avoided. In many instances in questionnaires examined in the present study, figures for "normal" employment were asked. Some replies interpreted this to mean *pre-war*, others some time in 1920, still others *plant capacity* and, in some cases, a figure arrived at by making an arbitrary reduction (15–25 per cent or more) from the maximum point of employment in 1920. A practicable way of putting this question is to ask for the figures of persons employed on a definite date, to serve as an initial point of comparison. If figures have been kept for a few years, the need for any question designed to obtain the "normal" will disappear. Such terms as "skilled," "semi-skilled," and "unskilled" permit of a variety of interpretations, some of them referring to the individual skill of the worker on his own job. Estimates of "how many do

[1] In a report of the committee, submitted at the annual meeting of the Association, Chicago, December 29, 1922.

[1] A total of some 300 Minneapolis firms were divided into 25 groups representing important local industries, and the returns were analyzed separately for each group, then combined and totalled.

you expect to employ in the winter" or on some given date are usually unsafe, chiefly because of the margin of personal equation.

From an examination of a few of the best questionnaires used in the cities visited during the past winter, the following form is suggested as a practical questionnaire for monthly returns:

NOTE: Information furnished below will be considered confidential.

Name of firm or plant

1. Number of employes on payroll nearest .....(date)
2. Total amount of the payroll
3. If plant has been shut down at any time during the month covered, give dates showing length of time closed
4. Is *plant* working part time?
5. If *employes* work part time, give nature of shifts
6. Do you expect to increase or decrease your employes within the next thirty days?

Signed.....

3. Follow-up and Analysis. When questionnaires have been sent out there still remains the task of following them up if returns are not satisfactory in number or promptness. It is well to state somewhere in the questionnaire, in as conspicuous a manner as possible, the date at which returns are desired. This should not appear as a peremptory limit, however, first because it offends and, secondly, because a late return is often better than none. It should, however, be emphasized. The percentage of the firms selected that will make returns may vary considerably in the different communities. It depends in part on the standing of the group that sends out the questionnaire; also on the time of the year, the nature of the industries and their organization, and the method of approach. An introductory letter accompanying the first questionnaire, and special letters or other personal approach to strategic firms by influential members of the committee are desirable. One hundred per cent response cannot be expected.

Information for successive periods should come from the same firms. It is well worth experimenting a while and postponing the adoption of a final list of firms to which questionnaires will constantly be sent until after the first two or three regular returns have been received and the dependable firms thus ascertained. It

is comparatively a simple matter for the statistician to make the required adjustments in his material if occasional changes in the list used are necessitated. If for any reason one or more firms fail to continue reporting, it is possible to substitute other firms representing the same industry with approximately the same working force. If the returns are regularly published, it is highly desirable to repeat figures for two or three months preceding and for the month of the preceding year which corresponds to that of the latest figures obtained.

One of the greatest aids in obtaining co-operation from reporting firms—besides scrupulously preserving the confidential nature of the individual returns—is to furnish a report to the firms, either directly or through publication, of the general summary of the replies.

In the end, after all, the methods of follow-up and the success in obtaining a large percentage of continuous replies will depend very much on the energy and earnestness of the group that is carrying on or giving its support to the inquiry.

The value of the material obtained depends, also, upon intelligent interpretation and presentation of the data. It is desirable to have if possible a body of knowledge as to the industrial distribution of wage-earners in the city or metropolitan district under inquiry and as to changes in this distribution from year to year. In making comparisons it is imperative to recognize and explain occasional fluctuations. The effects of unforeseen or temporary influences must be revealed by analysis of the data. For example, the Ford plant in Detroit, at the end of December, 1921, closed down for two weeks to take inventory. In that month the summary figures of the United States Employment Service indicated a very great decrease in employment for the country as a whole, due primarily to this one influence. As a matter of fact, most of those employes returned at the end of two weeks, so that the readers of the Bulletin should have been cautioned not to give undue weight either to the sudden decline or to the unexplained recovery.

4. Employment Figures and Wage Income. Admittedly, returns which give only the number of persons employed and its fluctuation, fail to give either the *amount of actual employment* or what is, after all, the real point—the *amount and fluctuation of wage*

income. Just as the wage income is increased in periods of prosperity by overtime—which does not appear in the figures given of the number employed—so in periods of depression wage income is decreased by enforced part-time work beyond the point which would be indicated by shrinkage in the number of workers. In recognition of this fact, both state and federal departments, in collecting employment statistics, obtain also data concerning amounts of the payroll. While such figures still leave much uncertainty, since reductions for salaried persons are not so generally made, and since, in any case, there is no way of telling whether the changes in the payroll represent workers at both high and low wage levels in proportion, nevertheless these payroll data may be all that reasonably can be collected in connection with continuous employment statistics of state or federal departments.

Local inquiries or statistics from special industries can often do more. From January, 1921, through August, 1922, a survey committee of the Employment Managers' Group of the Manufacturers' and Wholesale Merchants' Board, in the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, obtained bi-weekly reports from members of the group giving certain uniform data. Some 50 firms employing men and 14 firms employing women made returns to the committee.[1] Diagram 3 shows three curves based on the reports[2] for men, which record the fluctuation of the number of employes, of the production hours, and of the hiring rate of pay of common labor in the firms represented by this group of employment managers. It is clear that, while all three reflect the depression, the aggregate hours worked showed greater depression than do the number of employes. Production hours represent more nearly the true measure of employment and, inasmuch as wages are in general based on hours of work, they give a better hint of the economic situation of the workers. Both curves—number employed and production hours—agree in respect to the trend of employment. If rates of wages had remained unaffected, these curves would also show the trend of wage income. But wage rates also were reduced, as shown for the common labor

[1] Figures for firms employing women were first reported in August, 1921.

[2] The returns as summarized show per cent decrease of aggregate number of employes on basis of "normal" number (represented by conditions in May, 1920), per cent decrease of production hours on the same basis, and the hiring rate for common labor in the respective firms.



Diagram 3. Employment, production hours, and common labor wage rate changes in Cleveland as recorded by the Employment Managers' Group of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, January, 1921, to June, 1922

group in Diagram 3. How this concomitant decline in wage rates may have affected the wage income of this group is suggested in Diagram 4. This diagram is largely speculative and represents probably a somewhat exaggerated situation, inasmuch as the basis of comparison falls at a point of unusual prosperity in 1920,[1] and the rate of wages represented in the calculation is the hiring rate of common labor. For this latter reason the diagram does not represent the situation for the entire working population. It does, however, approximate the story of a large group, and one that has during the emergency constituted the greatest burden of social

[1] The figures from which this diagram is drawn were supplied by the Department of Statistics of the Russell Sage Foundation and are based on the data already referred to in connection with Diagram 3.

agencies that deal with individuals and families. The reduction in the cost of living during the same period, as shown by the broken line in the diagram, failed by a wide margin to compensate for the extreme shrinkage in the wage income of this group.



Diagram 4. Decline in the wage income of the common labor group, compared with the decline in the cost of living

The diagram is based on data from Cleveland. The wage curve represents decline in employment as well as in the wage rate. It shows the reduction in wages of an entire group rather than for the portion of the group remaining at work.

Statistics already available, whether national, state-wide, or regional in scope, may, of course, be utilized to the limit of their applicability by an individual social agency during a depression, as a guide for judging the necessary expansion of relief and service, and for the extent to which funds, staff, and administrative methods require increase or modification. But dealing with a local emergency is not the task of a single agency or even of a minority group of agencies. Such a task belongs to the community as a

whole, including organizations outside the ranks of social agencies. The search for information that will guide common action is, therefore, to be carried on by representatives of all civic interests and must cover the most significant basic facts.

For any intelligent, well-planned course of action the best attainable information on prevailing conditions is necessary; employment statistics constitute the best type of information for this purpose, and every effort should be made to get them, by utilizing the work of state departments and federal services in the first place and by instituting local inquiries when necessary. But the greatest care should be exercised in prosecuting local studies if they are to be of both immediate and permanent service.

In many communities, nevertheless, especially in the smaller ones, it will probably be difficult even with common effort to obtain adequate employment statistics. Are there, in the routine of community life, any other figures available without special studies, the fluctuation in which may indicate the economic condition of the population as affected by unemployment? And are these of such a nature that they may easily be made to serve the purpose of a guide for local action? In the next chapter some simple indices of this type that have been found useful in the past are presented.

CHAPTER X

THE STATISTICAL INDICES AVAILABLE IN A COMMUNITY

THOSE very effects of depression resulting from unemployment which the community hopes to lessen are among the best indications of the severity of the depression and of the extent of the need. It is true that not all such effects are measurable, and that many which could be measured are insufficiently recorded; but some others might readily be made to serve the practical purposes of guiding the community in its problem of relief. A special advantage of such records is that they are part of the routine of community life, and so provide a continuous basis of comparison. Thus their use for gauging the material welfare of the population requires a minimum of labor.

The indices suggested in this chapter are not the only ones available, and not all that were used in the course of this study are here presented.[1] Those reproduced are given mainly as demonstrations of method, as examples that might suggest the use of similar guideposts in future emergencies. Some are so clearly indicative of the trend of the situation during the depression between 1920 and 1922, however, that they may very well be studied as records of its severity. In the diagrams submitted, it is important not to compare curves given for one city or organization with those of another as to quantity or extent of variation. In addition to differences in definitions, many important factors in any community or agency affect conditions and reduce direct comparability. Each diagram or curve should, unless otherwise indicated, be read in relation to the immediate discussion only.

Wherever possible, the charts presented here have been prepared to allow comparison of three consecutive winters, 1919–20, 1920–21, and 1921–22; the first falling in a period of prosperity, the two

[1] There may be found, in the material in this chapter, a preponderance of data for certain cities. This is due entirely to the varying degree of success with which, in the brief time necessarily spent in any one city, the writer was able to recruit adequate statistical assistance.

latter in winters of depression. They are generally based on monthly figures, these being most useful and best adapted for showing seasonal fluctuations.

The principal value of any index of the type discussed here is its function as a signal for possible action. Changes in the curve representing any activity that are not accounted for by the normal seasonal fluctuation of that activity call for attention and study. Thus, any observer who has habitually followed an employment



Diagram 5. Number employed in 1,648 identical establishments in New York State, by months, 1917 to 1922

curve such as that which has been published currently by the New York State Department of Labor during the past six years would have noticed in the early fall of 1920 a continuation of the normal summer decline in factory employment that was not usual for that season of the year. This was a signal. It marked, in fact, the beginning of the serious depression of the years 1920–22.

Comparison with other indices available in the community would

have confirmed the trend illustrated by the change of direction in the employment curve. Some of these were represented by curves taking the same direction, others by curves of an opposite tendency, according to whether the phenomena charted increased or decreased



Diagram 6. Fluctuations in the case load of three large social agencies, the United Charities of Chicago, the Associated Charities of Cleveland, and the Overseers of Public Welfare of Boston, by months, 1919 to 1922

with the progress of the depression. A comparison of the charts that follow with Diagram 5 will make this clear.

1. Statistics of Social Agencies. Perhaps most significant among local indices for the present purpose are figures reflecting

the volume of work of social agencies engaged in family welfare service and in the relief of the various forms of distress, especially where no effort is made to limit the number of applicants for aid received. Many types of data of such agencies might be used, such as the total "case load" of the agency, the number of new cases, the amount of material relief expended, the number of unemployment cases under care, the number of new unemployment cases, the proportion of unemployed to the total "case load," the number



Diagram 7. Cost of boarding children placed out by the Cleveland Humane Society, and the share of cost borne by parents, by months, 1920 to 1922

of homeless men cared for, the number or cost of children boarded out. For these purposes it hardly matters what exact definitions are used in the statistical system of the agency so long as the same terminology is consistently employed by the given agency during the entire period.

Diagrams 6 and 7 will illustrate sufficiently the very close relation which the recent employment depression, as shown in Diagram 5, bears to the increased volume of work in social case work

agencies. The curves for the different cities in Diagram 6 should, as has already been indicated, be read independently, since any difference in the amount of increase in unemployment in the several cities depends on conditions peculiar to each place.

Diagram 8 is introduced to illustrate several important points. It represents the fluctuation of expenditures for material relief in New Bedford and Cleveland during the period of the depression of



Diagram 8. Relation of unemployment and expenditures for relief during the period of depression in two American cities.

For New Bedford, the relief expenditures are those of the Overseers of the Poor, and the employment curve represents returns of trade unions as reported by the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries. For Cleveland, expenditures are those of the Associated Charities, and the employment curve is based on returns for 50 plants obtained from the Chamber of Commerce.

1920–22. In each city the figures are those of the agency that had the highest relief disbursement among the organizations in the city. For both cities it was possible to obtain a dependable curve indicating the course of unemployment during the depression.

It is clear that the curve of expenditures serves a double purpose; first, showing the trend of developments, and second, suggesting the nature of the actual financial burden imposed by the depression

which must be borne by the social or other agency. A comparison of the curves for the two cities shows that the greatest distress as well as the peak of unemployment in each came at widely different dates. A brief reference to the industrial composition of these cities will give the reason: New Bedford's industry is overwhelmingly the manufacture of cotton goods, which had its worst depression in the winter of 1920, whereas Cleveland depends on iron and steel, industries that experienced their greatest deflation in the winter of 1921. Evidently, a generalized, country-wide index of employment that might have given guidance for Cleveland would have availed little for New Bedford. As there is always an interval between the onset of unemployment and the need for active relief measures, it would seem that social agencies might be forewarned and would be able to prepare for the larger disbursements made necessary, or that they would be aided in such preparation, if they could obtain timely information on the local trend of employment.

When statistics representing the activities of social case work are brought together, compared, and interpreted in the light of the social worker's experience, they are replete with advice to the wise administrator. It has already been pointed out, for example, that there is not necessarily an absolute coincidence between the point of time when employment is at its lowest and the point at which the case load, the new applications, or the amount of material relief expenditure is highest. As already stated, people do not rush for aid the minute they lose their jobs. They depend upon their temporary resources, or they struggle and strive, most of them, before they apply for help. The number of applications for relief, therefore, does not begin to mount until some time after the jobs have shrunk. On the other hand, applications do not necessarily cease of a sudden when employment arrives or increases. The deprivations of the unemployment period postpone the time at which they become self-supporting and tolerably free from debt. For the same reason it is vain to assume that the increase of jobs and the decrease in relief burden with the coming of spring mean necessarily the end of great distress. Fuel, clothing, medical service, always demand the heaviest outlay in winter. The spring let-up may be due not to greater income and sufficiency, but to less acute need. There is a wealth of temporary jobs in the spring and sum-

mer, and the problem of shelter is rendered less pressing by the mild weather. But when the stringencies of the inclement season begin, the difficulties may return and the resources with which to meet them may be fewer than before. Accordingly, the pleasant flattenings of "relief curves" should be viewed with suspicion, with watchfulness for change, and with preparations made for the possible rebound in the oncoming winter.

In another direction also these figures demand caution. If agencies, public and private, were equipped in personnel and income to



Diagram 9. Average daily attendance in high and elementary schools in Cleveland, by months, 1918 to 1922

meet any situation that might arise and were, therefore, not constrained to husband their resources, the amount of service rendered, assuming that it was wisely given, would constitute a very valuable measure of the extent of distress. In only a few instances, however, is this the case. More frequently the resources are inadequate. This results necessarily in greater economy, greater restrictions in giving material aid, more superficial service, and the danger of failure to serve at all.[1]

[1] See Chapter V, p. 101 sq.

2. School Attendance and Work Certificates. There are available in most communities statistics which indirectly reflect the condition of the families of the working population. Among these are the records of school attendance and of the issuance of work certificates for children. Diagrams 9 and 10, showing the course of school attendance in Cleveland and of work certificates issued in Minneapolis, respectively indicate the progress of unemployment, although they suggest the beneficial result that school attendance is increased during the economic depression. This is shown particularly by the separate presentation of statistics for elementary



Diagram 10. Work certificates issued by the Board of Education of Minneapolis, by months, 1919 to 1922

and for high schools. In the former the increase is comparatively slight and probably may be attributable mainly to the growth of the population of Cleveland. The increase in high school attendance is considerable, and is attributed to the fact that many children of high school age go or are permitted to go to school when they cannot get work, who under other conditions would leave school. For this same reason the issuance of work certificates to children declines during the unemployment period.

3. Vital Statistics. That conditions of economic distress directly affect marriage, birth, death, sickness, suicide, and so on, has been demonstrated by numerous studies.[1] It is, however, difficult to ascertain those effects; often the statistical requirements necessary are too difficult to make the results of value as indices. A greater difficulty is the fact that such effects are delayed and often become manifest when the time for action is passed. While, therefore, vital statistics are indicative of conditions over a long period of years, they are of little use for the present purpose during an emergency.

4. General Business Statistics. The effects of economic depression may be seen in a variety of aspects of the city's life, some of which are recorded and easily accessible. The purely business effects are partly ascertained and published by such agencies as the Federal Reserve banks, local banking corporations, and various business information services. Such items, indicative of the volume of business, as department store purchases, bank clearings, sale of stocks and bonds, movement of grain and live stock, freight car loadings, and so forth, are especially within the field of those agencies. To these may be added information on the number of business failures, the amounts on deposit in banks (both time deposits and savings accounts), and the number and estimated value of building operations for which permits have been granted, the number of "want" advertisements in local newspapers, and so on.

Savings accounts decrease in number and average size; business failures, mortgage foreclosures, evictions, applications at employment bureaus, trend steadily upward with poor business conditions and extensive unemployment. Of the many other indices of this nature, some move up while others decline. Diagrams 11 to 14 illustrate strikingly the way in which certain business statistics reflect the general depression that, to the workingman, means unemployment and distress. Such statistics, therefore, might fairly serve as signals and guides for those concerned with the study of conditions and with planning for relief. In Diagram 11 the fluctuation of "want" advertisements and, in Diagram 12, that of

[1] The latest of these is an excellent study by William F. Ogburn and Dorothy S. Thomas on "The Influence of the Business Cycle on Certain Social Conditions," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, September, 1922, pp. 324–340.

"for rent" advertisements will be found to indicate a change in the economic situation at about the same time—the latter part of 1920—as does the employment curve in Diagram 5. The great similarity between curves for "want" advertisements in Diagram



Diagram 11. "Want" advertisements in the Kansas City *Star* and Cleveland *Plain Dealer*, by months, 1920 to 1922

11 and the employment curve is particularly striking. A general similarity of such curves would be expected, because advertising in the press is one of the important means of bringing employers and workers together in any city. But the high degree of similarity



Diagram 12. "Help wanted" and "For rent" advertisements in the Cleveland *Press*, by months, 1920 to 1922

is noteworthy. The number of such advertisements in local newspapers is a figure that can be easily obtained and may be conveniently used in the absence of an employment curve if the latter cannot be obtained for the locality.

Diagrams of school attendance and of the issue of work certificates showed that the general depression had precisely opposite effects on those phenomena. Diagram 12, based on newspaper advertisement figures, presents another striking example of indices revealing the same trend of conditions by taking opposite directions. The broken line of this diagram represents the "help wanted" advertisements of a Cleveland newspaper. It takes the same general form as the curves in Diagram 11. The solid line denoting the movement of "for rent" advertisements takes an upward trend. Since prosperity tends to fill apartments and depression has the opposite effect, the increase in the number of "for rent" advertisements is an expected accompaniment of the depression. Both curves in Diagram 12 thus confirm the meaning of the drop in the employment curve.



Diagram 13. Total savings deposits in Sioux Falls National Bank on April 1 of each year, 1919 to 1922

Diagrams 13 and 14 suggest statistics of savings as another type of serviceable index. In Diagram 13 the "totals on deposit" on a particular date of four consecutive years in the Sioux Falls National Bank are given. These figures evidence a continuous decline from the spring of 1920 to that of 1922.

Diagram 14 represents fluctuation in the volume of postal savings during the period covering the depression in four of the cities visited. Three of these show a trend that would be expected; namely, a decline following the onset of depression. In Boston, postal savings accounts showed an entirely contradictory trend. The immediate conclusion might be that Boston was extraordinarily prosperous while the other cities were experiencing a serious depression. It is known, however, that that was not the case. The

explanation offered by local authorities is that a banking firm serving a large group of the foreign-speaking population had been convicted of fraudulent practices, and that the accompanying publicity seriously affected the confidence of this part of the population in private banking firms. Therefore, the increase in postal savings in Boston was a peculiar circumstance. This exception does not invalidate the general significance of postal savings records as indicative of local prosperity.



Diagram 14. Volume of postal savings accounts in St. Paul, Minneapolis, Hartford, and Boston, by months, 1920 to 1922. Scale figures indicate hundred thousand dollars except in Boston, in which case they indicate million dollars

5. Miscellaneous Indices. A few more examples will serve to illustrate the variety of local statistics that may be used and some precautions to be taken in their use.

The demand for personal loans increases in times of depression. Loan agencies, therefore, would be expected to do a larger business at such periods. Diagram 15 shows this to have been the case in

the Equitable Loan Association of Minneapolis—a semi-philanthropic agency. Both the number of loans and the amount lent increased during the depression, as indicated in the curves in Diagram 15. The increase was not so great as might be expected, because organizations of this type have limited capital, which determines the extent of their expansion. The second section of Diagram 15 shows somewhat more clearly the increase of demands for loans from year to year during the depression. In this section, in



Number of loans granted and total amount of loans outstanding, by months

Number of loans granted by months in three year periods, August to July

Diagram 15. Loan transactions in the Chattel Division, Equitable Loan Association, Minneapolis, 1919 to 1922

order to show the increasing demands for personal loans independently of the seasonal fluctuations, the curve is broken up and the three successive twelve-month periods from August of one year to July of the next are compared. It might appear that this increase represents the normal growth of chattel and pledge loan business. As a matter of fact, however, such growth is, as has been explained, limited by the available capital, and the increase represented by the diagram was made possible in part by reducing the maximum of the loan granted to any one individual.

In Chapter VIII changes in the ratio of applicants to jobs available in the public employment office were given as an index of employment conditions. Generally, however, figures of employment offices depend so much on special conditions that their use for the present purpose is often unjustified. Diagrams 16 and 17 give employment service figures for two special types of applicants. The first shows a great drop in placements by the Junior Division of the United States Employment Service co-operating with the



Diagram 16. Applications and placements, Junior Division, United States Employment Service, co-operating with the Public School Employment Service, Pittsburgh, by months, 1920 to 1922

Diagram 17. Applications and placements of colored workers, Bureau of Employment, Chicago Urban League, by months, 1920 to 1922

Board of Education in Pittsburgh. Here the applications show the same trend as placements, although an increase in the number of applications might be expected with the decrease in the number of placements. The probable explanation is that the figures represent young persons living with their families, not under the absolute necessity of earning their daily bread and able, therefore, when they see the futility of applying, to postpone their efforts until better times. At the same time they may also decide to take advantage

of the situation by getting some further schooling. In Diagram 17 applications of colored workers in Chicago are seen to increase in tremendous number by contrast with a drop in placements. The Application Bureau of the Urban League, which supplied the figures for the diagram, handled the great majority of colored applicants for work in the city of Chicago. The extensive unemployment in that group in 1920–21 drove the number of applications to unprecedented heights. This diagram, therefore, represents to a considerable degree the seriousness of the unemployment situation among the colored population of Chicago in the winter of 1920–21 and the comparative improvement in the winter of 1921–22. This improvement has been attributed largely to the opportunities for colored men presented as a result of the packing house strike in Chicago. When a large body of white laborers were thrown out of employment by that strike, their places were filled by colored workers.

Neither of these sets of figures for employment service—each representing a special group—would have given a true picture of the general employment situation of these cities.



Diagram 18. New families visited each month, Visiting Nurse Association, Minneapolis, 1919 to 1922



Diagram 19. Dispensary visits each month, General Hospital, Minneapolis, 1919 to 1922

Diagrams 18 and 19 show service records of medical service organizations in Minneapolis—the number of new cases in the Visiting Nurse Association and the record of dispensary visits in the General Hospital. Whether these services are free or given at low

fees, the effect of depression is to increase the demand for them. Facts of the kind represented in these diagrams may, however, also indicate the effect upon the health of the working population. It may mean more sickness as well as less ability to pay for medical services.

6. Composite Chart of Indices in Cleveland. Having assumed the availability of abundant local figures of significance, an attempt was made to collect a representative group of such indices for some one city. It was possible, through the co-operation of a number of Cleveland agencies and by the use of a few general indices obtained from other sources, to construct a composite chart showing a representative group of the many converging indices that, with some diligence, may be obtained for a single community.[1] Among the charts are included a few that are not of a strictly local nature, but they are of the same importance and pertinence for Cleveland as for the general field which they cover and, therefore, reflect local conditions as much as they do a general situation. Thus, inasmuch as steel is a basic factor in Cleveland's industries and the interest rate in New York is directly applicable for Cleveland as well, the charts giving facts on these subjects have full force as local indices.

The existence of material of this kind in most communities leads to several practical conclusions. In the first place, social agencies should realize that it is to the interest of the whole community that records of the type here discussed, because they are useful beyond the limits of a recording agency, be accurately kept. Inasmuch as these records tend to mirror the economic condition of the local population, it is important not only that they be kept by the several agencies, but also that they be brought together in one place in such a manner that they may be currently consulted by those whose work it is to deal with the public welfare. If there is a council of social agencies in the city, such a task would seem logically to fall within its scope, unless a survey committee such as that proposed in Chapter 11 is created, in which case the collection, observation, and current interpretation of these indices may be more naturally assumed by such a committee.

[1] In addition to the social agencies in Cleveland, the author is indebted to the Cleveland Trust Company and to the Chamber of Commerce for some of the data used in the chart.



Diagram 20. Collected indices of social and economic conditions in Cleveland for the period of the depression of 1920–22

A second consideration is that in times of threatening employment depression, various local indices of this nature may be of great service in addition to employment statistics. For local action some of these figures may sometimes prove an even more useful guide than employment statistics, especially in respect to the need of relief. We may not count on having all our depressions in the future preceded by such extraordinary prosperity as was that of 1920–22. The individual wage-earner may have fewer resources at his command when another emergency sets in than he had in 1920. Distress may, however, be measured more adequately by social and business indices than by employment statistics.

It might be profitable, if possible, to list here those indices that have been found most significant, though only tentative judgment can be given of their value. It would require a long period of testing to arrange them in an order of excellence. Certain groups might even now be recognized as having promise of usefulness. Some, however, may prove more useful in one place, others in another. It is the problem of local organizations to find the most adequate indices for their community and to select those that best supplement the weaknesses of the rest. The general value of such figures cannot be doubted, and the recognition of their worth imposes the obligation to use them.

CONCLUSION

IN TIMES of distress, as at other times, the family's first line of defense against the disintegrating forces of the emergency consists of its "natural resources." These include the power of adjustment to changed conditions, some savings and credit to serve as a margin of safety, and the fluid asset of mutual help; in brief, the massed availability of many small resources. By any standard of measure, this first line of defense is the strongest, longest, deepest. Its main bulwark has long been recognized as the economic stability and moral courage of the individual family, maintained despite the constant strain exerted by the combined forces of recurrent unemployment, sickness, and increasing family responsibilities. In normal times and in emergencies as well, the social engineer's task is to insure the strength of that bulwark, and thereby the strength of the entire defense.

As the danger of a breach in this first line is greatly increased by an unemployment emergency, the community at such a time must strengthen its second line of defense. Employers, trade unions, social agencies, are among the important forces in this line. Then, behind these must be still another, an emergency line, prepared for but not brought into action until circumstances require its services.

This study has been concerned mainly with the second and third lines of defense—more particularly with the position and special tasks of social agencies, and with the nature of the emergency machinery of the community. The story of these undertakings, as observed during the winter of 1921–22 and as related in the foregoing pages, leads to a few generalizations, both as regards the desirable features of permanent preparedness against an emergency and as to those measures adopted during the emergency itself that proved either practicable or undesirable. A brief summary of these generalizations will naturally fall into two divisions, dealing with preparatory or continuous activities and with emergency measures, respectively.

1. Continuous and Preparatory Measures. 1. Any direct count of the number of unemployed persons has proved entirely impracticable. A count by central registration of those seeking work, and estimates based on questionnaires sent to selected persons, have proved equally unsatisfactory. The important thing to know, however, is not the exact number of unemployed at any time, but rather the chances of employment and the extent of need or distress that exists or is imminent. Any machinery for obtaining relevant and valuable data should, therefore, be directed toward the scrutiny of fluctuations in the extent of employment and the observation of available indices of distress among the working population.

2. No local situation is entirely isolated from the effect of state-wide or nation-wide forces. In order to gauge local conditions, therefore, it is helpful to follow any guides of the general prosperity that are at hand or procurable. Publications of district federal reserve banks, of the United States Department of Commerce, and of business services are among the more important of these possible guides.

3. The movement for better employment statistics has recently received a new and strong impetus. It is especially urged by many competent authorities that the several states undertake—preferably in co-operation with the federal government—the collection of employment statistics within their jurisdiction. This movement should have the active support of social workers, even to the extent of their taking the initiative, where necessary, in creating a demand for such service. In respect to the manner of collecting and publishing the data, it is important that information be given for local units, that is, for municipalities. That involves certain corollary changes in the method of their collection and in the choice of reporting firms. This is an opportune time—with the President's Conference on Unemployment still fresh in the public memory—to make some headway in that direction.

4. There is, however, no necessity for putting all the eggs into one basket. The collection, organization, and continuous maintenance of such local indices of the economic condition of the population as have been discussed in preceding chapters need not await the creation of state-wide employment statistics. Local indices are valuable not during emergencies alone, but under ordinary cir-

cumstances as well, and once the simple machinery for their compilation has been established, it is comparatively an easy routine to keep it going.

5. For this purpose as well as for other reasons, it may be well for the city that wishes to be prepared for emergencies to organize, without undue haste, some form of *committee for the continuous survey of local economic conditions*, under some such auspices as the council of social agencies, or, in the absence of such an organization, under the auspices of a joint committee of interested organizations. As has been pointed out, such a survey committee need be no very formal body and may, indeed, serve best if it is composed of individuals chosen for their natural interest and the relevancy of their usual occupations, rather than for their formal relations with any organization. The continuous product of the work of such a committee would be of direct and invaluable service to emergency groups formed when the need arose.

6. The best guarantee of efficiency in the emergency lies in the strength of the community agencies of the city in normal times, and in the fullness of their co-operative relations. The extent to which the community's organized forces for public and social service are adapted to its normal needs and adequate for meeting them decides largely the measure of their usefulness in the emergency. This principle implies, from the standpoint of the needs of unemployment relief, the existence in normal times of at least the following: a competent and flexible public employment service, an enlightened public welfare department, well supported and well staffed family welfare and other social agencies, an adequate public health service, a council of social agencies, and a courageous and comprehensive policy for dealing with the homeless man.

7. The relations among certain local groups and associations that are frequently not well defined need especially careful study and the good services of the best citizens. Chambers of commerce, trade unions, and local federations of labor, social agencies severally or through their councils or financial federations, and the municipal government are some of the largest and most important groupings concerned not only in service rendered day by day, but also in possible emergency plans. Chance might render the co-operation of these groups at such times all that may be desired, and the division

of labor among them of a maximum efficiency. But it may be a better plan to work out their relations with a clearly defined purpose in mind and by consciously directed effort in normal times.

8. A policy for dealing with homeless men that would meet normal needs and provide for emergency expansion is one of the important feasible measures of constant preparedness, and one in which the above-mentioned groups are all directly concerned. Such a policy must vary not only from city to city but from section to section as well. It must be well balanced between the right of the involuntarily homeless man to help and the need of suppressing deliberate vagrancy. It implies preferential aid for resident persons, central clearing of homeless applicants in the community, police co-operation, the interest of health departments, and so on. For the most effective policy, regional agreements and clearance machinery, comprising a number of states each, may be the best method, the regions being determined by the similarity in the distribution of types of homeless men and their customary manner of self-support in the given region.

9. While, on the whole, the prevention of unemployment does not lie within the power of the local community or even of the state, one type of prevention—which is in part in the nature of relief—is distinctly within their realm; namely, the long-range planning of public works. There is general agreement that the execution of public works may be so planned as materially to stabilize employment in a given territory. Thus far, little has been done to this end. It is largely an untried though generally approved method, and one open for the pioneer application of community statesmanship. No single measure promises greater returns for emergency relief than the far-sighted planning of public works *by each community*.

10. The activities thus far summarized constitute parts of a foundation from which the emergency relief machinery may be launched with some promise of effective work. With the first recognition that a period of distress may be upon the community, an unemployment committee representing service organizations may be brought into being, begin its activities, take up for discussion the findings and records of the continuous survey above mentioned, form its subcommittees, and proceed to quiet preparations for

co-operative relations with industrial plants, the press, municipal authorities, and social agencies. The resources of the agencies would be ascertained, their facilities measured, and plans perfected for increasing these facilities as needed. It would also be necessary to provide for so much of the planning, publicity, and clearance of information as might be required for effective co-ordination of service and for specific emergency measures. All of the above proposals, while stated in abstract terms, have proved themselves practically feasible and represent little more than a generalized description of the common-sense procedures which have already been applied to unemployment situations by experienced workers in the past.

2. Emergency Activities. 11. Two central facts stand out as of leading significance in the attempts of community agencies to meet the demands of the depression of 1921–22. One is that their success in the emergency was measured largely by competency in normal times; the other, that it depended to a high degree upon an early start in recognizing the signs of coming distress and applying prompt measures of preparedness.

12. There is no escape from the conclusion that an unemployment committee of community-wide interest is a most desirable instrumentality for effective work; that it can focus information, provide a channel for the co-ordination of the endeavors of numerous separate bodies, centralize and control publicity, stimulate interest and participation of the general public, and perform liaison service between private effort and public service. As between committees of this kind appointed by mayors or created by the spontaneous coming together of those agencies that are directly in touch with the service operations required in distress, the latter has proved, at least in the larger cities, by far the more desirable and effective. The independent strength of such committees and the extent to which they need undertake separate functions, distinct from those of the regular agencies, appear to depend in part upon the strength of their constituent organizations and in part upon the existence of other channels for the joint activities of the local agencies.

13. Some of these separate functions, as exemplified by the work of unemployment committees in 1921–22, seemed well adapted to

their particular make-up. They comprise mainly those of an educational and mediatory character, such as interpreting the special needs of social agencies to the public, the government, employers, and business associations, co-ordinating the emergency phases of the work of agencies, studying important functions through subcommittees, raising funds by unobtrusive methods, and carrying on propaganda for special emergency measures, such as the opening of shelters for the homeless and of temporary employment bureaus, the provision of public works for relief, the concentration and increase of odd jobs, and so on.

14. Except in quite small cities it does not seem that temporary unemployment committees can successfully carry on administrative functions, whether they be of a strictly relief nature or take the forms of employment service, of a clearing house of any kind, or even of the conduct of temporary shelters for the homeless. In so far as any undertakings of these kinds are desirable, they are best carried on under the immediate supervision and management of some regularly functioning agency that possesses the experience and easy routine of tried workers.

15. Registration of the unemployed at any central point, as distinct from application for employment at an employment office, has proved to be not only useless and possibly harmful, but entirely impracticable, and need not be seriously considered by unemployment committees.

16. Some functions usually neglected by these committees seem peculiarly adapted to them, but require careful organization, long-time planning, and sustained interest. Such are employment surveys within the community through the sending out of periodical—preferably monthly—questionnaires to representative firms; co-operative planning for public works with other municipalities and with state and federal bodies; a current scrutiny and recording of the experiences of the emergency; and their analysis and presentation to the community or to its agencies when the depression has passed.

17. A redistribution of the relief burden in times of emergency among the social agencies, particularly as between private agencies and the public welfare bodies, has generally taken place, though with varying degrees of thoroughness in planning and of

soundness in the principles of the division of labor. The fact that some public departments of welfare have found it easier to obtain additional funds than private agencies, that frequently those departments were quite willing to assume the added burden, and that the quantitative change in the private agency's case load forced down the standards of treatment, has tended to spread the theory that unemployment relief is fundamentally the duty of the public authorities and that, therefore, the private agencies should carry an extra burden of this type only under protest, if at all. On these particular grounds, at any rate, such a conclusion does not seem warranted.

18. Certain specific emergency measures have clearly demonstrated their value and usefulness. Among these are: intensified employment service during the depression, stimulation to increase temporary and odd jobs, provision of additional public works by expediting plans for such works, effective propaganda for rotation of jobs in industrial plants, part-time work, and accelerated construction and repair work in manufacturing plants. Municipal lodging houses have proved desirable, and fairly effective work-tests are practicable. The co-operation of such bodies as women's city clubs and church federations have afforded substantial benefits. It has not been beyond the power of municipalities, if so minded, to provide sufficient care for unemployed homeless men, so that none need suffer hunger or cold, and no spectacular bread lines and soup-kitchens need be established.

19. In case work agencies the paramount importance of continued service and, therefore, of adequate staff has been demonstrated, even where societies were hard-pressed for resources for material relief. The indispensability of the clearing house or social service exchange for emergency relief would seem almost more absolute than for ordinary case work. The fundamental soundness of preference for residents over nonresidents has been emphasized by every phase of emergency work.

20. In the specific policies of case work organizations there has been a tendency to recognize the effect of emergency pressure by modifications in some aspects of case work. Investigations were reduced to skeleton dimensions. Great care was exercised to insure sufficient and proper food for families aided, even at the cost of

re-introducing, temporarily, relief in kind, especially in respect to milk. The menace to the health of clients necessitated sustained vigilance, but, even so, illness increased and taxed the community's facilities for free or low rate medical service. The rent problem remained puzzling and even increased in intricacy. Whatever benefits the lowered cost of foods afforded were generally offset by mounting rentals or stationary rentals at high levels. Relief in the form of work was resorted to in increasing degrees as the psychological effect of unemployment wore down the moral resiliency of clients. Yet the tasks of well-guarded work relief entailed additional labor and special cautions in case work.

21. The answer to the all-important question of how to obtain necessary funds for carrying the increased burden of service in an emergency has been given in a manner so different, from city to city, that one conclusion only may be drawn, though that is perhaps sufficient: All the cities visited seemed to have latent financial resources; these became actual and available to the extent that social agencies, severally or as a group, had obtained the interest, confidence, and co-operation of the public—the extent, perhaps, to which they had educated the public as to the nature and value of social service.

22. A deplorable lack of opportunity for full discussion of emergency methods of unemployment relief by the executives of social agencies and for the formulation of these experiences into a text that might serve as a guide for future depressions of a similar nature has been redeemed by only a few scattered descriptions detailed enough to be of real value, and these have thus far not been published. There is enough knowledge and experience among the workers who struggled through this depression to guide many a faltering step in future difficulties. Not yet has a way been found to bring all this experience together and to preserve it for another time. These pages are but a fraction of what ought to be said by those who bore the burden to those who may have to bear it in a future period of depression.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

GENERAL CONDITIONS IN THE CITIES VISITED

IN THE foregoing pages no attempt has been made to give a unified picture of the local situation in any of the 15 communities studied. The brief résumé which follows is an attempt to supply this lack.

Boston (Population 748,060 in 1920). The year 1921–22 was a second year of industrial distress in Boston. The decrease of employment from 1920–21 to the next year was not so great as from the period of prosperity to the first year of the depression. In some industries, in fact, there had been the beginning of a revival. But the great exhaustion of the resources of the unemployed brought greater suffering and an increasing demand for relief.

The occupational distribution of the population of Boston covers a variety of commercial, clerical, and industrial fields, and, while unemployment was fairly general, it did not descend in extraordinary intensity upon any particular group or bloc of the city's inhabitants. Need was extensive but at no point disastrous. Moreover, the woolen and cotton industries began to recover fairly early, and the candy industry continued to present work opportunities for women.

Like many other New England communities, Boston counts among its industrial army a large percentage of foreign-born workers. The distinction between employer and employe tends to be complicated by contrasting national traits. There is a tendency to deny to the employe, because he is an immigrant, the New England virtues of application, earnestness, thrift. This tendency may account for a certain tardiness on the part of the better situated original stock of the community to bring to the unemployed the understanding and sympathy that the situation demanded. One of the leading social agencies found it wise to discontinue any mention of unemployment relief in its appeal for funds after some replies had shown signs of this lack of sympathy with the workers.

Organizations for the relief of distress include the usual public and private agencies, most of them long established. Of the public agencies, the Board of Overseers of the Public Welfare (formerly Overseers of the Poor) is the most important. Its outdoor relief comprises two principal functions: that of temporary family relief and that of mothers' pensions. The former includes relief of non-residents for whose support their places of legal residence are, so far as possible, held responsible. A subcommittee of the Board conducts the Wayfarers' Lodge for homeless men, which is partly self-supporting. (During the winter of 1921–22 the Lodge was closed for repairs, and a very unsatisfactory temporary building was utilized in its

place.) The Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Department is the next in importance in respect to quantity of work. Its field of activities includes the relief of veterans of the last three wars. The major part of relief during the past winter—some 80 per cent out of a budget of over a million dollars—went to unemployed veterans of the World War.

Private agencies comprise a large variety and number of organizations. The family agencies proper have the usual denominational divisions. Thus, the Jewish group assume full responsibility for the relief of their own, and the Catholic body is rapidly gaining strength, but the major task remains with the non-sectarian organizations. Among these the most important are the Boston Family Welfare Society, specializing in service through a number of district committees, each with a staff of social case workers, and the Boston Provident Association, specializing in relief. The former relies for relief funds considerably on the latter, which, in turn, utilizes the service staff of the Family Welfare Society and utilizes it so intelligently as to aid in the maintenance of standards. Both organizations rely to a considerable extent for relief funds on permanent endowments. Neither organization had sufficient funds to meet adequately the full demands of the winter of 1921–22.

In the usual division of labor between these agencies and the public department, the latter assumes entire responsibility for mothers' aid cases and, having larger relief funds than the private agencies, also cares for a large part of the other cases requiring continuous allowances, while the private agencies, because of their larger service resources, usually retain cases demanding service rather than relief. In many instances, service was continued even for families that had been referred to the Overseers for relief. Because "unemployment cases" required material relief even more than service, the number of such cases referred by the private agencies to the public department for relief increased during the emergency.

Boston social agencies recently had been united in a Council of Social Agencies which, at the time of the unemployment emergency, had not yet attained a position of leadership for such purposes as stimulating co-ordinate action in the emergency or guiding the agencies by supplying pertinent information on the developments of the situation. It did serve as a channel for arranging conferences initiated by separate social agencies. These resulted in some co-operative emergency measures.

Leadership in the emergency from official unemployment committees was also lacking. There was, indeed, a Mayor's Committee, consisting of 33 members and including some representatives of social work appointed by Mayor Andrew J. Peters on October 7, 1921. But the work of that committee remained unimportant. It brought forth little more than some informal and rudimentary employment service. A Massachusetts Committee to Promote Work, appointed by Governor Channing H. Cox, which had its first meeting on September 28, 1921, made several subcommittee reports of comparatively little practical importance, but did succeed in obtaining a legislative appropriation of $100,000, of which $60,000 was expended in wages for the clearing up of débris in the metropolitan parks. This gave some work to a small number of unemployed in Boston for several weeks in the middle of the winter.

Boston contributed perhaps the most dramatic episode of the unemployment

emergency in the form of the much advertised "auction-sale" of unemployed on Boston Common, through which Mr. Ledoux, a local minister, sought to bring the situation forcibly, if theatrically, before an indifferent public.

Chicago (Population 2,701,705 in 1920). Chicago, also, was in its second year of the unemployment depression. According to figures of the Illinois Free Employment Service, jobs were much scarcer than during the preceding year, and the number of applicants was increasing. Labor troubles complicated the situation. The building trades were on strike, and a group of employers and their sympathizers, organized as a Citizens' Committee to enforce the "Landis award,"[1] were importing strike-breakers. Feeling was running high, and violence was not unknown. At the end of the winter peace was not in sight. The employes of the packing plants, mostly foreign-born laborers, had gone on strike against a reduction of wages. There was much distress, this group having far smaller resources than the workers in the building trades. On the other hand, the unemployed colored population of Chicago, who had been still more destitute than either the artisans or the packers, got the chance to earn a livelihood as strike-breakers which had been denied them as competing laborers.

Chicago is one of the clearing points and hibernating centers of the migratory labor of the Middle West. The winter of 1921–22 drove such labor in unusually large numbers and with smaller resources than usual to these centers, where they clogged an already overcrowded labor market.

By all these signs there might reasonably have been expected an overwhelming amount of distress. Yet, heavy as were the needs and great the demands for relief, there was no such burdensome destitution as was expected. Several plausible explanations were offered: first, Chicago, though a manufacturing city, had not experienced the sudden and disproportionate prosperity and increase of population that took place in cities which were war industry centers; second, the variety of manufactures and the large number of small establishments helped to break the impact of the unemployment wave; in the third place, Chicago's economic foundation is rooted not only in its industries but also in its character as trade and banking center for the Middle West, and as a railroad and food distributing center.

The extent of distress, on the whole, did not exceed the limits of the community's resources for relief. While the labor situation did not enhance the generosity of the donors, it did not prejudice them seriously enough against the unemployed to prevent giving. Ethnological differences were not keenly felt, as in Boston, since the Middle West is comparatively a new economic structure and is strongly conscious of the contribution of foreign-born labor to its making.

Family welfare work in Chicago is largely centralized. The non-sectarian United Charities cares for Protestant and Catholic families both, although the Catholic body aids to the limit of its powers. The Jewish population cares for its own indigent. While the unemployment emergency increased the expenditures of

[1] Wage Award by Judge K. M. Landis in the Chicago Building Trades, September 7, 1921.—*Monthly Labor Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 4, October, 1921, p. 112. Washington, D. C.

the United Charities for the current year, increased appropriations to county authorities for mothers' pensions released a considerable amount previously expended by the organization in supplementing mothers' pensions, and the special financial efforts of the society increased its annual income by nearly $100,000, so that the organization was, relatively speaking, in good financial position.

Public out-door relief is limited in Chicago to a uniform relief system, without any attempt at adequate service, and taking chiefly the form of relief in kind administered through the "county agent" of Cook County. Mothers' pensions are controlled by the Juvenile Court, which has a considerable case work service at its disposal.

The private agencies did not transfer any part of their case load to the public authorities, and the latter do not seem to have been in a position to receive the burden. Both the private and public agencies failed to take adequate care of the homeless man or to deal with him effectively. The private agencies adopted no systematic policy, and the city authorities failed to open up a much-needed municipal lodging house.

The movement to organize for a serious winter of depression began in the middle of the summer of 1921. Initiative appears to have been taken at several points—the American Legion, the governor of the state, the public employment service, and the social workers at large. Excellent co-operative relations among social agencies made possible within a few weeks of the initial moves the organization of an Unemployment Conference composed of thirty-odd of the social agencies, with the president of the Chicago Council of Social Agencies as chairman and its director as secretary. This Conference successfully represented the interest and desires of the social agencies in respect to the emergency. Most of the work of the Conference was carried on by its authorized executive officer, the chairman.

The organization of the Unemployment Conference comprised, in addition to an executive committee, a number of subcommittees with fields of activity chiefly as follows: procurement service, public works, publicity to prevent influx of unemployed, action on a municipal lodging house, special problems of the social agencies, fund-raising. Conditions in the city did not become serious enough to require full activity of all these committees or to test the strength of the Conference as a whole. A brief résumé of its chief activities and accomplishments is as follows:

1. Co-operating, despite difficulties due to situations irrelevant to the emergency, with a Mayor's Unemployment Commission reluctantly appointed by the Mayor.
2. Securing an appropriation of $5,000 from the commercial and industrial clubs for the expenses of a special temporary procurement staff to be added to the equipment of the Chicago office of the Illinois Free Employment Service.
3. Securing the aid of the Woman's City Club, which organized a further volunteer procurement service, in co-operation with the public employment service, by utilizing the club's extensive and active ward organization.
4. Controlling publicity in legitimate and fair ways, and securing adequate publicity service when necessary.
5. Influencing the city authorities to make an appropriation for opening a municipal lodging house. This appropriation ($18,000) came too late, however, and the institution did not become available.[1]
6. Reporting by committees which were fully prepared for further action should the need arise.

The merits and standing of this unofficial Unemployment Conference rendered any action by the Mayor's Commission unnecessary.

Cleveland (Population 796,841 in 1920). Among the cities visited Cleveland was one of those most deeply sunk in the slough of industrial depression. It was a close second in this respect to Pittsburgh, and for the same reasons—the tremendous temporary inflation of its production activities by the war industries, and its close dependence for prosperity upon the steel and other metal industries. The manufacture of automobile parts alone, almost entirely a metal industry, accounted in 1920 for some 25,000 employes among Cleveland's inhabitants. The steel industry, among the first to suffer, was among the last to recover. There were, therefore, thousands of residents who entered, with the autumn of 1921, the second year of a period of unemployment which was practically continuous except for odd jobs.

In mitigation of these conditions a number of important factors were operative. Several years of continuous work at high wages; comparatively peaceful relations between capital and labor; an excellent minimum employment guarantee system in the clothing industry, by which the worker could count upon forty-one weeks of work in the year with fair assurance; enlightened, progressive industrial leadership that put forth considerable effort—both independently and in co-operation with labor—to lessen the impact of unemployment by continuing part-time work, manufacturing for stock, alternating shifts of workers, and carrying considerable relief work for employes who had to be discharged. Added to all this, there is in Cleveland a public opinion well educated as to the functions of the social agencies.

There was no noticeable difficulty with the large, unassimilated national units in the population of the city. Whole foreign-speaking towns are included in its boundaries; districts almost solidly Slovak, South-Slavic, Hungarian, Roumanian, seem to have been smoothly absorbed in the functional life of the city. The colored population alone constitute a distinct and difficult problem. Their number quadrupled during a single census period—a development largely due to war industries which drew them from the reservoir of southern farm labor. When work became less plentiful they were among the first to be dropped. Their resources, only fairly husbanded and drained by a cost of living higher than that of their white neighbors, dwindled faster than those of other groups, and a certain habit of dependence, moreover, sent them flocking, when the reserves of the old-time colored group had been depleted, to public and private charities.

The out-door relief division of the public welfare department, ill equipped for

[1] Some interesting developments are reported from Chicago as these pages are going to the press. An intensive study of the problems of the homeless man, resulting in a set of progressive and comprehensive recommendations which involve both the public and the private agencies, has already brought about the establishment of a "clearing house" for homeless men, to be conducted in connection with a municipal lodging house.

case work service, restricts its activities mainly to relief in kind—to coal, food, and shoes. It utilizes the service resources of private agencies and regularly consults the Social Service Exchange. The phenomenal increase in applications for relief in the winter of 1921–22, averaging well over ten times the normal, made this department little more than a distributing agency for coal, groceries, and shoes. Colored applicants constituted some 80 per cent of its clientèle. Some city officials of high standing, aware of this ratio, but failing to recognize the disadvantages under which the colored group was laboring, exerted considerable pressure upon the executive of out-door relief to eliminate them, as strangers, from among recipients of aid, and thus reduce municipal expenditures. The executive steadfastly withstood the pressure and continued to give the Negroes emergency aid.

Among the private agencies of Cleveland, the Red Cross chapter carries a considerable load of relief. The Jewish relief agency cares for its own. For the rest, the Associated Charities, centrally organized and fully districted, with active committees in every part of Cleveland, supplies in the field of family social work a high grade of case work service supplemented by relief. It also assumes the responsibility of caring for homeless men, and, during the emergency, expanded its original plant and personnel, entering for this purpose into co-operative relations with veterans' organizations for the separate housing and care of homeless ex-service men.

The Welfare Federation of Cleveland, comprising practically all the private social agencies of the city, serves in the nature of a financial federation though modified by activities partaking of the nature of a council of social agencies. The raising of funds for the maintenance of the agencies and of the federation is the direct responsibility of the Community Chest, an outgrowth of a war-time community organization. For emergency relief alone, in addition to the regular budget, the sum of approximately $500,000 was set aside to be used by agencies giving relief. There was no difficulty in meeting the financial demands upon relief agencies during the emergency.

Cleveland may justly boast of having begun its preparations for the emergency period almost with the beginning of the deflation in the summer of 1920. In the autumn of that year an informal committee, called by and including the general secretary of the Associated Charities and having the sanction of the Welfare Federation, approached city officials, municipal legislators, employers, and newspapers, requesting them to leave the conduct of community relief and its attendant publicity to the regular permanent organizations of the city, and suggesting a practicable distribution of the burden. A more formal committee of the Federation found no opportunity for more extensive activities. A Mayor's Committee, appointed under the influence of the nation-wide publicity of the President's Conference—its creation by the Mayor held off up to then by request of the informal committee of the social agencies—held several meetings, made some good committee reports, then, recognizing that it could add little to what had been accomplished in preparedness by the social agencies, suspended its meetings and later, in view of the approaching change in the city administration, practically disbanded before January 1, 1922. Previous to this date the formal committee of the Welfare Federation

voted to request its discharge. The necessary measures for relief had been taken by the social agencies, and the needed funds had been supplied by the Community Chest.

The particularly weak spot in Cleveland's emergency preparedness has been its inadequate public employment service (later reorganized). One of its unusual accomplishments, beyond adequate relief preparedness, has been the collection and somewhat limited distribution, beginning with January, 1921, of excellent employment statistics by the Employment Managers' Group of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce.

Columbia, S. C. (Population 37,524 in 1920). An artificial prosperity existed in Columbia up to the summer of 1921, due to the continued operation near the city of one of the southern war camps. Its last year of existence overlapped the first year of the employment depression. There is practically no manufacturing in Columbia aside from the cotton mills and a small amount of lumber and railroad work. These constitute its chief industries. The shrinkage of industrial employment would have come by way of the mills. But by the fall of 1921 the cotton mills, never so badly depressed as metal trades, were experiencing a decided revival and approaching normal rates of employment. Thus the depression in Columbia came in a different way from that in the manufacturing cities.

Columbia is the capital of the state and one of the banking and commercial centers of an agricultural region. The State University, some six other educational institutions, and State and federal offices are also situated there. The entire economic structure of the state, including its mills, is built on the foundation of cotton. The summer of 1921 brought a headlong tumble in the price of cotton, and the boll-weevil, making its first serious raid on the state, destroyed over half of the cotton crop that summer in the territory that constitutes Columbia's economic foundation. Rich farmers suffered, poor farmers and tenants were practically ruined. Confidence was shattered, both for investment and for the risk of putting in another crop. As a consequence, general business in the city shrank.

Unemployment proper, affecting particularly clerical workers, female help, and the building trades, was complicated by the diffidence in purchasing, and by the influx to the city of colored farmers with their families, who, in escaping from their ruined farms, failed to realize in the city their hope of finding work.

Columbia's social agencies are few. The only family welfare agencies are the Associated Charities, which includes service for all denominations and both races, and the Salvation Army, which is not usually regarded as a case work agency. The Associated Charities acts as the agent of out-door relief for the municipality and receives an annual appropriation as well as office space free of rental from the city.

Demands for relief upon the association were rapidly mounting during the winter of 1921–22, and its financial condition was fast becoming insecure. No extraordinary plans had been adopted to meet the difficulty, but no curtailment of work was inaugurated. Technical difficulties arose chiefly from two sources: first, from the influx of colored farmers' families and, second, from other transients. No agreement in respect to the latter, looking to a division of labor, had been sought with the Salvation Army. The Army also was in financial straits.

A Mayor's Committee, consisting of six active citizens of good standing and of known initiative, was the official contribution to the relief of the emergency. This committee proposed and, upon grant of appropriations, opened, in November, 1921, an employment bureau designed for three months, then continued for another period of three months. Considerable placement has been credited to the bureau. In the course of the winter this bureau assumed the task of placement work for girls and women also—a task given up by the Young Women's Christian Association for lack of funds and because the shrinkage in the field of employment did not justify the continuance of a full-time bureau. The early spring of the south was bringing the usual temporary relief before it became clear what the cotton situation would be in 1922.

Evanston (Population 37,234 in 1920). Evanston is practically a suburb of Chicago, and chiefly a residential community with but one fair-sized factory and considerable business in the wholesale distribution of coal. It was visited in the course of the present study only for the purpose of learning in some detail of the activities of its Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, which had been reported as performing highly efficient emergency work. For this reason the following statement is limited to this one factor of the emergency relief measures in Evanston.

The committee, called some time after the meeting of the President's Conference, elected an executive committee and authorized it to proceed at its discretion. Its six members comprised a clergyman as chairman, one representative each of the Central Charities, the Red Cross, the Chamber of Commerce, a colored social worker, and an official of the public service corporation. Plans were adopted for the operation of an emergency employment bureau, opened about January 3, 1922. Excellent publicity was given to the service by newspapers, from the pulpit, and by the distribution of blotters. An unemployment secretary was engaged, his salary provided from the funds of the Central Charities and later refunded from a special appropriation by the city. The service proved entirely satisfactory and unexpectedly helpful. All available odd jobs were ferreted out and the creation of jobs encouraged. Service was given to residents of Evanston exclusively, and publicity was designed to emphasize that point.

The most picturesque part of the work of the committee was the ingenious immediate execution of some work planned by the city for the spring. A number of trees in the city's parks had been marked to be cut down in the spring. The committee proposed to have it done forthwith so as to give work to the jobless. Knowing that the city's treasury was unable to finance the work at the time, the committee secured the promise of a public service corporation to advance to the city franchise fees due the following summer. By this means the work on the parks could proceed without delay.

Evanston's unemployment situation, though relatively severe, was light enough to be handled by its normal agencies with the aid of this one committee.

Hartford (Population 138,036 in 1920). A veritable army of clerks is employed in Hartford by the numerous large insurance companies which distinguish the city. The manufacture of small metal goods, such as typewriters, guns, tools and the like,

is the other basic occupation of the city. As the capital of Connecticut and somewhat of a distributing point for temporary labor on the tobacco fields of the surrounding country, it gains additional importance. It is also at the center of a cluster of smaller towns, including Manchester with its extensive silk-mill plant. The machinery and metal trades experienced the general war boom. A corresponding shrinkage came with the deflation. The insurance business was comparatively slow in responding to the depression, so that the thinning of clerical forces did not take place until well on in the unemployment period. The general situation of the working population in 1921–22 was, therefore, severe but not distressing. Not until December, 1921, did the case load figures of the Charity Organization Society show a menacing increase.

The percentage of native-born persons in the wage-earning population is fairly high in comparison with other industrial centers of New England. This is due, probably, to the skilled labor required both in the insurance offices and in the manufacture of fine metal goods. In common labor and the temporary farm labor supplied for tobacco fields, the foreign born assume larger proportions. There is no appreciable difficulty in the city attributable to this phase of American city life. In the field of industrial relations there had been somewhat more friction, as the "open shop" controversy in the city was acute. This fact had its effect on the emergency unemployment work. Yet no strained situation comparable to that of Chicago or the Twin Cities existed.

In the opinion of local observers, much of the labor for the post-war industrial expansion came from the surrounding country and, with the onset of unemployment, returned there. On the other hand, Hartford, like other urban centers, attracted considerable unemployed labor from smaller towns and floaters *en route*.

Like other old New England communities, Hartford has many small philanthropic organizations and endowments. Not a few of these, dating from a period when the influx of immigrant groups first became appreciable, are protected by restrictive qualifications for beneficiaries, designed to aid the basic stock. Thus, the organic integration of the work of social agencies has been somewhat retarded. Nevertheless, within the last few years the Charity Organization Society has brought local social work into greater harmony with the actual conditions of a present-day Hartford, and the recently organized Central Council of Social Agencies is providing a channel for the necessary integration of social work. The Charity Organization Society is the foremost non-denominational family agency; the Open Hearth Association is the only agency serving exclusively the homeless man. The municipal department of public welfare renders chiefly indoor relief service, though it also gives out-door relief, largely in co-operation with the case work service rendered by the family agencies.

The weakest spot in the social service of the city, as revealed by the emergency, is the care of homeless men. The Open Hearth Association is inadequately equipped and lacks the flexibility of treatment required for the homeless in an emergency. The Salvation Army in Hartford and the Charity Organization Society exclude the homeless man without means from their clientèle.

The general complexion of the situation was not favorable to the assumption of

emergency leadership from within the ranks of the social agencies. Initiative came as early as the fall of 1920 from the secretary of the Mayor's Americanization Committee, who brought the matter repeatedly before the Central Council of Social Agencies. A series of informal committee activities, partly involving the Central Council and also the Chamber of Commerce, came to a head first in an appeal to the city council for appropriations to provide wages in work on needed public improvements, under the immediate direction of existing city departments. Some precedent for this type of measure had been established in 1914–15. An initial appropriation of $5,000, made January 24, 1921, was followed by regular monthly appropriations of like sums to be expended as proposed.

Following the meeting of the President's Conference, the Mayor of Hartford, who had before that been reluctant to appoint any emergency committee, gave official sanction and standing to the unemployment committee that had gradually and informally been formed under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce. This larger committee elected an executive committee, and the services of the secretary and staff of the Mayor's Americanization Committee were loaned to the organization for the duration of the emergency.

The work of this committee was centered entirely around employment service. Its executive received applications and assigned them to work carried on by means of the appropriation above mentioned, under the direction of city departments and with active encouragement by the Mayor. Five hours per day of work were given to each man accepted, at 35 cents per hour. The committee also developed odd job service and gave "work relief" at charitable institutions of the city from funds raised by entertainments and similar methods. Only residents of the city were given work, with preference for family heads with children. Verification of the statements of applicants was demanded but not insisted upon. The committee undertook also to act, in a sense, as employment agent for the private social agencies, but this arrangement was only indifferently successful.

In the work of the committee a certain lack of experience in employment service, an unfortunate involvement in the labor controversy, and an incompletely worked out system of co-operation with the social agencies proved somewhat retarding. Nevertheless, within existing limitations the work of the committee was deemed by local workers to have been distinctly worth the effort.

Kansas City, Mo. (Population 324,410 in 1920). Separated from Kansas City, Kan., by an artificial state boundary, Kansas City, Mo., is at one and the same time entirely separate and intimately interlocked with its sister city. As a conscious community, however, it stands apart.

Kansas City, Mo., is described as the gateway to the southwest and spoken of as a railroad center second only to Chicago. Through it pass eastward, wheat, beef, pork, and other food products in immense quantities; and westward, farm implements, machinery, money. It is the market place of the southwest and the wholesale trading center of an immense agricultural territory. Its life and activities depend upon the prosperity of that territory. Kansas City is also the labor market and distribution center of the army of harvest labor that passes from Texas to North

Dakota between June and August of every year. The headquarters of the Federal Employment Office, which attempts to guide this annual migration of harvest labor, is in Kansas City. It is a manufacturing center only to the extent that an urban population of 600,000 (Kansas City, Mo., and Kansas City, Kan., and the immediately adjacent territory) is bound to be. The prosperity of the city reflects the prosperity of the agricultural territory which it serves.

By reason of its peculiar nature the agricultural industry cannot collapse with such suddenness as the manufacturing industry. Even though the prices of farm products tumble as soon as a depression sets in, the farmer's purchasing power and his confidence are not so immediately affected. The manifestations of the depression in a city like Kansas City, catering almost entirely to agriculture both as buyer and as seller, did not, therefore, make themselves severely felt until the second year of its course. The unemployment emergency began to appear as a first year of distress in Kansas City during the winter of 1921–22.

By this time signs were unmistakable. Placements by employment bureaus fell perceptibly, migratory labor flocked to the Helping Hand Institute, the case load of family agencies mounted. The distress took no catastrophic dimensions, but to a community that had passed with little perturbance through a winter which had brought want into other communities it began to look serious. The fact that distress in Kansas City came as a secondary manifestation of the fall in purchasing power rather than as a direct result of industrial unemployment is shown in an interesting manner by the fact that the Jewish population, which in other cities is usually affected only when this second stage of the depression has been reached, had experienced the onset of deprivation at the same time as the general population. To the increasing unemployment in 1921–22 was added the strike of packing house workers, constituting the largest industrial unit in Kansas City, Kan., across the state line.

In the distribution and organization of social agencies in Kansas City there are several somewhat unusual peculiarities. The family welfare agency—called the Kansas City Provident Association—performs case work service for a number of other social agencies through its own staff. The Council of Social Agencies and its constituent agencies are financed from common funds raised annually by the Charities Bureau of the Chamber of Commerce. An agency included in the Council and devoted entirely to the homeless man, the Helping Hand Institute, serves a very large body of migratory labor which uses Kansas City as its base of operations.

The ethnic composition of the city's population presented two difficult points in the problem of relief—the Negro and the Mexican. Kansas City is largely southern in sentiment on the race question, though not fully southern in its social institutions relating to that question. There is, therefore, a less frank and clear-cut policy in the matter of the Negro. Thus, while the family agency took care of colored families, there was no provision—beyond a makeshift, improvised by the colored Young Men's Christian Association—for colored homeless men. Mexican families under the care of the family agency did not receive the same type of case work service as American white families. They are considered, and perhaps are, an entirely unassimilated unit in the population. The previous year a large number of them

were, with their own consent and at the joint expense of the Mexican government and the Kansas City Chamber of Commerce, repatriated into Mexico.

The only cognizance that Kansas City appears to have taken of the unemployment emergency was a special emergency fund of $25,000 included in the budget of the Council for 1921–22. Of this sum only $10,000 had been requested for expenditures due to the increase of the case load of social agencies, the request coming from the family agency. No unemployment committee or mayor's committee was formed. A meeting to discuss the advisability of such a move, the outcome of which was to determine in part the appointment of an unemployment committee by the Mayor, was held by the Chamber of Commerce in October. Not only had the depression as yet failed to reach Kansas City, but the temporary improvement experienced throughout the country in that month provided a plausible ground for deferring action. No further attempt followed that early meeting, and the Chamber of Commerce was content to permit that optimism to remain unclouded.

Memphis (Population 162,351 in 1920). Like Columbia and Kansas City, Mo., Memphis also is rather a trade and clearance center for an extensive agricultural territory than a manufacturing city. For the same reasons, therefore, unemployment struck it as a secondary feature of the depression, following the partial collapse of purchasing power and the reduced demands for the products of the territory which it serves. These products are chiefly cotton and lumber. The strategic position of Memphis is due in part at least to her location on the Mississippi. While distress followed more slowly upon the heels of deflation than in outright manufacturing cities, considerable unemployment showed itself in 1920–21, but was largely counterbalanced by an unusual building boom that followed the suspension of building during the war years. Building operations helped also to a considerable extent in reducing the rigors of unemployment in 1921–22.

The most trying feature of the relief problem here, as in Columbia, was the influx of colored farmers with their families, ruined by the collapse of cotton. As Memphis depends for its wealth upon a tri-state territory—Mississippi, Arkansas, and Tennessee—so it also drew these destitute families from three states.

The social agencies of Memphis are well organized and show considerable initiative. The Associated Charities, as the leading non-denominational agency, occupies, as in Columbia, office quarters supplied by the city free of rent. It draws some of its resources from municipal and county appropriations. In addition to these, though not paid with great regularity, certain receipts from Sunday performances in theaters are assigned to the Association as the only non-sectarian organization caring for both white and colored people. From these additional sources, unusual as compared with most such agencies, the Associated Charities expected to draw the necessary funds to carry the emergency relief burden of 1921–22. There was, at any rate, no apprehension as to finances.

Homeless men pass through Memphis mainly *en route* to the South and North in the fall and spring. Many are given lodging at the police station. The larger number, however, are probably cared for by the Salvation Army.

A council of social agencies has existed for a year or two, but has contributed little

as yet to the work or leadership of the social agencies. Its secretary, who is in the service of the Chamber of Commerce and theoretically privileged to give half of his time to council matters, has, in fact, been able to devote but little time to this work. The strength and cohesion of its social agencies assures, nevertheless, an active central council in the early future.

No distinct activity in Memphis during the unemployment period may rightly be termed an emergency measure. No unemployment committee was organized or contemplated by social agencies, central council, Chamber of Commerce, or Mayor. An inquiry into the status of employment had been shunted onto the shoulders of the Associated Charities, and, although an excellent questionnaire had been devised by its executive and distributed to some employers, it was not possible for that organization to follow it up in an adequate manner. The emergency did not prove extraordinarily severe, and the inherent strength and resources of the social agencies appear to have been able to cope with the outstanding needs.

Minneapolis (Population 380,582 in 1920). Minneapolis suffered heavily from the unemployment depression from its beginning in the autumn of 1920 and increasingly throughout its duration and especially during the winter of 1921–22. There is considerable manufacturing in the city, including food products, metal trades, and knitting. These felt the depression at the very beginning. As a market for the grain of an immense territory and a large trading center for the needs of its agricultural population, Minneapolis felt keenly and heavily the reduction of the purchasing power and the loss of confidence by the farmer. The merchandizing and clerical occupations, as well as farm implements, suffered as a consequence. Minneapolis is one of the largest labor markets of that section of the country. Construction work in cities or out, copper mining, lumber, ice-cutting, as well as wheat harvest in the northern section of the wheat belt, draw labor from Minneapolis. All these reasons contributed to an early incidence and heavy impact of unemployment. As one of the focal points of migratory labor, the city was certain to have serious difficulties in facing the relief problem of its homeless men.

Climatic conditions are also unfavorable. Winters are long and severe, the season for building and construction comparatively short. Shelter, fuel, clothing, demand a proportionately heavy share of family expenditures.

To compensate somewhat for these difficulties, the population includes a large ratio of frugal, thrifty Scandinavians, and the homeless element is largely a hard-working group, not habitually parasitic. Moreover, ice-cutting and lumber are seasonal trades coming in the winter and thus tending to supplement in part the seasonal work of the summer. A great many of the migratory workers who divide their efforts among the seasonal trades of construction, harvesting, lumber, and ice use Minneapolis as their headquarters and are to all intents and purposes, if not legally, residents of that city. They generally stay there for part of the winter between November and April, and most of them can under ordinary circumstances support themselves during their stay in the city from savings of their season's work and from odd jobs picked up in town.

From 1920 to 1922 their work opportunities on farms, in the woods, and at construction were meager. Their savings were deficient and odd jobs were not avail-

able. They gravitated in large numbers, therefore, to the city for shelter, aid, and the faint promise of work.

Relations between labor and capital in Minneapolis have long been tense. An infiltration of sympathy with Non-Partisan League activities increased the strain. This situation affected local politics, where the opposing forces are somewhat evenly divided. Thus, in 1921–22 the Mayor enjoyed the support of employers, while the city council held a majority of labor sympathizers. The local government, resting largely in the council, was inclined to favor measures for the relief of the unemployed and was opposed by the organized interests of employers. Minneapolis has, moreover, a powerful, militant anti-trade union organization which, under the title of Citizens' Alliance, has taken the lead in measures opposed to organized labor. The Citizens' Alliance took pains to minimize the unemployment situation, practically denying its existence. It interfered with the procuring of jobs planned in connection with the proposed registration of the unemployed, and opposed the principle of relieving the unemployed homeless in Minneapolis.

Reference has been made in the body of this book[1] to the effect of this controversial atmosphere on the general relief situation. The social agencies, well organized, competent themselves, and united in a central council, had to reckon with a cautious contributing body and a suspicious labor group.

Aside from these facts the social agencies present no special peculiarities. The Family Welfare Association occupies with competence its position of leading family welfare and social case work agency; the City Mission serves the homeless ably and with circumspection. All agencies in the financial federation suffered a 20 per cent cut in their budgets for the year 1921–22 because of the incomplete success of the Community Chest campaign. This shortage was ascribed largely to the financial depression. The Family Welfare Association was forced to arrange for the transfer of unemployment cases to the public department, and the homeless men also fell largely to the public exchequer. These points have been more fully covered in the text.

A Mayor's Committee on Unemployment was appointed in due course, following the request of the President's Conference, but, after a futile attempt to register the unemployed, it undertook no further activities. The Mayor in person co-operated with the State Labor Department in an abortive survey of unemployment conditions, and the City Council made successive appropriations for the homeless and for some emergency relief work: firemen organized a short-lived relief system; the Trade and Labor Council expended some three to four thousand dollars in the relief of destitute trade union members; but for the main part the regular social agencies, public and private, bore the brunt of the emergency relief added to normal demands for help.

One of the most characteristic features of the emergency work of Minneapolis has been the continuous and frequently acrid publicity that accompanied every move and countermove by agencies, city government, labor organization, or employers' representatives—publicity that often seemed to have no regard for the real interests of the unemployed or of the community.

[1] See p. 46 sq., and p. 180.

New Bedford (Population 121,217 in 1920). In the winter of 1921–22 New Bedford reported that over 90 per cent of the normal force of the cotton mills were at work. As this is almost the exclusive industry of the city, there may be said to have been little unemployment at the time and certainly no emergency. The preceding year, however, the first of the depression, had seen an almost complete temporary collapse of mill work and, consequently, almost universal unemployment among the wage-earners. Those who remained lived on savings, a little fishing, a few odd jobs, and public or private relief. Not a few are said to have left the town. By the following autumn, employment had returned to nearly normal, but the drain of the year had left many families bereft of savings, in debt, and otherwise below their normal ability for self-support. The need for relief continued, therefore, to be out of all proportion to the rate of employment. To this exhaustion must be added the mental strain of an impending reduction of wages which bided only the result of the general strikes in the mill towns of Rhode Island and New Hampshire, where wages had been reduced and the number of hours of work increased.

New Bedford had been a great whaling town in days gone by, but the character of its population now is shaped in large measure by the labor demands of thirty-odd cotton mills. The few retired farmers and small group of fishermen are comparatively a small minority. Two-thirds of the population consist of the foreign born and their children, against about one-third of native stock. The former are chiefly French, Portuguese, French-Canadian, English, Polish, and a sprinkling of others. These are chiefly operatives and their families, while the native born are owners, managers, salaried officials, and tradesmen. There is little in common between the two groups except the mills that sustain them all. It is difficult to speak of the community and include in that term the entire town.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the relation of employer and employe enters into and confuses other community relationships, that no community emergency measures could be adopted that were not in consonance with the interests of the mill managements, and that no unemployment committee was organized.

The burden of relief fell heavily on the shoulders of the Family Welfare Society, so that in addition to its usual division of the field with the public welfare department, it was forced to transfer to the latter such applicants as had previously been known to the department. The latter, in assuming that burden and many new cases due to unemployment, eventually doubled for the year 1920–21 its annual expenditure of over $200,000. Its case load and rate of expenditure decreased in the following year, but not so fast as the revival of employment. Between these two agencies was divided the major task of care of the unemployed during the emergency.

There was considerable effort expended on the part of the executive of the family agency to bring about the organization of an unemployment committee and to undertake emergency activities, including the establishment of a public employment bureau. The Council of Social Agencies, where lay the responsibility for pressing such a move, was not convinced, and, lacking any active support from contributors, board members, employers, or Chamber of Commerce, this proposal for the only

organized community response to the emergency failed of acceptance until after the winter of 1921–22 had passed.

New York, Borough of Manhattan (Population 2,284,103 in 1920). The size and complexity of New York City render it not only beyond reasonable comparison with other cities of the country but also render its consideration as a unit impracticable. There are five boroughs—coterminous with five counties—within its boundaries; many small communities have been absorbed by it, and numberless "neighborhoods" present individual needs. The family agencies of the boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens, and Richmond are distinct and separate units, as are indeed most of the other agencies there. In fact, few agencies other than city departments consider all of Greater New York as their field of activity. In view of the five to six million inhabitants of the city, this geographical division of the field of labor would seem reasonable. The private agencies and the field of activity considered in this study have been restricted to the borough of Manhattan.

It has been an exceedingly puzzling undertaking to determine the extent of distress in New York City. Indices were contradictory to a degree. The private social agencies visited that were doing relief work showed an increase in case load, indeed, but not to a degree to indicate great distress, and none of these had made any extraordinary effort to increase or had appreciably increased their funds available for relief work. The family agencies followed their usual policy and discouraged application by those of the unemployed whose affairs were found, after conference with them, to present no other complications. The Public Welfare Department gives no out-door relief other than that for certain veterans and their families, and the increase in the number of these carried in 1921–22 was inconsiderable. Emergency shelters had been established for the homeless, adding somewhat over 1,000 beds to the capacity of the municipal lodging house and capable of indefinite extension, but even the facilities thus made available were rarely utilized to the limit, while at least three large breadlines were operating in downtown New York during most of the winter and street begging had increased to an astounding degree. Employment agencies reported a practically dead labor market, and the surveys of the Merchants' Association estimated an average of more than three hundred thousand unemployed in Greater New York during the winter of 1921–22.

A tentative reconciliation of these and other indices would justify some such summary as the following: New York's livelihood depends on commerce, transportation, banking, and other clerical occupations as much if not more than on manufacture; its factory products, with the exception of the garment trades, are exceedingly varied and split up into a great many comparatively small concerns. Unemployment, therefore, came by degrees, and the increasing depression was variegated by numerous small localized revivals. No large industry suddenly threw great blocs of the population out of work. Nevertheless, unemployment increased and opportunities for work decreased. In numbers of unemployed, New York may have reached an extraordinary figure, without—for the reasons suggested—a corresponding degree of distress. Resources of the various kinds must have been both numerous and not easily exhausted. The exceedingly large proportion among the

wage-earners of those of Jewish stock, known for thrift and versatility, may also have helped to retard a catastrophic tide of distress.

Practically no emergency relief measures were undertaken in New York in 1921–22 aside from the establishment of supplementary emergency shelters under the Industrial Aid Bureau of the city, which lasted from November until April. The constructive plans for unified dealing with the homeless, by the organization of the Co-operative Bureau and later the Federation of Agencies for Homeless Men, are also attributable to the emergency. Social agencies, particularly the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, increased their work relief policies and facilities, but otherwise no striking deviations from the usual varied and well-developed procedures were instituted.

Three distinct and independent emergency activities were undertaken in New York City. These were conducted under the auspices of an emergency body, the Industrial Aid Bureau and its advisory committee, appointed by the Mayor early in the autumn of 1921. One of these was the unemployment survey made with the aid of the Merchants' Association at the request of the advisory committee; the other, the opening of the temporary shelters under the guidance of one of the subcommittees of the advisory committee and with the co-operation of the Salvation Army; the third was the opening of a large emergency employment bureau. These constitute the sum total of large emergency relief measures in the part of New York City here considered. The remainder of the work was borne by existing agencies.

Philadelphia (Population 1,823,779 in 1920). Owing to the fact that the social agencies of Philadelphia had just been united into a Welfare Federation for their joint financial support, that the Federation was making its first financial campaign in November, 1921, and that considerable difficulty had been encountered in the various phases of the new undertaking, it was decided not to include that city among the communities to be studied in this connection. The peculiar and interesting developments that took place, however, especially in the technical phases of emergency relief following a gift of $25,000 for the relief of the unemployed in January, 1922, made it advisable to make some inquiries in respect to the manner in which that fund was expended. This point and the relevant factors in the situation in Philadelphia have been treated in various chapters of this report and need not be repeated here. No survey of the general situation was attempted in that city.

It was patent, however, from even a brief contact with conditions in Philadelphia, that the extent of unemployment and of the distress resulting therefrom were very serious, and that neither public nor private agencies were prepared or able to meet all the demands made upon them. On the other hand, there appear to have been most earnest efforts made by the agencies severally and jointly to recognize the emergency by taking adequate action. Their failure appears to have been due to no lack of energy or intelligence.

Pittsburgh (Population 588,343 in 1920). The city of Pittsburgh has become almost synonymous with the steel industry. The importance of a few minor industries, such as glass and food products, is vanishingly small in comparison.

Pittsburgh itself is only the nucleus of a steel mill district extending as far as McKeesport and comprising a metropolitan area of nearly one and a quarter million inhabitants. Such trade, banking, and other interests as develop in the service of such a large population, together with the commercial aspects of the steel industry, make up that part of Pittsburgh that is not absolutely dependent on steel. The steel industry was, perhaps, the hardest hit of all major industries. The number of employes in the steel mills in and about Pittsburgh shrank from some 105,000 in plants reporting to the United States Employment Service in January, 1921, to about half that number in August of that year, and the January figure itself represented a considerable falling off from peak figures of the preceding June. Despite reluctance for technical reasons to permit furnaces to grow cold, many plants were entirely shut down, and the remaining ones were only partly in operation.

Unemployment in Pittsburgh in the winter of 1921–22 was exceedingly severe. Dependable figures were available to show it: consecutive reports in the United States Employment Service bulletins, local surveys early in the autumn of 1921, one of them by the Employers' Association, and figures of public and private employment bureaus agreed on the question. Yet hardly a trace of recognition of the fact came from the press or from the civic organizations of the city.

Local opinion had it that a tacit understanding between employers' interests and the press blocked any such publicity: first, in order to maintain general optimism; second, to maintain the labor supply in a dependent position, and, third, in order to prevent public knowledge of the mass of unaided unemployment attributable to the industries of the city. Certainly, surprisingly little attention was paid by the local press to the unemployment situation.

In Cleveland also there had been little publicity, as a result of deliberate plans to that effect by the social agencies. But in Pittsburgh the social agencies had not joined in a co-operative effort to deal with such problems as the unemployment emergency might present. There was little hearty co-operation among the socia agencies of the city. They were combined in two groups, the Co-operative Welfare Association and the Council of Social Agencies respectively, and were conducting two separate social service exchanges. These were at length united in a Federation of Social Agencies toward the latter part of the winter of 1922, but the union was entered guardedly by the various agencies, with agreements securing the position of each group in the new body. That no solid front was presented by the social agencies during the emergency is illustrated by the fact that, while one social agency in appealing for funds said that families in the city were suffering privations, another hastened to the press with a denial and the assertion that no family need be in distress, for its own resources were plentiful.

Some of the agencies were experiencing unprecedented calls upon their resources. Among them were the Red Cross chapter and the Associated Charities. The financial position of the former was safe; the latter was hard put to it to raise the funds and ferret out other resources for meeting its trebled burden of monthly expenditures. In the opinion of the most experienced case workers interviewed, distress was extensive and serious.

Characteristic of the general unpreparedness of the city was the treatment given

to homeless men. There is no municipal lodging house nor any strong agency devoted exclusively to their care. The Association for Improvement of the Poor conducts a workingmen's hotel, part of which is used for the shelter of indigent homeless, who pay for their shelter and food in the form of labor performed at the institution. A very large majority of the beds, even during the heaviest part of the winter's emergency, were occupied by paying guests, and Negroes were not admitted. Meanwhile the flood of homeless broke over the city and sought the police stations. By courtesy of the chief of police, a large space used as a police drill-room was assigned to the homeless, and by the generosity of a few individuals they were given coffee and bread. This place, where men slept on the bare floor, covering its entire surface, was referred to in the press with some satisfaction as the city's "lodging house." Here Negroes also were admitted. The limited facilities afforded by the local colored community had not been sufficient to house all the transient homeless Negroes.

Of distinct emergency measures there were none in Pittsburgh. Neither the public officials nor private agencies went through even the formality of organizing unemployment committees.

St. Paul (Population 234,698 in 1920). Geographically, St. Paul and Minneapolis are a continuous city. It is difficult to distinguish where the one ends and the other begins. The centers of the two cities are hardly eight miles apart. The population of St. Paul is less by about one hundred thousand than that of Minneapolis. Although the former is the capital city of the state and more generally a manufacturing community, it cedes to Minneapolis the leadership of the state in banking, in commerce, and as labor market. St. Paul is much less affected, on the other hand, by fluctuations in the lumber, mining, and grain industries, and by the vicissitudes of seasonal industries. It depends for its livelihood on a somewhat varied list of industries, among which meat packing, railroad shops, and publishing are probably the foremost. St. Paul was hard hit by the depression, but not so hard as its sister city of Minneapolis.

In the distribution of St. Paul's population, the German stock takes a place corresponding to that of the Scandinavian in Minneapolis. The foreign-born group centers largely around the packing industry, which, though situated in South St. Paul, a separate municipality, is to all intents and purposes part of industrial St. Paul.

Relations of capital and labor are only slightly less bitter than in Minneapolis. Trade unions are stronger, but their hold on the city government is less decisive. During the winter the packing house strike was added to that of the printers, the latter one of long standing. Within the two years preceding the winter of the present study a Citizens' Alliance had been formed along lines similar to those in Minneapolis and with tactics and purposes not very different. This organization was actively supporting the employers' side in the packing industry strike. There were criminal proceedings in progress in the winter of 1921–22 against a person identified with the Alliance, who, in an attempted assault on a labor leader, had confused identities and seriously injured a citizen entirely outside the controversy.

Feeling grew increasingly bitter, and this situation had some definite effects upon the emergency activities for the relief of unemployment in St. Paul.

There is a financial federation in St. Paul which was entering its second year in 1921. Its annual campaign for funds, conducted in the autumn of 1921, had failed of its goal by 20 per cent. Several reasons were given: one, the general depression; another, the imperfect organization of the federation machinery; still another, the boycott by organized labor. The last, in turn, was attributed to the fact that six of the twelve representative members of the board of directors of the federation were appointed by the St. Paul Association—the local name for the organization corresponding to a chamber of commerce—which had given its moral support to and largely included the membership of the Citizens' Alliance already mentioned. At any rate, the campaign fell short of the goal, and the goal had been estimated with an optimistic disregard of the impending emergency. As a result, social agencies were in sore straits for relief funds during the winter, and the most important ones were continually facing the possibility of suspending activities in the midst of the winter's distress. Supplementary campaigns were undertaken too late and failed of success. Eventually loans were negotiated, at least for the United Charities, against the funds of the 1922 campaign.

The only modification of the usual division of functions among the social agencies of the city may be found in the combination of some of the children's work with the case work conducted by the family agency, the United Charities. St. Paul has a large Catholic population, and family work is also undertaken by the Catholic charities, which are growing in strength and equipment. For the care of the homeless men the Salvation Army conducts a shelter, and the Good Will Industries carry on a modest lodging arrangement in connection with their industrial plant. Mission flops are available, and the police station has been used as a shelter by transients. Most of the homeless men of the district, however, gravitate to Minneapolis. There is no central council of social agencies, and conferences are arranged and co-operative plans devised through the medium of the initiative of the several social agencies, among which the United Charities has occupied a leading position.

With respect to financial resources, the private agencies were not prepared to meet an increased case load of family work. Homeless men were not provided for until an appropriation by the federation, in January, 1922, enabled the Salvation Army temporarily to enlarge its bed capacity. The public welfare department had taken no special measures. An emergency appropriation of $100,000 made by the city for relief work was vetoed by the city comptroller, who ruled that no emergency existed. No unemployment committee existed, official or unofficial. The first impulse for emergency action came from the local American Legion posts, which through their county organization had undertaken relief and employment service for veterans. Under pressure from this organization, the Greater St. Paul Committee of the St. Paul Association met and organized an unemployment committee and instituted the activities elsewhere described in this report.

Sioux Falls, S. D. (Population 25,202 in 1920). Sioux Falls is the metropolis, and the political, commercial, banking, and manufacturing center of South Dakota.

The manufacturing aspect is largely confined to a packing firm employing some 700 to 900 employes and to a few biscuit factories. The packing house was not affected by the almost nation-wide strike of packing house workers and consequently increased rather than decreased its employes during the winter. Not being truly a manufacturing center, the city was not seriously affected at the beginning of the depression. But as the city is virtually a trading center for an extensive agricultural territory, it felt keenly the lowered purchasing power of the farmer, and so by the fall of 1921 there was considerable unemployment and some suffering among the population. Sioux Falls is in the heart of the grain belt and on several railroad lines, thus attracting a considerable amount of migratory labor which rarely stays, however, for any long period of time.

Increasing unemployment in the city, due largely to the serious reduction of purchases by farmers, was observed by local agencies and confirmed in an employment survey undertaken early in the autumn jointly by the Chamber of Commerce and the Family Welfare Association. Some relief had come with a few construction jobs, some repair work had been necessitated by a severe storm in the summer, and relief was expected from the ice harvest early in the winter. In December, 1921, it was still impossible to predict whether the family agency and the out-door relief functions exercised by the county commissioners would meet with merely a very severe winter relief problem or an emergency problem of wide distress. Ice-cutting, continuous operation of the packing house, comparatively an open winter, and a hardy and thrifty population (including a considerable quota of Scandinavians) tilted the balance in favor of the former.

The leading family welfare agency, entering upon its third year of existence, was in fair financial position to meet the winter. The acute relations between the Chamber of Commerce, which had endorsed a militant open shop campaign a year earlier, and the trade unions, which were fighting a desperate battle for life, had been smoothed over by the suspension of the campaign. Comparatively amicable relations had followed, and the family agency enjoyed the support of both. There were no serious problems of community psychology to complicate the relief problem.

Of distinctly emergency measures there was none. Increased appropriations for public works such as streets, water supply, and sewerage had been made, and the work was distributed with some regard to unemployment by the substitution of hand labor for machine digging and alternation of shifts. No unemployment committees had been appointed nor had the need for any been felt.

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